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PREFACE

For many centuries Africa has never experienced

proved elusive

in pre-colonial

lasting peace.

Peace and

and colonial Africa. The scourge of slave

stability

trade, intertribal

warfare and imposition of colonialism could never have allowed peace and stability a foothold
in Africa.

stability

One would have expected emancipation and independence

and

relative peace. Instead, post-colonial Africa has

to usher in an era of

experienced conflicts of a scale

and magnitude unwitnessed before. Pre-colonial Africa may have been

volatile; but the

rudimentary nature of the weapons obtaining then and the unsophisticated organizational
structure of the societies, rendered conflicts
catastrophic.

The emergence of an

more

artificially

contradictions, sophisticated state apparatus and

made

upsetting and indeed adventurous than

constructed modern state with internal

weaponry, coupled with external forces has

Africa one of the most unstable regions in the world, and peace prospects a daunting

task.

Conflict

and

civil

wars have of course not been a preserve of the African continent.

Two world wars marked a dark period in the Northern hemisphere.
itself

when

the iron curtain collapsed.

communist hegemony

in eastern

With the end of

and central Europe,

states

the cold

History seemed to repeat

war and the collapse of

were plunged into

tribal

and ethnic

conflagration hitherto prevented by communist socio-political order. Ethno-nationalism seems
to have re-emerged in the western

Africa

was

Hemisphere as

well.

also not spared the adverse repercussions of the

super-power sponsored
to the balance of

conflicts during the cold

power

end of the cold war. While

war were low-key

in the region, post-cold

war

conflicts

(albeit protracted)

due

have been marked by

VI

unparalleled rapidity and devastating consequences.

dwindling of Africa's geopolitical importance
allies in

the non-aligned

The

situation has

in the post-cold

movement and former

socialist bloc

war

been worsened by the

era. Africa's traditional

have recapitulated due to post

cold war economic hardships. The result has been a general lack of concern with what

happens

in Africa.

While the United States and

NATO

are prepared to intervene in Haiti to

restore a democratic regime and in the former Yugoslavia to end 'ethnic cleansing',

no one

respectively,

After

all,

no

strategic

is

ready to intervene to avert a bloodbath

the Breton

war era punctuated by forces of economic

Woods

institutions in the

economy _

or Sierra Leone.

The

short and long of this

liberalization

and dominance of

_

placing her at the fringes of the

but also wrought insecurity in their wake.

This post-cold war "new order" only serves to emphasize the need for the
reinvent itself to cope with these

and other challenges facing the
in conflict resolution,

and

new

challenges. This thesis

OAU, make

offer suggestions

refashion itself to face up to the old and
lasting

peace

this

Addis Ababa

on how the

new

to

an attempt to unmask these

a postmortem of the performance of the

OAU

OAU can critically re-evaluate and

challenges that threaten the efforts to create

is

no

telling that the

has to do with
in

May

its

OAU past record in conflict resolution is not outstanding.

history and constitution.

The

fruition.

signing of the

OAU Charter at

1963 was greeted with optimism and high expectations. Aspirations of

continental unity in a continent hitherto divided by the

reached

is

OAU

in Africa.

There
Perhaps

is

economic management of the developing countries, have

not only accelerated the economic marginalization of Africa
global

Rwanda

western interests are harmed there, and in any case the United Nations

Charter Prohibits intervention in internal affairs of other states!
that the post cold

in

The

phenomenon of colonialism had

polarizing differences experienced in the preceding preparatory

conferences pitting the radical Casablanca group against the conservative Monrovia

camp had

vu
been bridged, and the biggest regional organization

was not

in the

world was born. The

just an expression of continental efforts to achieve unity;

it

OAU however

was by and

culmination and a concrete expression of the aspirations of the pan- African

large, a

movement

dating

back to the beginning of the 20th century.

Dismay and disillusionment soon, however, replaced
dried on the Charter before the continent

was plagued by

this

optimism. The ink had not

a plethora of conflicts, civil wars

and a myriad of other problems. The celebrated organization

many had hoped would

that

consolidate continental security and nurture peace and stability had failed to deliver the goods.

Indeed

civil

wars, inter-state conflicts and their concomitant humanitarian crises

of socio-economic

life

and massive

loss of lives

_

disruption

and property _ have bedeviled the African

continent since independence, threatening to tear the

it

apart.

What went wrong?

A big debate has been raging on what went wrong. Many writers have attributed the
problems of inter-state and

intra-state conflicts to the colonial

the nature of the colonial state that

dismal performance of the
Charter,

its

OAU,

was

artificial

borders, and

inherited after independence. Others have

its inability

to resolve conflicts, to

normative structure, they argue, has

ineffectiveness

legacy of

an

inbuilt

its

charter.

blamed the

The

OAU

tendency to encourage

and ineptitude. The conservative application of the concept of non-

interference with internal affairs of states, and sanctity of borders, has completely rendered
the

OAU ineffective.
Be

that as

it

may, any objective view of the role the

OAU

has played in resolving

regional conflicts must take the aforementioned historical and ideological context, and internal
as well as external forces as the point of departure. That

appreciate the role played by
situations in Africa.

way one

is

able to discern

and

OAU given the complexities and intricacies obtaining in conflict

VUl

By examining

the role played by

OAU

in regional conflict resolution

settlement, the present writer hopes to contribute to this debate.

in a nutshell, the origins, purposes, principles

charter.

The OAU's mechanisms of dispute

resolution activities

is

undertaken

and

institutions

The introduction examines,

of the

OAU as envisioned in its

resolution as well as case studies of

in chapter one.

Chapter two examines the

interaction in African conflict resolution. In particular, the delimitation of

exercise of concurrent jurisdiction between the United Nations and the

The Problems and prospects of utilizing United Nations organs
is

and dispute

its

conflict

OAU-UN

competencies and

OAU is discussed.

in resolving African conflicts

also discussed in this chapter. Chapter three discusses legal and other impediments to

effective conflict resolution in Africa. Chapter four examines the need to create a regional
self-defense

and intervention force as well as sub-regional conflict resolution mechanisms. The

conclusion summarizes the arguments in the rest of the

thesis.

Vlll

settlement, the present writer hopes to contribute to this debate.

in

The introduction examines,

a nutshell, the origins, purposes, principles and institutions of the

charter.

The OAU's mechanisms of dispute

resolution activities

is

undertaken

OAU as envisioned in its

resolution as well as case studies of

in chapter one.

Chapter two examines the

its

conflict

OAU-UN

interaction in African conflict resolution. In particular, the delimitation of competencies

exercise of concurrent jurisdiction between the United Nations and the

The Problems and prospects of utilizing United Nations organs
is

and

OAU is discussed.

in resolving African conflicts

also discussed in this chapter. Chapter three discusses legal and other impediments to

effective conflict resolution in Africa. Chapter four examines the need to create a regional
self-defense

and intervention force

as well as sub-regional conflict resolution

conclusion summarizes the arguments

in the rest

of the

thesis.

mechanisms. The
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INTRODUCTION

A purely contemporary view of any problem is necessarily a limited and even
distorted view. Every situation has
into the present; the present

A.

The Origins

of the

is

its

roots in the past ... the past survives

indeed the past undergoing modifications.

1

OAU

Cultural and spiritual affinity

among

the black people

is

an age-old phenomenon
2

exhibited in the poetry and music of African people the world over. But

it is

not until the

nineteenth century that this affinity evolved into fraternal solidarity, and eventually a
formidable

movement

in the

common struggle

against racial discrimination.

present-day symbol and embodiment of the ideals of
formative stages the pan- African

movement was

led

this

3

The

OAU is the

pan-African movement.

by black north American

4

In

intellectuals.

'Quoted from Celestine O. Bassey, Retrospects and Prospects of Political Stability

in

Nigeria, 32 AFR. STUD. REV.97 (1989).
2

Wideman writes that "... rhythm, blues and rock 'n' roll are rooted in traditional
African music." JOHN EDGAR WIDEMAN, BROTHERS AND KEEPERS 197 (1984); See also Lawrence
W. Levine, African Culture and Slavery in the United States in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF AFRICAN
Prof.

Diaspora 103 (Joseph E.

Harris ed., 1982).

3

Elenga M'buytnga, Pan-Africanism or Neocolonialism 34-42

4

See P. Olisanwuche Esedebe, pan- Africanism:

5

The man

(1979).

The Idea and Movement (1982).

Movement", Henry
was a West Indian Lawyer who was then practising Law in London.
See Owen Charles Mathurtn, Henry Silvester Williams and the Origins of the
Pan- African Movement (1976).
credited with coining the term "Pan- African

Silvester Williams,

1

its

5

2

Among

the most notable ones

was W.E.B. Dubois

approach and philosophy differed.

6

7

and Marcus Gurney, although

their

A series of pan- African conferences, starting with the

1900

Manchester conference, were organized

in

which goals for the advancement of black people

generally and the protection of native Africans from white settlers were formulated. 8

After the

World War n, pan- Africanism took

a continental dimension

becoming a

9

potent force in the struggle for independence from colonialism in Africa. African intellectuals
like

Kwame Nkrumah,

Leopold Senghor, Jomo Kenyatta and Sekou Toure, commencing with

the 1945 Manchester conference, took a center-stage in the

were organized

in the African soil at the

rearticulated the vision

movement. 10 Several conferences

the beginning of the twentieth century which

and reformulated the goals of the Pan- African movement. 11 Thus the

movement was transformed from a

sentimentalized

forum

for racial solidarity to a

movement

for self-determination of the African people geared towards the eradication of colonialism

the promotion African nationalism.

movement have been
1.

12

In

its

continental phase

and

four distinct goals of the

identified as:

complete independence for the entire continent;

2. development

of fraternal alliance of Africans based on a loyalty which

would transcend

all tribal

and

territorial affiliations;

3. Creation of a united Africa based on a federation of sub-regional groups within
which there would be a limitation of national sovereignty; and
13
4.non-intervention by Africans as partisans in international power politics.

6

See generally w.E.B. DU BOIS (David Lewis ed., 1995); Kwado 0. Pobi-Asanani, W.E.B.
Dubois, his Contributions to the Pan- African Movement (Daryl F. Mallet ed., 1994).
7

8

See Jon Henrk Clark, Marcus Gurvey and the Vision of Africa (1974).

Ronald w. Walters, pan-Africanism in the African Diaspora 205 (1993).

9

ld.

10

1

•Gordon Harris, the Organization of African Unity k (1994).

12

1

jon woronoff, organization of african unity 23 (1970).

Woronoff ju/?ranotel0,

Walters supra note

8, at

at 28-56.

206.

3
All the conferences that took place in Africa in one

was consensus

that regional cooperation

way

or another echoed these goals. There

and unity was crucial

if

the vast resources of the

continent were to be utilized for the prosperity of the continent and

The road

to continental unity

Independent African

states

15

people.

14

was however marked with confounding

emerged from colonialism

The main post-independent groups

obstacles.

to find themselves balkanized into

regional and ideological groups that were, ironically, the

conferences.

its

that

fruits

of the pan-African

preceded the

OAU

were: the

Casablanca Group composed of Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, United Arab Republic and
the Algerian Provisional
for East, Central

and Southern Africa

Liberia, Ivory Coast,

Upper

Government formed

in

January 1961:

16

The Pan African Movement

(PAFMESCSA); 17 The Monrovia Group composed

of

Cameroon, Senegal, Malagasy Republic, Togo, Dahomey, Chad, Niger,

Volta, Peoples Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, Gabon, Ethiopia and

Libya, formed

between

in

May, 1961

18
;

and the Brazzaville Group composed of Cameroon,

Central African Republic, Madagascar, Peoples' Republic of the Congo, Ivory Coast,

Dahomey, Gabon, Mauritania, Upper Volta, Niger, Senegal, and Chad formed
I960.

in

December,

19

"Id.
15

Esedebe supra note

4, at

161-162.

16

See The African Charter of Casablanca in louis
Regional Organizations 42-43 (1971).
17

b.

Sohn, Basic Documents of African

See Richard Cox, Pan-Africanism in Practice:: an East African Study

18

See Decisions of the Monrovia and Lagos Conferences

19

Woronoff supra note

10, at 96.

in

Sohn supra note

1 1

(1964).

16, at 53-54.

4

The preparatory meetings preceding
was

leaders that

two main

the

May

to adopt a charter for continental unity

The

ideological camps.

1963 Addis Ababa summit of African

saw the African

radical Casablanca

group of

states balkanized into

states favored a continental

union government while the Conservative Monrovia group desired a loose continental body
of independent states.
the

20

The Addis Ababa conference had

gap between these groups opposed

be argued

later,

emerged

to each other.

compromise document

as a

to find a

The

that

middle ground to bridge

OAU Charter therefore, as shall

had

lost its cutting edge.

21

Instead

of serving as blueprint for continental political unification as intended by the "progressive"
forces

_

to appease the conservative leaders

compromise

that

argued that

if

is

at the heart

borders prevents the

The
created.

non-intervention in internal affairs of

from scrutiny and resolution by the

OAU,

member

OAU

was born
rule.

their sovereignty

approach

22

It is

states

sanctification of national

OAU from going to the bottom of the problem of border conflicts.

emerging from colonial

common

It is this

OAU however cannot be divorced from the historical seetting within which

The

safeguard

the Charter supported the status quo.

OAU conflict resolution and management crisis.

norm of

the Charter's

insulates internal conflicts

of the

_

OAU

was

at

an epoch-making period when the African states were

It

was

24

natural that these newly independent states seek to

from any future subjugation while

in the strruggle against the

and objectives of the

it

23

embody

at the

same time adopting a

remaining vestiges of colonialism.

25

The aims

these African concerns of the time and (as one will

observe) are not radically different from those of its predecessor_ the pan- African movement.

^See
21

22

infra note

391

See infra note 393.

See infra note 394.

"See

infra note 410.

^See

infra note 400.

"JUL

& 392.

.

5
It is

movement

also important to reiterate that the continental phase of the pan- African

and the struggle against colonialism was dominated by leaders of the pro-independence
nationalist

movements. 26

It is

these leaders propelled into the leadership of their respective

by the granting of indepence,

states

domination of the
accidental.

that

converged

institutional structure of the

OAU

by these leaders

is

OAU. The

therefore not

27

The preamble of the

OAU Charter opens with the following words:

of African states and governments assembled in the
7*

present charter".
state

Adis Ababa to form the

at

of Addis Ababa, have agreed

formation and evolution of the

in the

preamble of the United Nations Charter which

starts

emphasizing the centrality of the people

United Nations,

at

least

in

theory.

OAU. 29

Contrast

with the words

United Nations"

The success

in the

"We

with the

this

the peoples of the

aims and objectives of the

or failure of the

OAU

is

therefore

consequently intertwined with the weaknesses or strengths of the African heads of

indictment on the

OAU

is

to the greatest extent an indictment

leadership. Indeed the heads of state and

OAU

-

the "Assembly of

The

See generally

Woronoff supra note
27

28

is

is

to a large extent determined

therefore important to examine the

See The

(1965);

at 364.

16, at 63.

The Preamble,

by

1 1

^See Boutros-Ghali
3<

the African states'

Hans Kohn, African Nationalism in the Twentieth Century,

10, at

an

31

Charter of the Organization of African unity (hereinafter The

Sohn supra note

31

architectural foundation. It

See Boutros-Gali infra note 86,

The

in

Heads of State And Governments".

its

on

state:

governments constitute the supreme organ of the

efficacy and effectiveness of an organization

the nature of its Charter;

26

to the

This underscores the predominant and exclusionist role the African heads

have played

30

city

"We, the heads

infra note 86, at 370.

U. N. Charter.

OAU Charter Art. Vm

OAU Charter) reprinted

6
basic tenets of the

OAU Charter to be able to appreciate how this impacts on its capacity to

resolve conflicts.

and Principles of the

B. Purposes

Article

of the

OAU,

I

of the

Charter delimits the geographical frontiers of the membership

which include the continental African

surrounding Africa.
to differentiate

One can

OAU

OAU

it

32

It

was important

states,

to clarify the geographical limits of the

to

b. to

in scope.

a shift in the pan- African

a universal out-look to a regional world- view.

The purposes and
a.

OAU,

islands

OAU in order

with the mainstream pan- African movement which was diasporic

therefore discern, with the formation of the

movement from

Madagascar and other

objectives of the

promote the unity and

OAU,

enumerated

in Article II are:

solidarity of the African states;

co-ordinate and intensify their co-operation and efforts to achieve a better

life

for the peoples of Africa;

to defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity

c.

d. to eradicate all

e. to

promote

and independence;

forms of colonialism from Africa; and

international co-operation, having

due regard to the Charter of the

United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

To
harmonize

the above ends Article

II calls

upon

the

member

their general policies. Priority areas identified for

include: political

health, sanitation

(OAU), had

earlier

on been included

now embodied

in the Charter of the

and nutritional

in the

name of

Monrovia Group. See the

Charter of the Inter- African and Malagasy Organization reprinted in Sohn supra note 16, at 55.
33

and

harmonization and co-ordination

This was to appease Madagascar (Malagasy), whose name,

the organization

states to co-ordinate

and diplomatic cooperation; economic cooperation, including transport and

communication; educational and cultural co-operation;

32

33

OAU Charter Art. 11(1).

7
cooperation; scientific and technical co-operation; and cooperation for defense and security. 34
Clearly, the areas requiring harmonization through

all

facets of socio-economic

purposes of the

The

and

political life

common efforts

of the

member

OAU echo those of its progenitor,

principles and

norms

that the

aimed

their teleological

OAU member

principle

1

35

It is

may be

and encompass

also evident that the

movement.

states are

pledged themselves to

classified into three categories

and philosophical underpinnings.

safeguarding the sovereignty and

at

states.

the pan- African

observe scrupulously are enumerated in Article IV, and

depending on

are diverse

36

territorial integrity

Category one are principles

of member

which recognizes the sovereign equality of all the member

states.

These

states; principle

are:

2 which

prohibits interference in the internal affairs of states; and principle 3 which underlines the

member

states

and

inalienable right to independent existence.

its

pledge to pay respect to the sovereignty and
37

territorial integrity

Principle

of each state

4 which immortalizes the

principle of peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation or
arbitration,

may

also

fall in this

category since

it is

peacefully before they escalate into conflicts that
integrity of

member

34

The

35

states.

may

threaten sovereignty and territorial

38

OAU Charter Art. H (2).

The extent which

these highly ambitious objectives have been achieved

determine.
36

The

OAU Charter Art. m.

37

The

OAU Charter Art. IE.

The OAU

38

a principle aimed at settling disputes

Charter Art.

m.

is difficult

to

8

Category 2 principles are aimed
under the yoke of colonialism

To

this

at

decolonization and emancipation of territories

end the member

to the total emancipation of the African territories

Principle 7 stands in a category of

its

member

states.

member

The

policy of non-alignment

and the superpower

states

backdrop of the

intensity

it

40

interprets

may be put

it.

the provision

in

in theory, the

category one or

_ seen

as a

This thesis

member

states strongly

is

The OAU

own depending on how

as well as subversive activities

a curious one.

_
It

may been viewed

on

political institutions

perfectly falls in category one.

member

as a

However

measure to protect

states.

concerned with dispute resolution. These principles

and sovereignty of member

states. Suffice

it

states

of the

Charter Art.

m

OAU Charter Art. m.

OAU to resolve conflict

and non-interference

here to say that there

(6).

will therefore be

one dealing with protection of

is

in the internal

an inherent tension between the

desire to create a strong and effective organization but at the

The

between the

understandable seen in the

a category of its

detail later in so far as they affect the capacity

of member

40

non-

personalities occupying the highest offices in the land other than a

is

territorial integrity

39

member

question whether in practice they

settle disputes. In particular principles in category

affairs

is

measure to protect the national

safeguard to the political institutions in the

more

in

extraterritorial forces

on assassination

and perpetuate the

and

the basis to govern the relations

Condemnation of political assassination

from being undermined by

in

39

states foreign policy relations with

of the cold war then. However, despite the

the part of neighboring states

examine

dependent".

a different matter.

is

Principle 5

one

is

still

represents an attempt by the

blocs. This principle

professed adherence to no-nonalignment
followed

It

member

states to create ideological uniformity in the

states affirm their "absolute dedication

which are

own.

still

same time jealously guarding

9

member

the sovereignty of the
ineffectiveness of the

states.

is

it

this

tension that

is

at the heart

of the

OAU as a regional arbiter, and stabilizer.

C. Principal Institutions of the

The

And

task here

is

to

OAU

mention the main organs of the

OAU

so as to have a holistic

appreciation of the organization before dealing with the niceties of conflict resolution. 41 In
a nutshell, the

OAU Charter creates four "principal institutions" to carry out its

mandate.

These are the Assembly of Heads of State and Governments; the Council of Ministers; the
General Secretariat, and the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation, and Arbitration. 42

1.

The Assembly of Heads of States and Governments
The Assembly of Heads of

States and

Governments

general supervisory role over the other organs of the

OAU. 43

It

is

the supreme organ with a

has powers to discuss matters

of concern to Africa with a view to co-coordinating and harmonizing the general policy of the
organization. Additionally,

it

may review

organs and specialized agencies.

The Assembly
representatives.

is

the structure, functions and acts of

the other

44

composed of heads of

The Charter

all

state

and government or

establishes an annual general meeting for the

extra-ordinary session at the request of any

member

state

their accredited

Assembly and an

on approval by a two-thirds

For a detailed analysis of the OAU Institutions See James S. Bowen, Power and Authority
in the African Context: Why Somalia Did not Starve _ The Organization of African Unity (OAU)
as an Example of the Constitutive Process, 14 Na'L BLACK L. J. 92, 101-107 (1992).
4l

42

OAU Charter Art. VTL

43

OAU Charter Art. VIIL

44

OAU Charter Art. VUL

10
majority.

45

The Assembly of heads of

interpreting the Charter.

2.

The Council

states

is

also entrusted with the judicial function of

46

of Ministers

The Council of Ministers

consist of foreign or such other ministers as designated by

the governments of member states.

47

The

role of the Council

is

to prepare conferences of the

Assembly, implement the decisions of the Assembly, and coordinate
in

accordance with the instructions of the Assembly.

3.

General Secretariat

An

50

entrenched

49

One

or

in the Charter.

reflect

45

48

more

Assistant Secretaries General shall also be appointed by the

The independence of the Secretary General and

from any other authority
might

cooperation

administrative Secretary-General, appointed by the Assembly, directs the affairs

of the Secretariat.

Assembly.

inter- African

on

The Secretary General and other

other staff of the Secretariat

staff shall not receive instructions

external to the organization and shall refrain from actions which

their positions as international officials responsible

only to the organization.

OAU Charter Art. IX.

"^See

The

OAU Charter Art. XXVI which posits that questions of interpretation of the

Charter shall be determined by a vote of two-thirds of the Assembly of Heads of State and

Government.
47

48

OAU Charter Art. XH.
Evidently, the role of the Council of Ministers

of State and Government. Indeed, Article

XDI

states that

is

adjunct to that of the Assembly of Heads

"The Council of Ministers

responsible to the Assembly of Heads of State and Government."
49

OAU Charter Art XVI.

^OAU Charter Art XVII.
51

is

OAU Charter Art XVm.

shall

be

51

11

The member

states undertake to respect the exclusive character

of the Secretary-General and

other staff and not to seek to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities.

The Commission of Mediation,
next chapter. At this point
in the

the

it

is

Arbitration and Conciliation will be discussed in the

important as a concluding note to mention the voting process

OAU. For both the Assembly and the Council,

quorum.

53

52

two-thirds of the total membership form

Procedural and substantive matters in both the Assembly of Heads of state and

government and the Council of Ministers are determined by a simple and a two-thirds majority
of the total membership of the organization, respectively. This
in that

53

See

OAU Charter Art. X & XTV.
paralysis of the

Assembly took place when Morocco and

summit meeting prompted by the

Republic

54

OAU Charter Art. XVm.

^Such

OAU

a very significant threshold

one can envision the organs being paralyzed by lack of quorum.

52

a

is

official recognition

(SADR) by the OAU. See Naldi

infra note 148.

its

sympathizers boycotted

of the Sahara Arab Democratic

CHAPTER I
REGIONAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AND PEACE

MAKING WITHIN THE OAU CONTEXT

Mechanisms

A.

for Peaceful Settlement of Disputes in the

OAU Charter

That a Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration was established under
the

OAU

Charter as one of the principal institutions of the organization, and a detailed

protocol elaborating on

its

composition, procedure and function, underlines the seriousness

with which the founders of the organization of African Unity valued dispute resolution by
peaceful means.

55

Indeed Article

XIX establishing

the commission, echo the prohibition of

the threat or use of force (in international relations) in the United Nations charter.

1.

The Commission

56

of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration

The protocol on

the

Commission forms an

integral part of the

OAU Charter. 57 The

protocol consists of six parts and provides in elaborate detail the modes, procedure and types

of dispute to be submitted for settlement.

58

Part one of the protocol deals with the establishment and organization of the

Commission. The Commission consists of twenty-one members elected by the Assembly from

55

The

OAU Charter Art. XIX.

56

U. N. Charter Art. 2

57

The

(4).

OAU Charter Art. XIX.

^See The Protocol of the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and
(Hereinafter The Protocol) reproduced in Sohn supra note 16, at 69-76.
12

Arbitration

13
a

list

prepared by the Secretary General consisting of names of persons of recognized

professional qualifications nominated by the
to nominate

state.

member

states.

59

Each member

two candidates and no two members of the Commission

state

will hail

is

entitled

from the same

60

Members of the Commission hold
reelection.

Upon

expiry of their term

office for a

term of five years, and are

members of the Commission remain

eligible for

in office until the

election of a

new Commission. The members

proceedings

which they are already engaged the expiry of their term notwithstanding. 61

The

in

tenure of office of the

of the Commission shall complete any

member of the Commission

is

secured by Article IV. They

be removed from office except by decision of the Assembly of heads of

shall not

state,

by a

two-thirds majority of the total membership on the grounds of inability to perform the
functions of their office.

The Commission

Assembly from among
eligibility for reelection.

full

62

shall

be headed by a president and two vice-presidents elected by the

members of

the

The

the

Part

two of

59

The

jurisdiction of the

The Protocol

Art.

II.

°The Protocol

Art.

H

The Protocol

Art.

m.

The Protocol

Art. P7.

6

62

63

the rest of the

Commission and

Commissioners

shall

shall

be

be part time.

63

the protocol entitled "general provisions," sets out the procedure for

dealing with disputes.

61

for a period of five years without

three shall constitute the bureau of the

members of the Commission while

time

Commission

The Protocol

Art.

VL

Commission

is

restricted to disputes

between

14

assumed

states. It is

them and member

even nonmember

that

states to the

states

Commission

may

submit disputes interse or between

for adjudication.

64

A dispute may be referred to the Commission jointly by the parties concerned,
party to the dispute, by the Council of Ministers, or by the Assembly.

65

Where

by a

a dispute has

been referred to the Commission and one or more parties have refused to submit to the
jurisdiction of the

for consideration.

assumed

Commission, the Bureau
66
It is

resolution

if

conciliation

and

arbitration.

is

mediation.

makes a recommendation by means of

Assembly

XIX establishes

way one knows them
formal

to the

passed by the Assembly

Article

The

is

for approval.

three alternative
three

modes do not
69

rightly

a resolution

doubtful however, whether the

It is

68

differ in

Among

any significant manner from the

the three modes, the simplest and least

the parties agree to mediation the president of the

Once appointed

it is

modes of settlement of dispute: mediation,

obligated, with the consent of the parties, to appoint
70

67

legally enforceable.

in international law.

Once

to mediate the dispute.

matter to the council of ministers

not clear what happens after referral to the council but

that the Council of Ministers

which may be submitted

shall refer the

Commission

one or more members of the Commission

the mediator shall endeavor to reconcile the views

^See The Protocol Art. XI; T. O. ELIAS, AFRICA AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF
International Law 170 (Richard Akinjinde ed., 1988).
65

The Protocol

66

67

The Protocol

See the

Art. XHI.

Art. XHI.

OAU Charter Art. XIII; INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES: THE LEGAL ASPECTS 77-159

Sir Francis Vallat ed., 1972).
68

The

institutions

^See
Resolution, 7

from

Charter does not create any mechanism for enforcement of the decisions of the

of the

OAU.

& Romana Sadurska, The Anatomy of International Dispute
ON DlSP.RESOL.39 (1991); Dayle Spencer & Honggang Yang, Lessons

Christine rhinlcin

OHIO ST.

J.

the Field of Intra-national Conflict Resolution, 67
70

The Protocol

Art.

XX

is

NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1495

(1992).

(

15

of the parties and shall make written proposals to the parties as expeditiously as possible. The

means

the mediator proposes,

arrangement between the

IV

Part

if

parties.

accepted by the parties form the basis of a protocol of

71

elaborate the procedure of reconciliation.

A request for conciliation is formally

submitted to the Commission by means of a petition addressed to the president by one or

more of the

parties to the dispute. In the later case the petitioner

must show

that prior written

notice has been transmitted to the other party. The petition shall include a
explanation of the grounds of the dispute.

72

The

president of the

Commssion

shall then set a

board of conciliators, consisting of three persons appointed by the president from

Commission and one appointee of each

members of

the

Commission chairman of

exercised to ensure none of the

The duty of the board

The

party.

be to

among

the

president shall designate one of the

the board. In the nominations, care shall be

members of the board

shall

summary

are nationals of the

clarify the issues in

same

73

state.

contention and endeavor to bring

agreement between the parties upon mutually acceptable terms. The board has jurisdiction to
consider

all

questions submitted to

it

and may undertake any inquiry or hear any person

capable of giving any relevant information concerning the dispute. With the consent of the
parties the

board

The

shall

parties

determine

its

own procedure. 74

have a right to be represented before the board by agents

act as intermediaries

between the board and the

be assisted by counsel and other experts, and
evidence appear before the board.

71

The Protocol

Art.

The Protocol

Art. XXTJ.

The Protocol

Art.

XXIH.

Art.

XXTV.

Art.

XXV.

72

73

74

The Protocol

75

The Protocol

XXI.

75

who

shall also

parties. If the parties wish, the agents

may

request that

all

may

persons with relevant

Finally, at the close of the proceedings, the

board

shall

16

draw a report

stating

whether the parties have come to an agreement, and

of such agreement or that

has been impossible to effect a settlement.

it

if

76

need be the terms

The

report shall be

submitted to the president of the commission as soon as possible and shall be published only

with consent of the parties.

77

The procedure of establishing an

arbitral tribunal

the dispute shall designate an arbitrator
parties shall pick only persons

who

are legally qualified.

If the

one month, the Bureau

shall designate one.

who need not
members of

79

To

the tribunal by the

arbitrators fail to agree

who

shall

parties to a dispute agree to

to be a submission in

international law

good

arbitration,

7<

The

Protocol Art.

78

The Protocol

79

The Protocol

80

The Protocol

81

The

Art.

faith to the arbitral

members

XXVI (1)
XXVI (2).
XXVII

Art.

XXVH (2).

Art.

XXVE (3).

(1).

XXVm.

same

territorial

dispute.

domicile with the

80

such agreement shall be presumed

award. This provision strikingly echoes the
1

servanda? As evidence of such agreement the
the undertaking of the parties to

legally binding, the decision

Art.

Protocol Art.

additional

have equal powers with the other

same

in the

to arbitration

compromis specifying

and to accept as

The Protocol

77

go

principle of pacta sunt

parties shall conclude a

two

ensure objectivity and impartiality within the tribunal, the

have served as mediators or conciliators

Once

arbitrators

on the choice of a chairman within

the consent of the parties, appoint

arbitrators shall not be nationals of the parties, or have
parties, or

two

78

be members of the Commission but
the tribunal.

V. Each party to

A third person to act as chairman of

members of

appointed by the parties.

The president may, with

spelt out in part

from among the members of the Commission. The

the tribunal shall be designated from the

two

is

go

to

of the tribunal. The compromis shall

17
further specify the subject matter of the dispute

may also
The

specify the law to be applied, and

if

and the seat of the

tribunal.

82

The compromis

the parties agree to adjudicate ex

aequo

bono.

et

time limit within which the arbitrators shall give an award, and the appointment of

counsel to take part

in the

proceedings

may

In a case where the compromis

also be indicated in the

is silent

on the law

compromise

to be applied, the tribunal shall

decide the dispute according to the treaties concluded between the parties, international law,
the Charter of the Organization of African Unity, the Charter of the United Nations,

the consent of the parties, ex aequo et bono.

A

arbitrators decide otherwise.

94

The hearings

writing and shall state reasons for every point decided.

conflicts

it,

be

in

camera unless the

record of proceedings signed by the registrar and the

arbitrators shall alone be authoritative of the proceedings.

Such elaborate machinery

shall

and with

The

arbitral

award

shall

be

in

85

clearly demonstrates the founding fathers desire to settle

and disputes by peaceful means through certain and formal procedure. The irony of

however,

is

that

no member

state has ever submitted their dispute for adjudication

by the

commission. The effectiveness or otherwise of this machinery has therefore never been tested.

Indeed the Commission
resorted to

is

of phantom existence. Instead the

ad hoc committees and good

existence of the Commission

offices to resolve their conflicts, totally ignoring the

.

Writers in the early stage of the existence of the

OAU attributted this anomaly to the

infancy of the commission, pleading that the commission
to evolve a

mondus operandi. 96 Others

82

The Protocol

Art.

XXIX (1).

The Protocol

Art.

XXIX

The Protocol

Art.

XXX.

Art.

XXXI.

83

84

85

The Protocol

86

OAU and its member states have

attributed the

is

of recent creation and needs time

redundancy of the commission to the

(2).

Boutros-Ghall The Adis Ababas Charter 45

(1964).

18
susceptibility of African disputes to "friendly solutions".

otherwise. Thirty five years

More

down the road,

Commission

is

However time has proved

yet to

come out of its

infancy.

often than not African disputes have been settled at the battlefield other than at a round

table conference. Perhaps the greatest

the

the

87

Commission

weakness

emergence of

that has militated against the

as a viable vehicle for peaceful settlement of disputes

is its

very nature

- it

can only be moved to action through the consent of the disputants and, further more, there
is

no machinery

in place for the

enforcement of its decisions; hence hardly any incentive to

disputants to submit to the jurisdiction of the Commission.

2.

88

Other Conflict Resolution Mechanisms

As already mentioned
committees

the

OAU

has preferred the use of

to deal with conflicts to the formal

good

offices

and ad hoc

machinery provided by the Commission of

Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration. Perhaps such

less

formal procedures are more

attuned to the fluidity and rapidity of conflict situations in Africa that defy overly legalistic

and time consuming

formalistic solutions.

89

It is

disputes in Africa have been addressed through

87

88

F.C.

no accident then

that

most

ad hoc arrangements. 90

Okoye, International Law and the New African States 147

See The

OAU Charter Art. XIX, XXH, XXVH & XXXI.

^See Gassama

^See Meyers

infra note 345, at 285.

infra note 293, at 419.

conflicts

(1972).

and

19

Under

the incumbent Secretary-General

Of the OAU,

Dr. Salim

Ahmed

Salim, a

new

mechanism, perhaps intended to replace the obsolete Commission of Mediation, Conciliation

and Arbitration, has been created. This Mechanism dubbed
Prevention,

Management and

with the recent Zairean
Nairobi (Kenya), and in

its last

91

Its

meeting

in

Togo managed

and timely intervention.

ad hoc arrangement,

93

a specialized

OAU

in

of Laurent
92

Plans are

to facilitate investigation of potential

Commission envisioned under

charter (most improbable option), were fruitless.

The Performance of the

to a negotiating table.

Efforts to establish whether this

probable option), or an institution of the

B.

to bring the rebels forces

Mobutu Sese Seko

underway of establishing an early warning system

conflict areas

in dealing

"peace quartet" organized a series of conferences

Kabila and the government of dictator
also

Central Organ for conflict

some measure of success

Resolution," has registered

crisis.

"OAU

mechanism
Article

established through an

another

is

22 (the most

amendment

to the

94

OAU in Conflict Resolution and Dispute Settlement:

Case

Studies

This subsection undertakes case studies of conflicts in Africa with the aim of grasping
the challenges that faced the

challenges.

A thematic as

Morocco-Algeria border

OAU

in

conflict

is

the

OAU responded

adopted. In the

to those

Maghreb

PanAfrican

News Agency,

is

the focus in the horn of Africa. In

West Africa

http://cgi-bin.nando.net/pIwewb-cgi..., 07/02/97.

93

Pan- African News Agency (PANA),

The present writer relied on

the

and the Western Sahara conflict are discussed. The

PanAfrican News Agency, http://cgi-bi.nando.net/pIweb-cgi..., 07/02/97.

92

94

how

well as a sub-regional approach

Ethiopia/Somali/Kenya border conflict

9l

each conflict and

May

1 1

,

1997.

electronic material

which provided

partial information.

the

.

20
Nigerian

civil

war

is

Southern Rhodesian
conflicts before

1.

examined, Central Africa the Congo
crisis. It is

crisis,

worth the while however

embarking on case

and

in

Southern Africa the

to attempt a characterization of

studies.

Characterization of Conflicts and Case Studies
Scholars have

come with
two

colonial African conflicts into

the sense that they emanate

the

new

different

ways of classifying

categories:

(I)

those that

post-independence alignments mainly

them

into intra-state

and

98

in the

and

(ii)

95

Elias places post-

be regarded as inherited,
that

in

devolved upon

those that are the result of

economic and technical spheres. 96 Furley

inter-state conflicts.

Inter-state conflicts are in the
colonial legacy.

may

from the complex of rights and obligations

states in the consequences of state succession;

categorizes

conflicts.

97

main caused by border disputes emanating from the

African state boundaries are traceable to the Berlin conference of 1889

at

which the European imperial powers partitioned Africa into spheres of influence oblivious of
the natural boundaries

divided

between the

among Kenya, Somalia and

and Ghana.

different nationalities.

Ethiopia while the

99

Thus

for

example the Somali are

EWE are divide into Dahomey, Togo,

100

95

in

See Ted Robert Gurr, Theories of Political Violence and Revolution in the Third World
CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN AFRICA 153-189 (Francis Deng & William Zartman eds., 1991).

^.o. Elias, Africa and the Development of International Law,
97

162 (1988).

01iver Furley, Introduction: Africa in the Habit of Conflict in CONFLICT IN AFRICA 9

(Oliver Furley ed., 1995).

^For a thorough discussion the phenomenon of African colonial boundaries see IAN
Brownlie, African boundaries: a Legal and Diplomatic Encyclopaedia (1979).

"See European Imperialism and the Partition of Africa (E.
100

Cervenka infra note

1

13, at 51

F.

Penrose

ed. 1975).

21
Intra-state conflicts

from the divide and

rule tactics of the colonial regimes in Africa (for instance Hutu-Tutsi

Rwanda and

conflict in

conflict are

have a myriad of causes ranging from ethnic animosity emanating

Burundi) or historical differences between groups.

connected with

Africa

103

_

102

rights violations are other principal causes of conflicts in

Other intra-state conflicts are closely linked with the nature of the nation-state

the so-called crisis of the nation-state

power and wealth by one
elite

Other causes of

disparities in the distribution of wealth within the states.

Governance problems and human
Africa.

101

elite faction

in

_ characterized by a monopolization of state

and the ensuing

conflict

caused by attempts by excluded

groups to wrestle power from the group controlling state apparatus and national wealth,

exacerbated by the ruling

elite

defense of the status quo at

that claimed a lot of lives has been

105

There are other

conflicts

costs.

104

viewed as reactions by other

Tigrey and the Oromo) excluded from the
class.

all

spoils of state

caused by special problems

The Ethiopian
elite

power by

like conflicts

civil

groups (mainly the

Amahara

the

caused

in

For instance the Chad conflict

is

basically an ethnic conflict between the

ruling

Southern

Africa by the destabilization policies of the former apartheid regime in South Africa.

101

war

106

Muslim Arabs

in

and Black Africans in the South who are either Christians or profess African traditional
For a detailed discussion of this North-South divide see Rene Lemarchard, Chad: the
misadventures of the North-South Dialectic, 29 AFR. REV. 27 (1986).
the North

religions.

102

See M. Louise Pirouet, The Effects of Conflict,

supra note 97,

I:

Human

Rights

and Refugees

in Furley

at 274.

103

For a discussion of the process of class-formation and ensuing conflict see Emmit N.
in an African State: The Case of Kenya's Educated

Evans, Sources of Socio-political Instability
Unemployed, 20 AFR. STUD. REV. 52 (1977).
104

See David Throup, the Colonial Legacy

105

in Furley

supra note 97,

at

237-274.

Patricx Gilkes, The Dying Lion: Feudalism and Modernization

in

Ethiopia 175-

227(1975).
106

See

Tom Lodge, Perspectives on

s upra note 95, at

115-149

Conflict Resolution in South Africa in

Deng et

all

22
It is

state

is

important to note that the characterization of conflicts into intra-state and inter-

because of the complexity and interconnectedness of causes and

arbitrary

consequences. Intra-state conflicts
inter-state conflict certainly

categorization

is

have

more

often than not

do have

extra-territorial effect while

intra-state repercussions. Secondly, although the

useful as an aid to analysis,

it is

too broad.

It is

possible to subdivide African

conflicts into seven less broader categories: intra-state conflicts arising

legacy of

artificial

above

from the colonial

borders; conflicts emanating from colonial state succession; conflicts

involving "illegitimate" and "racist" regimes resulting from delayed decolonization; internal
conflicts resulting

from

secessionist

movements;

conflicts resulting

from challenges

to the

legitimacy of the authority in power, conflicts involving external intervention; and conflicts

with strong religious or ethnic underpinnings.

a. Inter-state

I.

Conflicts Arising from the Colonial Legacy of Artificial Borders

The Algerian-Morocco Border
This conflict was the

conflicts. It is also a

illustrates the

10 '

Conflict

first test

case on the capacity of the infant

microcosm of other border

legacy of colonialism.

108

The

OAU

to resolve

conflicts bedeviling the continent in that

it

actual conflict erupted in July 1962 when, after

the referendum that ushered in Algeria's independence (after a bloody war of liberation),

Moroccan troops

107

tried to

occupy the border

Town

Ellen Frey-Wouters identifies five categories.

classification

by discerning seven

categories, buying

of Tindouf, claiming that

The present

writer deviates

it

from

from Frey-wouters two categories on

formed an

this

conflicts

involving external intervention and the one involving illegitimate and racist regimes. Ellen Fre-

Wouters, The Relevance of regional Arrangements to Internal conflicts in the Developing World
Law and Civil War in the Modern World 466-473 (John Norton Moore ed., 1974).
108

Alf Andrew Heggoy, Colonial Origins of the Algerian Morocco Border Conflict, 13

Afr. Stud. Rev. 22 (1970).

in

23

kingdom of Morocco. The gorvernment of Algeria responded through

integral part of the
military force.

The

109

genesis of the problem can however be traced to the beginning of French colonial

Maghreb.

rule in the

When the French conquered and occupied Algeria

existed as a distinct entity from time immemorial.

110

To

serve their

in 1830,

own

Morocco had

interest the

French

avoided demarcating the boundary between Morocco and Algeria, and indeed despite signing
several treaties with

Morocco and
community of

Morocco none of

Algeria.

111

those treaties attempted to

This and the Islamic concept of

believers, to be distinguished

ascertainable territorial entity, encouraged
that

when

fix

a boundary between

umma, denoting

from the western concept of a nation with

Morocco

to harbor irredentist ambitions.

the French were forced by the Algerian bloody

war of liberation

Algeria in 1962, seeds of conflict had been germinating for a long time.
In the process of that bloody conflict

a nation as a

Morocco decided

to

114

solution

first.

Hence emperor Haile

organized a meeting in

was

armistice

Bamako

its allies

113

to submit the dispute to the

OAU.

within the Security Council to seek an African

Sellasie of Ethiopia

and President Modibo Keita of Mali

to negotiate a cease-fire.

short-lived, the meeting

115

Although the negotiated

produced the famous Bamako communique which

109

Frank E. Trout, Morocco's Saharan Frontiers, 426 (1969).

1

10
I.

William Zartrman, Government and Politics in Northern Africa 19(1 964).

111

Woronof supra note

10, at 336.

ll2

Amanwah infra note

135, at 202.

113

Zdenek Cervenka, The Organization of African Unity 52 (1968).

114

Okoye supra note

u5

87, at 148.

Cervenka supra note 113.

So

withdrew from

Security Council while Algeria, favoring an African solution took the dispute, to the

Morocco however was persuaded by

112

.

24
consisted of a five point plan:
the immidiate end of hostilities;

1.

of a committee composed of Algerian, Moroccan, Ethiopian and

2. the creation

Malian military
3. the

officers to define a demilitarised zone;

supervision of security and military neutrality in the demilitarized zone by

Ethiopian and Malian observers;
4. the

request for an extraordinary meeting of the

purpose of creating a committee of

OAU Council of Ministers, for the

arbitration to effect a definitive solution of

Algerian-Moroccan dispute, and
5. the cessation

An
Ababa,

extraordinary meeting of the

November

in

of hostile propaganda attacks.

arguments

116

OAU Council of Ministers was convened in Addis

1963, to discuss the conflict.

117

It is

important to summarise the

that delegates of both parties submitted to the Council of Misters to see

diametrically opposed both sides were and the dificult position in which the
itself.

Morocco submitted

found

the following arguments:

1

Morocco had an

2.

Morocco made reference

historic claim to the area;
to various treaties

with Algerian provisional gorvernment
since the French

3.

OAU

how

left

in

concluded with France, and the treaty

1961;

the frontier between

Algeria should honor the 1961 agreement.

Morocco and

Algeria undefined,

118

Algeria replied with the following arguments:
that the

1.

1961 agreement was signed under force majeure, and would therefore not

be honored;

116

Woronoff supra note

117

Trout supra note 169,

118

S.

O.

10, at 338.

at 428.

Agbl The Organization of African Unity and African Diplomacy 9 (1986).

25

Morocco's expansionism was anti-OAU Charter and could,

2.

if

allowed, destroy the

OAU;
3. 'to

wish to impose unilaterally the

least revision

of the Algerian-Moroccan border

without doubt to create a precedent or an unfortunate jurisprudence for the future

is

of many African

state.'

119

Clearly the Council of ministers

was

in

a quandary, here are parties with equally strong

but irreconcillable positions. Characteristically the Council avoided dealing with the
substantive issues raised by both parties and instead appointed an ad hoc committee

composed of Ivory
examine the

Coast, Ethiopia, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan and Tanganyika "to
within the

crisis in all its ramifications

of Bamako".

spirit

120

The

so-called

commission of seven had several meetings with the parties present but none of them appears
to

have decisively changed the status quo.

However,

it

appears the disputants were undergoing a change of heart; the two

governments announced on February
resumed diplomatic

and

solidarity

ties!

OAU. There

between the two countries.

is

no doubt

122

that

the

ad hoc committee
The

from the protagonists. Be

facilitated (to a great

final settlement

that as

it

120

121

122

Id. at 9-10.

Amanwah

infra note 135, at 203.

Woronoff supra note
Id. at

343-344.

10, at 340-342.

measure) the

of the conflict however appears

may, a

future catastrophe in a fragile continent had been resolved.

119

had signed an agreement and

that they

to credit the end of this conflict singularly to the efforts of the

negotiations that preceded the settlement.
to have originated

1864

20,

A series of negotiations culminated in a general treaty of cooperation

would be erroneous

It

121

conflict that exhibited signs of

26
ii.

The Ethiopia/Somalia/Kenya Border
This

Conflict

yet another conflict with roots in Africa's colonial past.

is

The Somalis

are

perhaps the best example of the arbitrariness with which the European colonial powers went

about dividing Africa.

123

It is

not possible here to give an account of the history of the

establishment of the colonial state in the horn of Africa.

124

Suffice

it

to say that for the

convenience of the colonial powers the Somali people were subdivided into the four countries
that constitute the horn.

fifth

of Kenya.

126

The

125

They occupy one-fifth of Ethiopia, one-third of Djibouti and one-

protests by the Somalis against this balkanization fell

on deaf hears. The

British colonial authorities signed treaties with Ethiopia that completely transferred the

Ogaden region occupied by
Somalis.
in

127

To add

an

the Somalis to Ethiopia, despite consistent objections

insult to injury,

when

the British

were granting independence

from the
to

Kenya

1963, they ignored the wishes of the inhabitants of the Northern Frontier District of Kenya

(NFD) who were predominantly

So
1960 was

123

Somalis, to be unified with Somalia.

that the irredentist stance taken by Somalia

neither unexpected nor surprising.

129

128

immediately after independence in

Somalia called for self-determination for

See Generally Peter Anyang Nyong'o, The Implications of Crises and Conflict
in Deng et aal supra note 95, at 95-1 14.

in the

upper Nile Valley,
124

See Michael Chege, Conflict in the Horn of Africa,
AND DEVELOPMENT 87-100 (Emmanuel Hansen ed. 1987).

in

AFRICA PERSPECTIVES ON PEACE

125

Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia and Djibouti.

126

Nzongola-Ntalaja, The National Question and the Crisis of Instability in Africa, in

Hansen supra note 124,
127

at 65.

tom j. Farer, War Clouds in the Horn of Africa: A Crisis for Detente

128

Id. at

129
I.

57 (1976).

77.

William Zartman, Government and Politics in Northern Africa 173

(1964).

27
Somalis

and

in

their

Kenya and

posts.

130

The determination of Somalia to

create a "Greater Somalia"

resentment of what they viewed as British betrayal was registered

when Somali broke
reached

Ethiopia.

its

132

peak

in

Earlier

diplomatic relations with Britain.

131

The tension

that

in

March 1963

had been building

1964 when Somali nationals raided Ethiopian and Kenyan army and police

on Somalia's attempt

inaugural conference, found

However, due

stiff

to introduce the dispute for discussion at the

OAU

opposition from Ethiopia, and the matter was shelved.

to continued incitement of the Ethiopian

133

Somali population by Somalia

through radio broadcasts, Ethiopia requested an extraordinary session of the Council of
Ministers to discuss what Ethiopia considered "aggression" by Somalia.

government too requested the Secretary-General

when it met on February

12, 1964.

135

Council passed, other than imploring both sides to
accordance with the

Nzongola-Ntalaja supra notel26,
I.M. Lewis,

settle their differences

amicably
136

in

Neither

at 66.

INC., 1965)

132

Chege supra note 124,

at 90.

133

Lewis supra note 131,

at 198.

Id. at 27.

135

H.A. Amankwah, International Law, Dispute Settlement and Regional Organizations in
THIRD WORLD ATTITUDES TOWARDS INTERNATIONAL LAW 204 (Frederick E.

the African Setting, in

Snyder

Regrettably, the resolution that the

The Modern History of Somaliland: From Nation to State, 193

(FREDERICK A. PRAEGER,

l34

agenda

their cases before the

OAU Charter; did not address the substance of the problem.

130

131

The Somali

for inclusion of the dispute in the

of the extra- ordinary session. Both disputants were asked to present
Council of Ministers

134

& Surakiart Sathirai eds., 987).
136

Id.

28
did the next extra-ordinary Council of Ministers meeting that took place in

go

Lagos (Nigeria)

bottom of the problem. 137

to the

Somalia underlined the importance of self-determination for the Somali populations
in the

disputed region while Ethiopia warned of the danger of attempting to revise Africa's

borders.

The words of the Ethiopian delegate captures

placed on the
tribal

that

OAU:

or racial or ethnic

can only end

sides

"If

were asked

we

seek to redraw the

affinities,

in disaster."

to respect

138

we

will

map

the

dilemma

that the colonial borders

of Africa on the basis of the so-called

have cast ourselves

adrift

on a wild sea

in a

voyage

Understandably, the Somalia proposal was rejected and both

each others

territorial integrity.

The Council of Ministers

further

ordered the continuation of the cease-fire previously agreed, and cessation of hostilities.
Ethiopia had succeeded
Ministers

who do

in playing

on

Africa's worst fears

_

let

139

those in the Council of

not live in glass houses throw stones by attempting to revise the Ethiopia-

Somalia boundary.

The

cease-fire

was

as

good

as

it

lasted. Internal

the fragile peace

on a precarious balance.

affirmed that

would follow

it

A new

circumstances were changing; casting

government took power

in

Somalia and

the expansionist policies of the previous government.

However immediate danger was

averted when, through diplomatic efforts of president

Kaunda of Zambia, a memorandum of understanding ending

tension between

Kenya and

Somali was signed by the president of Kenya and the prime minister of Somalia.

seemed

to cool matters

137

l3

between Ethiopia and Somalis

Agbi supra note

1

18, at 27.

*Id. at 28.

139

Woronoff supra note

10, at 351.

140

Farer supra note 127, at 89.

14

V

142

at 90.

Chege supra notel24,

140

at 93.

for a while as well.

142

141

This

29

As

fate

would have

it,

new government led by Siad Barre took power

a

in Somalia.

Although Bare did not embark on an expansionist policy immediately (apparently due
internal problems), at the 21st meeting of the Council of Minister in Addis

Ababa

in

143

to

May

1973, Somalia attempted to persuade the summit to formally agree that a dispute existed

between Ethiopia and Somalia, but the Council rejected Somalia's proposal. That marked
the begging of a succession of events that culminated in the devastating

and Somalia between 1975 and 1978.
divides escalated the war.
146

to nought.

Due

to

145

Efforts

144

by the

war between Ethiopia

Participation by the superpowers

on both

political

OAU ad hoc committee to settle the conflict come

war weariness on the part of Somalia coupled by the OAU's recognition

of the Ogaden region as part of Ethiopia, and lack of resources to continue the war, the
Somalia forces

b.

who were

already being pushed out of Ethiopian territory gave up the war.

14

'

Conflicts Arising from Colonial State Succession

The Western Sahara

No

Conflict

other dispute has shaken the very foundations of the

Western Sahara

148

conflict.

OAU

like the

protracted

Following the admission of the Sahara Arab Democratic Republic

143

Christopher Clapham, The

144

Wat78.

145

Clapham supra note

,46

Cervenka supra note

Horn of Africa: a

Conflict

Zone

in

Furley supra note 97, at

76.

147

148

143, at 77.

1 1

Chege supra note 124,
0ther than

3, at 52.

at

93-95.

illustrating the intricacies

of conflict resolution in Africa, the Western Sahara

problem of state succession, imperatives of state membership in the
OAU, and the legal problem of attributing statehood to a territorial entity. For details see J. Naldi,
The Organization of African Unity and the Sahara Arab Democratic Republic, 26 J. AFR. L.152

conflict is also a study in the

30

(SADR) 149
a halt

to the

OAU,

a

Morocco

instigated boycott brought the activities of the

when the nineteenth summit conference planned

place due to lack of quorum.

A
territory

voyage back

of what

is

OAU to

to held in Tripoli (Libya) failed to take

150

to history puts the conflict into perspective. Spain acquired the

now Western Sahara between 1884 and

1934.

151

The kingdom of Morocco

which existed from time immemorial before the emergence of Spain into the scene, protested
the occupation of this territory by Spain; claiming sovereignty over

southern neighbor too claimed

Under pressure from

this territory as

152
it.

forming part of Mauritania.

Mauritania the

153

these expansionist regional states, and desirous of keeping

colonial acquisition, Spain declared Western Sahara one of

its

provinces in 1958. Spain's

decision raised furore and opposition within the United Nations General Assembly, and

Morocco and

Mauritania.

154

its

from

At the prompting by the security Council Spain accepted to hold

a referendum to determine whether the Sahawi, the inhabitants of the territory desired to rule

themselves, to join

Morocco

or Mauritania, or remain under the protection of Spain.

155

(1982).
149

Sahara Arab Democratic Republic. See Jeremy Harding

,

The Fate of Africa 103

(1993).
150

Naldi supra note 148, at 152.

151

Azzedine Layachi, The

OAU and Western Sahara: A Case Study, in THE ORGANIZATION

of African Unity After Thirty Years p.29 (Yassin El-ayouty ed.,1994).
l52

Id.

153

Radha Krishna Ramphul, The Role of international and Regional Organizations on the
peaceful Settlement of Internal Disputes (with Special emphasis on the Organization of African
COMP. L. 372,382 (1983).
Unity), 13 GA. J. IN'L

&

154

155

Layashi supra note 151,

at 28.

Yahia H.Zoubir, The Western Sahara Conflict:

A Case Study

Prenegotiation and Prolongation of Conflict 26 Cal.W. INT'L

L.J. 173,

Failure of
175 (1996).
in

31
Spain's attempts to hold a plebiscite in keeping with the earlier

Nations General Assembly

in

1965

156

OAU

and the

in

1972

when, largely due to Morocco's and Mauritania's diplomatic

57

demands by

the United

was, however, preempted

efforts, the

General Assembly

adopted a resolution seeking an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice.

The questions
1.

the court

was asked

Was Western

to

Sahara (Rio

158

answer were the following:

De Oro and

Sakiet El

Hamra)

at the

time of

colonization by Spain a territory belonging to no one (terra nullis)?
If the

answer to the

first

question

is

to the negative,

What were the legal ties between
Morocco and the Mauritanian entity? 159

this territory

2.

The court found

there existed

Morocco and some of the
ties existed

some

"legal ties of allegiance"

tribes living in the territory

between the Mauritanian

entity

and the Kingdom of

and the

of western Sahara, and equally, legal

territory

of Western Sahara. The court

held however that the evidence presented did not establish any
the territory of Western Sahara

between the Sultan of

ties

of sovereignty between

and the Kingdom of Morocco or the Mauritanian

entity.

The

court therefore found nothing preventing the General Assembly from "implementing the
principle of self-determination through the free and genuine expression of the will of the

peoples of the territory".

156

160

G.A. Res. 2072, U.N.

GAOR,

20th Sess., Supp. No. 14,

at

59-60, U.N. Doc. A/6014

(1965).
157

A.H.G. Res. 272, 9th Ord.

General Assembly

in

Sess., Rabat,

G.A. Res. 2983, U.N.

June 12-15. 1972 taken into consideration by the

GAOR,

Supp. No.30, at 84-85, U.N. Doc. A/8730

(1972).
158

G.A. Res. 3292, U.N.

GAOR, 29th Sess.,

159

GA.

GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp.

Supp. No. 31, at 103-04, U.N. Doc. A/9632

(1974).

Res. 3292, U.N.

No. 31,

at 104,

(1972).
160

Advisory Opinion, Western Sahara, 1975 LC.J. 68 (Oct.

16).

U.N. Doc. A/9632

32

Although the court's decision was an unequivocal

rejection of any claim

Mauritania to Western Sahara the intransigent King Hassan
interpreted the court's decision in his favor, and

II

Morocco

of

ironically

proceeded to organize the so-called "Green

March," an invasion of Western Sahara by Moroccan troops and

home coupled

by Morocco or

civilians.

161

Problems

at

with pressure from the United States, however forced Spain, under the terms

of the so-called Madrid Accords, to cede Western Sahara to Morocco and Mauritania.
Algeria the main backer of the Sahrawi nationalist

162

movement (POLIS ARIO), 163

that

had been waging a guerilla warfare against Spanish occupation, was outraged by the turn of
events.

164

With Algeria's backing, POLIS ARIO

until the later

peak

in

withdrew

1976 when

in

1979 due to

POLISARIO

shifted

its

attacks to

internal problems.

165

The

Morocco and Mauritania
rising tension

reached

its

proclaimed western Sahara an independent state under the

166
name SAhrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR).

Two

Council of Ministers meetings,

in

February and July 1976

in

Addis Ababa and

Mauritius, respectively affirmed the right of the Sahrawi people to self-determination but did

not

come up with concrete proposals on how

161

Layachi supra note

Desert War 21 11
162

1

5 1 at 3;
,

to conclusively tackle the conflict.

167

Attempts

TONY HODGES, WESTERN Sahara; THE ROOTS OF a

(1983).

Agreement on the question of Western Sahara, Nov.

14, 1975,

Morocco-Mauritania-

Spain, reproduced in Third Report by the Secretary-General pursuant to Resolution 379 (1975)

concerning Western Sahara, U.N. Scor, 30th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/l 1880, annex
163

(1975).

A. Peter Mutharika, The role of the United Nations Security Council in Africa Peace

Management: Some Proposals, 17 MICH.
164

Harding supra note 149,

165

There was

supra note 153,
166

J.

INT'L L. 537,549 (1996).

at 103.

internal instability subsequent to a military

at 383;

Harding supra note 149,

167

1

at 105.

Layashi supra note 151, at 33.

coup

in Mauritania.

Ramphul

33

between 1976 and 1978 to

call

an extraordinary meeting failed owing to lack of quorum.

Subsequently, a summit took place in

168

Khartoum where an ad hoc committee ("committee of

wise men") consisting of Mali, Guinea, Nigeria, Ivory Coast and Tanzania, was formed to
look into the

conflict.

169

In 1979 at the

Monrovia conference,

OAU passed a resolution

the

calling for a cease-fire and the holding of a free referendum for the inhabitants of

Sahara to exercise

their right

of self-determination.

General Assembly recognized
people.

POLISARIO

170

In the

mean

Western

time, the United Nations

as the legitimate representative of the

Sahrawi

171

At the Nairobi summit

in 1981, the

"committee of wise men" proposed a three point

plan for the resolution of the conflict: (1) cease-fire and direct negotiations between the
parties; (2) establishment

and

(3)

of a multinational peace keeping force and an interim administration;

referendum organized by the

OAU and the United Nations.

172

However

the plan

was

not implemented because the implementation committee appointed to succeed the "committee

of wise me," failed to bring the parties to a negotiating
In February 1982 the events took a

the

OAU

OAU.

Secretary General,

Edem

new

table.

turn when, in a Council of Ministers' meeting,

Kodjo, admitted the

This decision, inter alia, caused a

173

crisis that

SADR

made

the

to the

membership of the

OAU Tripoli summit fail to

1(

*Id.

169

Resolutoon AHG/Res. 92 (XV) referred in Naldi, supra note 148, at 159.

1

Resolution on the question of Western Sahara, A.H.G. Dec.

14, 16th Ord. Sess.,

Monrovia, July 17-20, (1979).
171

G.A. Res. 37, U.N.

GAOR,

34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 203-04, U.N. Doc. A/34/36

(1979).
172

Resolution on Western Sahara, A.H.G. Res. 103, 18th Ord. Sess., Nairobi, June 24-27,

1981 reproduced in U.N. Doc. A/36/534, annex
,

173

Layashi supra note 151, at 34.

JJ

(1981).

34
take place.

174

By 1984 Morocco managed

termed the "Useful
offensive,"

triangle."

on Morrocco

175

that

to complete building a wall surrounding

POLISARIO in turn planned its

pitting

resume diplomatic

were

problems

in

176

Morocco

both states against religious fundamentalist groups, forced the two to
177

ties.

Attempts

at direct negotiations

between Morocco and

POLISARIO

made. The establishment of United Arab Maghreb (UAM), an economic grouping

also

in the

to change; internal

it

Maghreb

proved to Morroco that the wall was not "watertight".

However, by 1989 circumstances seemed
and Algeria,

greatest attack, "the

what

region further explains the thawing of relationship between
It is at this

Morocco and

Algeria.

178

point that the arena of efforts to resolve this conflict changed from the

OAU to the United Nations. After a series of initiatives the Secretaries-General of the United
Nations and the
the

OAU worked out a comprehensive plan for a referendum to be held towards

end of 1990 or

beginning of 1992.

at the

179

The plan was approved by both

the General

Assembly and the Security Council. Subsequently, a United Nations Mission (MINURSO),
consisting of a multinational force and military observers to oversee the implementation of
the plan,

was

created, with both parties agreeing to the plan.

However, a key

POLIASARIO

174

1

obstacle to the implementation of the plan

emerged on the way.

and Morocco could not agree on the formula of identifying the true inhabitants

Zoubir supra note 155,

/5

This

180

is

at 186.

an area with rich deposits of phosphates; hence the term 'useful

I76

Layasi supra note

1

triangle'

5 1 at 34.
,

177

Economic cost of occupation became so high that Morocco was forced to negotiate while
internal unrest in Algeria caused by Muslim fundamentalism shifted the focus of the Algerian
government from effectively supporting S ADR to resolving problems at home. See George Joffe,
The Conflict in Western Sahara in Furley supra note 97, at 113.
178

Layashi supra note 151, at 35.

179

U.N. Dep't of Public Info.,The Blue Helmets 270

No.E.96.1.14 (Hereinafter,
180

Id.

The Blue Helmets).

(3 ed.,1996)

U.N. sales

35

POLISARIO produced a list

of Western Sahara. While

by Spain, Morocco on the other hand provided a
Sahrawi
place.

181

Due

needs to

is

roll

of 200,000 people claiming to be

to this fundamental disagreement, the United Nations plebiscite failed to take

Morrocco continues
This

of 74,000 people based a 1974 census

one of the

come up with

to

occupy Western Sahara

to this day.

182

conflicts in Africa that cries for resolution.

a formula to determine

who

The

security Council

are the genuine inhabitants of Western

Sahara so that the long overdue referendum can take place and the Sahrawi can
again.

in

Any objective

peace

observer will agree that taking the 1974 census as a point of departure

determining the original genuine inhabitants

Council has dilly-dallied over

c.

live in

this

is

the

most

realistic

purely technical exercise

Conflicts Involving "Dlegitimate"

is

formula.

Why the Security

difficulty to fathom.

183

and "Racist"Regimes Resulting from Delayed

Decolonization

The Namibian and Zimbabwean
struggle against the apartheid regime

other conflicts where the

181

182

183

OAU had to

Zoubir supra 155,

struggle for independence and the south Africans'

falls

under

this

category. These conflicts, unlike the

be seen acting as a neutral and impartial

arbiter, the

at 205.

Id.at213.

The

latest action

by the Security Council on the Western Sahara

Council Resolution 1084. The Security Council reaffirms

conflict is Security

on the Western
commitment to hold a referendum to determine the wishes of the inhabitants.
The resolution also calls upon the Secretary-General to continue with the efforts to break the impasse
blocking the implementation of security Council Resolutions and submit an interim report by
February 28, 1997, and a comprehensive report on the implementation of this particular resolution by
May 9, 1997. The resolution however falls short of the expectations of the suffering inhabitants of
Western Sahara and many observers of the conflict because while in Resolution 1084 the Council
Sahara Conflict and

its earlier

resolutions

its

"decides to remain seized of the matter," the resolution limits the operation of the United Nations

mission in Western Sahara
critical issue

to vote in the

of what formula

is

to

to 31

be used

May

1997 without making a concrete decision on the

in determining the

proposed referendum and when

critical issues, the Security

whose

(MINURSO)

genuine inhabitant of Western Sahara

to hold such referendum.

By prevaricating on

Council once again plays into the hands of King Hassan

irredentist posture has

shown

Sahrawi to self-determination. U.N.

the

of Morocco

by any means, the right of the
Doc. S/RES/1084 (1996).

his determination to subvert,

SCOR. 371th mtg, U.N.

II

.
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OAU directly challenged the legitimacy of the regimes in these countries.

184

It

viewed these

regimes as vestiges of white supremacy from the colonial era and therefore unacceptable.

The

OAU initiatives to liquidate these illegal regimes was double-pronged;

a diplomatic

185

war

within the United Nations, and financial and military support to the African liberation

movements within
of

this

these states.

186

The Southern Rhodesia

serve as an illustration

crisis will

category of conflicts.

184

Politics of Decolonization: the New Nations and the United Nations
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: POLITICS AND PROCESS 329 (Leland M.

David A. Kay, the

Political Process in

Goodrich and David A. Kay
185

See

eds., 1973).

OAU Resolutions on Decolonization and Apartheid discussed in Cervenka supra note

113, at 15-18.
186

Cervenka reports

six strategies adopted

by the

OAU Liberation Committee to tackle

colonialism:
1

to break off diplomatic

and consular relations between

all

African state and the

government of Portugal and South Africa;
2. to

introduce an effective boycott of the foreign trade of Portugal and South Africa

by:
a) prohibiting die import of

goods from those two countries,

b) closing African ports and airports to their ships and planes,
c) forbidding the planes of those

two countries

to overfly the territories of all

African states;
3. to

establish a co-coordinating

Committee consisting of Algeria, Ethiopia, Guinea,

Congo, Nigeria, Tanganyika, United Arab Republic and Uganda with headquarters
in Dar es Salaam, responsible for harmonizing die assistance for African and for
managing the Special Fund to be set up for that purpose. The Committee was, in
fact, supposed to become the directing center of operations aimed at die overthrow
of die white minority regimes of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, and die
liberation of the African continent
4. to establish a Special

states, to

Fund

to

total

from die remnants of colonialism;

be raised by voluntary contributions of member

be used for the necessary practical and financial aid to die various African

national liberation movements;

liberation

on the territories of independent African states nationals from the
movements in order to give diem training in all sectors and afford young

people

assistance they need for their education and vocational training; and

5. to receive

all

promote in each state the transit of all material aid and the establishing of a
body of volunteers in various fields, with a view to providing die various African
national liberation movements with the assistance they need in various sectors.
Cervenka supra note 1 13, at 15-16
6. to

..
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The Southern Rhodesia

Crisis

Perhaps the best potentialities and worst weaknesses of the

Rhodesian

crisis.

The

crisis

(UDI) by the Minority
It

was

triggered

by the 1964 Unilateral Declaration of Independence

community

Settler

Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) lead by Ian Smith.

in

was not a sudden declaration; preparations had been going on

'independence' by the

community

settler

requested independence from Britain.

188

independence was the 1961 class and

racially

The

OAU did not hid

its

in

18
'

The quest

community formally

community's demand for

based constitution that had given the country
settlers

forming the ruling class

189

the

Heads of State and Government meeting

in

Accra

October, 1965, passed a resolution which recommended the calling of a broad

based constitutional conference that would draft a non-racial constitution. Else the

member

for

consternation at the events unfolding in Southern Rhodesia.

The Second Ordinary Session of
(Ghana)

the settler

basis for the settler

de facto self-government with the propertied minority white

and the poor black people the underdogs.

for a while.

started immediately after the dissolution of the

March 1963 when

Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in

The

OAU are revealed in the

states

would take

OAU

the following measures in the event of a non-negotiated

independence:

new Rhodesian government;

1

refusal to recognize the

2.

continued efforts to reconcile the two African nationalist parties _ the

African People Union

(ZAPU) and

the

with a view to forming a government

Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU)

in exile

and extending to

it,

financial, political,

diplomatic and military assistance;
3

an emergency meeting of the

OAU

action including the most effective

187

Council of Ministers to consider further

means of involving

See T.O. Ranger, Southern Rhodesia: 1961 Trouble Spot?, 7 AFR. REP. (1962); L. H.

Gann, History of Southern Rhodesia (1965); Percy
188

189

the United Nations;

G.V.

f.

& MP. Doxey, Whither Southern Africa?

0sita C. Eze,

Hone, Southern Rhodesia (1969).
12 INT'L

OAU Faces Rhodesia, 5 AFR. REV. 42, 46

J.

25, 28 (1966-67).

(1975).
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4. call to

African

members of the Commonwealth and other African countries

to reconsider their relations with Britain and bring the utmost pressure to bear

on the

British government;

and

5. generally, to treat Rhodesia like South Africa and Portuguese African

teritories in applying

such measures as an economic boycott.

The Assembly established a committee of five member

states to

190

examine the resolution and

take appropriate measures for effective implementation of the resolution.

191

This did not

deter the white minority government from their efforts to gain independence, nor did

them from continuing to emasculate the African
increased as Africans increasingly

become

frustrated

permeated every sector of government as the
gained more and

more support from

nationalist

movements.

192

by oppression and discrimination which

right

wing Rhodesian Front party (RFP)

the settler white community.

193

The worst
in

fears

were

November

194

It is

against this background that the

Session was convened

in

repeated the earlier calls

made by

on

stop

Urban violence

confirmed by Ian Smith's flamboyant unilateral declaration of independence
1965.

it

Lagos

(Nigeria).

the

195

OAU

Council of Ministers extraordinary

In a no-nonsense resolution, the Council

Assembly of Heads of State and Government,

the Afro- Asian group in the General

Assembly

to take appropriate actions to ensure that

Britain adhered fully to the United Nations Resolutions

190

Eze supra note 189,

on Southern Rhodesia, and

at 55.

m Id.
192

Stephen John Stedman, The

End of the Zimbabwean

civil

War in

Stop the Killing

127(Roy Licklider Ed., 1993).
193

VULINDLALA MTSHALL RHODESIA BACKGROUND TO CONFLICT 74-88

194,

G.V.Doxey

195

et

aal supra note 188, at 25.

Eze supra note 189.

called

(1967).

also

39
resolved "that
order,

if

the United

Kingdom does

not crush the rebellion and restore law and

and thereby prepare the way for majority rule

1965, the

member

states of the

United Kingdom".

196

in

Southern Rhodesia by December 15,

OAU shall sever diplomatic relations on that date with the

The deadline was reached and

heeded by Britain nor the rebellious Rhodesia.

the

OAU's ultimatum was

turned out that the

It

neither

OAU membership was

divided on what action to take. Only nine states implemented the Council of Ministers
resolution.

197

It is difficult

to clearly point to the tangible

the resolution of this dispute.

However

and solid contribution of the

several issues are clear.

The OAU's

OAU to

rhetoric and

diplomatic pressure contributed to the isolation and pariah status that the Ian Smith regime
acquired. Its
realization

economic sanctions and

by the

illegal

regime that

that of the

its

United Nations greatly contributed to the

was

future

bleak.

198

The Smith regime

also in

good

time realized that the war against the African guerilla forces that had infiltrated the entire
rural country

was unwinnable. 199 There

Mozambique from Portuguese

however no denying

is

of

that the liberation

colonialism, the consequent ascendancy of an African

independent government to power, and the subsequent closure of the Beirra

196

Elias supra note 149;see generally

rail link to

the

GRAHAM C. KlNLOCH, RACIAL CONFLICT IN RHODESIA

(1978).
197

Several factors explain the

OAU's

helplessness in dealing Ian Smith's regime, and the

A military confrontation between the
OAU was ill-equipped to cope with a

division within the African ranks on what action to to take.

African states and the Smith Regime was ruled out

-

the

conventional warfare with Rhodesia. Economic sanctions could not be

strictly

enforced because the

neighboring African (Malawi and Zambia), were weak, and their economies were so closely

dependent on Rhodesia that they could

ill-afford to

impose sanctions on Rhodesia. Secondly,

sanctions were ineffective because Rhodesia had a link to the Sea through South Africa and the

Neighboring
198

199

territory

of Portuguese Angola. Doxey et

Eze supra note 189,

at 61.

Stedman supra note 192,

at 237.

al at

31-32.
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sea sealed the economic fate of landlocked Rhodesia, putting the

last nail to the coffin

of

UDI government. 200
On the other hand the polarization of the membership
not to break diplomatic

Some

within.

ties

writers have questioned the legality of the Council of Ministers resolution;

states

resolution.

absolve the

201

and hence the member

While, in a legalistic sense

power

states

to

make

decisions binding

on the

had no obligation to implement the

this position is correct, this

argument does not

OAU from its responsibility of ensuring that its organs act in unison and make

decisions that

the

OAU as to whether or

with Great Britain reflected the weaknesses of a house divide

arguing that the Council, under the Charter, has no

member

of the

members

are ready to implement. That

is

the

way

to insure the credibility of

OAU.

d. Internal Conflicts

Arising from Secessionist

Movements

A number of secessionist movements have sprung up in African post-independent
history.
birth,

202

They have been hardly

opposed any attempts

successful due to the fact that the

at revising the

OAU, from

borders existing before independence.

opposition has been induced by self-interest on the part of the African ruling

elite

its

203

very
This

and the

genuine fear that revising the African borders would open a pandoras box and throw the

200

Eze supra note 189,

^Elias supra note 64,
202

at 54.

at 159.

The most memorable ones

(discussed in the paragraphs that follow) are the Katanga and

Biafra secessionist provinces of Congo and Nigeria, respectively. See Peter Lyon, The Ending of

Cold War

in Africa in

203

See The

CONFLICT IN AFRICA 171-72 (Oliver Furley ed., 1995).

OAU Charter Art. m (3)

41
continent into unprecedented instability.

seceded from Ethiopia.
illustrate this

a.

and

The Congo

So

Crisis

far

it is

only Eritrea which has successfully

and the Nigeria

war

civil

will

be discussed to

category of conflicts.

The Congo
The

205

20*

Crisis

facts

surrounding the

Congo

now The Democratic Republic

crisis are

well known.

206

of the Congo), a country rich

The Congo

in

(later

Zaire

mineral resources was

hurriedly granted independence by Belgium in 1960 with Joseph Kasavubu and Patrice

Lumumba as president
did

little

and Prime Minister, respectively.

to prepare the

Congo

for independence,

207

The

crisis

Katanga province,

204

was
209

See generally

regime

and therefore any keen observer of the

local situation could have foreseen a crisis looming large.

The

paternalistic colonial

208

triggered by the Belgian-sponsored secession of the mineral-rich

and subsequent assassination of the

Ahmed

left-leaning

Lumumba,

shortly

An'na'im, Eritrean Independence and African Constitutionalism:

a Sudanese Perspective in ERITREA

AND ETHIOPIA: FROM CONFLICT TO COOPERATION ( Amara Tekle

ed., 1994).

^See Ruth Iyob, The Eritrean Struggle for Independence (1995).
206

shall

The

be shown

first

Congo crisis was triggered by a secessionist machinations. The second crisis
best illustrates how the involvement of superpowers in a local conflict can

as

later,

complicate the situation and render

its

resolution at the regional level, indeed even universal level,

The Internationalization of Civil wars: Lessons from the Congo,
AFRICA IN WORLD AFFAIRS 66-67 ( Ali A. Mazrui & Hausa Patel eds.,

daunting. Yashpal Tandon,

Nigeria and Vietnam, in
1

97 3); see generally George Martelll Leopold to
207

See Rene Lemarchard, Footnote

Lumumba ( 1 96 1 ).

to History:

How Lumumba Came

to

Power, 5 AFR. SP.

REP. 2 (1960).
208

The Blue Helmets supra note

209

Mutiny

in the

179, at 175.

Congo: The Linchpin Gives Way, 5 AFR. SP. REP. 3 (1960).

.
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after

of

independence.

Lumumba,

the fact that

210

A moderate government led by Aduola that emerged after the demise

did not last long. Political forces in the

divided despite

by 1963 the secessionist forces led by Moise Tshombe had given up

for an independent state.

By March 1963
the deceased

Congo were deeply

their bid

211

the

Congo was engulfed

Lumumba regrouped

in

another conflagration. Forces loyal to

under the name National Liberation Committee (NLC)

and launched an onslaught on the Aduola government from the neighboring Congo
Brazzaville.

212

Moishe Tshombe, with

the support of the United States,

mercenaries launched his second bid for power.
ineffectiveness of his

was sworn

in as

The

government

Prime Minister

in July 1964.

responsible for the assassination of

in

Cairo (Egypt) should

ensued and the

Aduola resigned and Tshombe

213

OAU. Tshombe was

Lumumba

mercenaries form Rhodesia and South Africa.
to

to the turmoil that

to contain the situation,

turn of evens shocked the

OAU member States threatened

Due

Belgium and foreign

widely regarded as a traitor

and the escalation of the
214

Small wonder that

in

crisis

October 1964 the

walk out of a Non-aligned movement

Tshombe be allowed

to attend.

210

by bringing

(NAM) summit

215

The assassination of Lumumba has been closely linked to machinations by the CIA and
Mobutu Seseseko who later took over the country in a bloody coup; see Shuyer infra note 216.
21

'The Blue Helmets supra note 179, at 176-79.

212

213

Amankwah supra note
Agbi supra note

1 1

135, at 205.

8, at

214

Ramphul supra note

215

Amankwah supra note

41

153, at 379.

135, at 205.
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The C.N.L.

forces reacted to the ascendancy of Tshombe to

onslaught against government forces and capturing Stanleyville.

ensued

power by launching an
216

A

bloody

civil

war

superpowers against each other with the local protagonists as pawns. The

pitting the

support of Tshombe by the United States was countered with the backing of C.N.L. by

USSR

and to a

lesser extent China.

Attempts by the

OAU

217

to resolve the conflict bore

no

fruits.

218

An

extraordinary

session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Governments met in September 1964 to
discuss the

crisis.

The Assembly appointed an ad hoc committee under

the chairmanship of

president Kenyatta of Kenya with a mandate to reconcile the warring parties and normalize
relations

between the Congo and

its

neighbors.

The

OAU also called for the withdrawal of

foreign mercenaries, the formation of a caretaker government and the holding of
elections.

219

Calls by the

OAU

reconcile the factions failed.

leader.

saw

Thanks

220

forces.

the defeat of C.L.N, forces

However

Ramphhul supra note

war

by the Kenyatta committee to

the C.L.N, forces

the

seemed

to get

famous Stanleyville operation

and the emergence of Tshombe

to the United States', Belgian

216

initiatives

In the continuing civil

over Tshombe 's

an upper hand
effectivelly

went unheeded and

and British paratroopers.

153, at 379; see generally PILLIPPA

as the

de facto

221

SHUYER, Who KILLED THE

Congo (1962).
2X1

218

Id. at

380.

External forces involved in the crisis were too strong and determined for the

counteract.
219

Amankah supra

^Agbi
221

supra note

note 135, at 205.

1

18, at 52.

Amankwah supra note

135, at 205.

OAU to

.
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The

OAU thus displayed

its

impotence

in yet

another regional conflict.

the active involvement of extra-regional forces in this conflict absolves the
fair

indictment. Indeed, the endorsement of the

OAU's

222

However,

OAU from any

the withdrawal of

call for

mercenaries by the United Nations Security Council went unheeded, and even the United

Nations peacekeeping forces utterly failed to keep the peace.

Moise Tshombe

Mobutu who
power.

224

later (in a twist

in a military

Mobutu

poetic justice!

all his

opponents and

installed himself to

since then presided over a corrupt government, looting and plundering

when, rebel forces led by Laurent Kabila launched an

Mobutu's moribund regime. Mobutu

fled to exile in

Morocco. 225 Talk of

226

22

The impotence of the

beginning of the

of fate) met his match in the person of Let. Marshal

coup, liquidated

the resources of Zaire until recently
offensive against

223

crisis

OAU can partly be explained by lack of a unified approach at the

with the radical states calling for intervention, the conservatives favoring

noninterference in the internal affairs of the Congo, and 'lukewarm' state desiring a middle way. For

more

details of the division of the African

camp by

the

Congo crisis

see Robert C. Good,

Four Views

of the Congo Crisis, 6 AFR. REP. 2 (1961).
223

The

intractability

and complexity of the

conflict is best illustrated

Dag Hammerskerjold

by

the fact that the then

Congo while on a peace
mission. See Martyrdom in the Congo, 6 AFR. REP. 3 (1961); ARTHUR LEE BURNS & NINA
Heathcote, Peacekeeping by the United Nations: From Suez to the Congo 23-36 (1963).
United Nations Secretary General,

224

lost his life in the

CNN Plus: Newsmaker Profiles,

http ://crmplus.cnn.O)nVresources/newsmake^/world/afric/seko.html, 06/03/97
225

CN Plus:

Newsmaker Profiles,

htm://cnnplus.oin/resources/newsmakers/world/africa/kabUa.html, 06/03/97.
226

Exteraal intervention

made

the

worthwhile to note that the worst dictators

governments to keep them

makes

this

in power.

Congo crisis
in Africa

the

most

intractable conflicts in Africa.

It is

have always received support from western

A respected western weekly Magazine, "The Economist",

sad note:

"The outside powers provided some of the world's most unpleasant regimes
with arms and aid. President Reagan welcomed Mobutu Sese Seko, the
predatory boss of the Zairean kleptocracy, to the White House as a 'voice of
good sense and goodwill,' and decided to 'go with Doe' after Master-Sergeant
Samuel Doe had stolen a spectacularly corrupt election in Liberia. France sent

45
b.

The Nigerian

Civil

War

The Nigerian
227

nation-state.

a microcosm of internal contradictions within the African

civil is

Nigeria was a country of promise

British in I960.

228

It

when

was not only an epitome of hope

it

for Africa in the

(being a rich country with abundance oil deposits) but also a

experimentation.

229

If

base Nigeria had just

gained independence from the

showcase

in liberal

what an emerging country required was a democratic

that; the

an elaborate and generous

bill

democratic

institutional

Federal constitution adopted after independence contained

of rights. The principles of separation of powers and the rule

of law were deeply ingrained in the federal constitutional order.

Yet behind the constitutional facade of democracy and
strife

economic sphere

were slowly germinating

in the political

arena

_

230

rule of law, seeds of civil

the tribal inclination of Nigeria's

political parties underlined the precarious political balance that could be tilted at the

soldiers to sustain

incumbent dictators in Franciphone Africa. Britain's

Thatcher played footsie with the white supremacist government in Pretoria,

even after apartheid started to crumble, and dismissed Nelson Mandela's
African National Congress as "a typical

Economist,

227

terrorist organization."

A Survey of Sub-Saharan Africa, September 7th

[The

19961

civil war see Laurie S. Wiseberg, Emerging
AFRICAN STUDIES REV.l 17 (1975); Zdenek
Cervenka, The Nigerian Civil War 1967-1970, (1971); john De st. Jorre. The Nigerian Civil
War (1972); H. John Kirk-Green, Crisis in Nigeria Vol. I& n 1(971).

For a review of literature on the Nigerian

Literature: Studies of the Nigerian Civil War, 17

A

228

229

B

.0.

Nwabueze,

See generally

A Constitutional History of Nigeria, 599

(

1982).

Oluwole Idowu Odumosu, The Nigerian Constitution: History and

Development ( 1 963).
23

°T. O. Elias, Nigeria:

245(1967).

The Development of its Laws and Constitution

117-

46
slightest push.

231

The National Council of Nigerian

Citizens

(NCNC), was dominated by

the

Ibo of Eastern Nigeria, the Northern Peoples party of Nigeria (NPP), by The Hausa of
232

Northern Nigeria, and the Action Group (AG), by the Yoruba of the Western region.
federal

government was a quasi-national loose coalition of the Ibo and Hausa.

newly independent countries allegiance

to the tribe

amalgamation of tribes and not a nation per

se.

was

233

The

Like other

the norm. Indeed Nigeria

was an

234

In January 1966 a military coup detat engineered by Ibo officers took place and the
235

prime Minister Tafawa Balewa was assassinated.
of the previous coup was executed

power.

236

The

turn of events

Eastern Nigeria

Lt. CI.

John

J.

was unacceptable

to the Itr6~

The

military

Gowon

civil

that lasted for three years

Governor of

war

pitting the federal

government

and claimed an estimated one million

238

Stremlau, The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War: 1967-

1970,4(1977).

^Ntalaja supra note 126,

at 71.

^William d. Graf, The Nigerian State, Political Economy, State Class and
Political System in the Post-colonial Era 27
234

Woronoff supra note

235

(1

988).

10, at 397.

Amankwah supra note

135, at 206.

^Id
23

'The coup was followed by a slaughter of Ibos in the northern part of the country. This

precipitated the ill-fated secession of Biafra.

^Ramphul supra note

153, at 381.

to

declared the Eastern region an independent

The well known bloody

and the secessionist Biafra,

231

counter-coup that catapulted General

Odumegwu Ojukwu

state to be called Biafra.

people, ensued.

in a

Later Aguiyi-Ironsi (a Ibo) the leader

47

What role did the

OAU play in ending this unfortunate conflict? The OAU's capacity

was

to resolve this conflict

inhibited by

its

Charter; the principle of non-interference in the

OAU

internal affairs of member-states prevented the
crisis.

239

Although the

OAU

was aware of

doing nothing while a devastating

civil

impotence

its

war raged on

of Heads of State and Governments summit meeting
therefore discussed the

emphasized
Assembly

240

crisis.

resolution that

was Nigeria's

that the conflict

at the disposal

The

from going

in

in

it

into the

did not want to appear to be

an African country. The Assembly

Kinshasa (Zaire) in September 1967,

was passed

at the

241

The conference

a consultative mission to the head of the federal government to
territorial integrity, unity

One wonders why the head
the

OAU's Assembly

139

In reference to

end of the conference

internal affair but placed the "services of the

of the federal government."

Assembly's desire for the

bottom of the

also decided to send

"assure him of the

and peace of Nigeria."

242

of the federal government required this assurance from

of Heads of State and Government, since the Assembly was not

why

the

OAU failed to resolve the Nigerian crisis Tandon gives a summary
OAU even in the other African intra-state conflicts. He writes:

of reasons that explains the failure of

"The OAU framework collapsed because of the following factors:
The fust was that the OAU is, by design and constitution, and essentially
conservative organization.

It is

anti-secessionist, anti-intervennonist,

and anu-

OAU with reference to the Nigerian
situation was its ability to enforce its decisions on its member states. The OAU
border changes.

.

.

.The second weakness of the

could do no thin g to prevent four

member states (Tanzania, Zambia, Ivory Coast and
The OAU has no sanctions, except those of
collective disapprovation of defaulting states, but even those the OAU was
The third factor was the weakness
unprepared to invoke against the four states.
Gabo) from recognizing

Biafra.

.

of the

.

.

OAU with respect to the outside world. Neither the OAU, nor any of its

members, posess the power

to insulate African

problems from extra-regional

Tandon, The Internalization of Civil war: Lessons from the
Congo, Nigeria and Vietnam in Mazrui et aal supra note 206, at 68.
intervention. "Yashpal

240

Stremlau supra note 23 1 at 93.
,

mM.
™StcId.

48
fighting to

why send

dismember nor was

it

violating the territorrial integrity of Nigeria. In

a mission to convey such an assurance; one head of state or a letter to the federal

government would have served the purpose. Whatever

lukewarm response by the Assembly

The

OAU

war several

however, did what

member

issues are apparent.

same time remain

faithful

Charter explains the Assembly's confused state of mind and unmitigated

diplomatic blunder.

a

to the Nigerian civil

logic lay behind this confused

tension between the desire to resolve the conflict and at the

to the

any case

state.

By
it

sending the mission to the federal government the

had

all

along pledged never to do _ interfere

The unfortunate

thing

however

is

that

it

in the internal affairs

is

of

interfered not as an impartial

umpire bent on genuinely mediating between the parties and ending the
surpporter of the federal government. This

OAU ironically,

conflict, but as a

yet another case of people living in glass

243

houses and avoiding to throw stones.

Internal Conflicts Resulting from Challenges to the Legitimacy of the Authority

e.

in

Power
Most of

other

traits

the cases

discussed.

examined above manifest

this characteristic in

addition to the

A revisiting of the Congo crisis will illustrate this point.

The Congo

problem first started as a conflict between the secessionist movement of Moishe Tshombe
against the government of Prime Minister

243

this

Lumumba and

President Kasavubu.

African heads of state (like emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia

244

At

this

who was in the forefront of
own countries. The

Nigerian initiative) acted this in an attempt to preempt similar revolts in their

Nigerian crisis was thus a premonition of similar conflicts that had to engulf the continent

Another weakness of the
decisions of the
the legitimate

OAU displayed in this conflict is the inability of the members to stick to the

OAU. While the official policy of the OAU was

government of Nigeria, some member

sanction emanating from the

Authority in the
244

OAU,

later.

OAU.

See

W.

Scott

state

government as

to recognize Biafra without

Thompson & Richard

15 AFR. STUD. REV. 18 (1972).

Tandon supra note 206, at 206.

to support the federal

went ahead

Bissel,

Legitimacy and

any

49
period there was no regional body within which the African states could launch an

They

initiative.

therefore acted within the United Nations framework to support a peacekeeping

operation.

245

However when Lumumba was ousted by Kasavubu,

deeply divided.

246

The

radical Casablanca

to the legitimate authority of the

affairs

Congo and

therefore unacceptable while the conservative

to a specific

situation

Cyrille

seemed

Aduola was

to improve.

Lumumba. 248 However

his

in the

Congo

as interference

The

radical states

this

247

installed as the successor to

government proved

when Tshombe supported by
and Kilu provinces.

group

of the Congo. The African states could not, because of

polarization, act in concert within the United Nations.

When

become

group show the ouster of Lumumba as a challenge

Monrovia group viewed any overt support
with the internal

the African states

saw him

ineffective

Lumumba

in

1961, the

as a legitimate successor to

and the

conflict

was renewed

the Americans, Belgians and mercenaries invaded

from Kivu

249

In reaction to this externally supported offensive C.N.L, forces loyal to the late

Lumumba

received direct support from the neighboring states of

Congo

(Brazzaville),

Burundi, Uganda and the Sudan, while the United Arab Republic (UAR), Algeria and

Ghana

supplied

245

it

with arms.

250

Majority of the African state leaders questioned the

Frey-wouters supra note 107,

at

467.

^See generally Allan p. Merrian, Congo Background to the Conflict (1961
24

).

'Frey-wouters supra note 107, at 467

24

*Id.

249

Leon Gordenker, The

OAU and UN: can

206, at 115.
250

Frey-Wouters supra note 107,

at

467.

they Live Together? in Mazrui et aal supra note

.

50
legitimacy of Tshombe's rulership over the

puppet".

are

as a "neo-colonialist

251

Other conflicts

war

Congo and viewed him

all

like the

conflicts resulting

Sudanese

civil

from challenges

war, the Rhodesian

crisis,

to the legitimacy of the

intra-state conflicts in Africa

were accused of interfering

in

Togo

a coup in

to incorporate Article III (5) in the

of dictator Idi

Amin

Uganda.

in

financial, military aid,

in

255

^Gordenker supra

253

neighboring states.

Charter.

254

The most famous

256

253

It

was

unilateral

the Tanzanian 1979 intervention and ouster
its

Liberation commission overtly

and training grounds for rebel groups fighting the

Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa.
is

is

of independence

prompted the Addis Ababa conference

The OAU, through

Mozambique and Angola

an internal conflict

that

OAU

intervention by an African state into another

252

252

in the early years

in the internal conflicts within the

Ghana's alleged involvement

in

power

have involved external intervention either

from within or without Africa. Some African countries

regimes

in

civil

Conflicts Involving External Intervention

A number of

gave

Namibian

government

although they have other peculiar characteristics mentioned elsewhere.

f.

the

last colonial

as well as the racist white minority regimes in

The

latest unilateral

involvement by African states

the alleged military support by Uganda, Angola, Burundi and

note 249, at

1

15.

See c above and g below.

OAU: Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution in THE
Organization of African Unity After Thirty Year 9 (Yassin El-Ayouty ed., 1994).
See James O. Jonah, The

254

This

article

condemns

political assassinations

and subversive

activities

"on the part of

neighboring states or any other states."

^Antonio Tanga, Foreign Armed Intervention in Internal Conflicts
256

See Jacobson infra note 28 1

174 (1993).

51

Rwanda

of the rebels of Laurent Kabila. Mobutu's use of mercenaries (from the former

Yugoslavia)

this

Kabila's forces.

257

time did not change the cause of history; he was eventually ousted by

The

intervention by

ECOWAS

in Liberia

and Sierra Leone as well as the

involvement of the great lakes regional states in Burundi conflict

During the cold war the East-West
superpower intervention

Angolan and Mozambican

civil

in the

examined elsewhere.

conflict manifested itself in Africa

in African internal conflicts.

Russian and Chinese involvement

is

Congo

259

The

Stanleyville operation

through

and the

has already been mentioned.

crisis

258

The

wars have been sustained by the Cuban and Russian support

of the incumbent governments and the sponsorship of the rebel movements in both countries

by the then South African government and the United States.

made of

the

US

and Russian involvement

in the conflict

France too has numerously unilaterally intervened

governments threatened by a

g.

civil

war or mutiny.

Conflicts with Strong Religious

The Hutu-Tutsi conflict

within

in its

260

Mention has already been

between Somalia and Ethiopia.

former colonies to save incumbent

261

and Ethnic Underpinnings

Rwanda and Burundi epitomize

conflicts with strong

ethnic angles exacerbated by colonial divide-and-rule policy of playing ethnic groups against

^see supra

note 224;

Time Magazine, 36-40

(Sept. 1, Vol. 150,

No.

9, 1997).

^see Chapter V.
259

Douglas Rimmer, The Effects of Conflicts:

II

Economic

Effects inFurley supra note 97,

at 302.
260

See Kathryn O'Neill

& Barry Munslow, Angola: Ending the Cold War in Southern

Africa in Furley supra note 97, at
261

1

82-8.

France has intervened on many occasions

in

Chad, Central African Republic, Congo,

Gabon, Mauritania, and Niger while Britain intervened to quash
and Tanzania

in 1964.

See Furley supra note 97,

at 9.

army mutinies

in

Kenya, Uganda

52
262

each other.

undercurrents

One of
is

the best example of a conflict with both religious and ethnic

the Sudanese civil war.

The Sudan

divided between the north and the south.
"animist'' south

took arms shortly

British rule in 1956 to fight for
controlled by the
in

The predominantly

black, Christian

and

Sudanese independence from joint Egyptian and

autonomy from

Muslim and Arabist

a country ethnically and religiously

north.

264

the

Khartoum government which was

A settlement of the bloody war was reached

1972 with the south assuming greater autonomy within a federal system of

government.
in

after

263

is

265

The war resumed

Khartoum reneged on

in

1983 when the increasingly fundamentalist government

the 1972 agreement, adopting Islamic policies like Sharia

imposing them on the southerners.

The Sudanese Peoples
other liberation movements

266

Liberation
in the

Movement (SPLM)

led by Col.

John Garang and

south have continued to fight what they perceive as

Khartoum

internal colonization by the north dating back to days of slave trade while the

government

(especially the current regime of Al-Beshir) has, with strong determination

strived to crash

what

sees as an insurgency by infidels against Islam.

it

polarization a negotiated settlement in the near future

The Intergovernmental Agency

262

law and

for

is

inconceivable.

26
'

With

this

kind of

The OAU, through

development (IGAD), a sub-regional body

in the

horn

See Generally Neil Weiner, Hutu and Tutsi of Rwanda and Burundi, Netscape,

http://www.backgroundbriefing.com/hutututs.html, 06/1 7/97.
263

Reference
2(A

Mohamed Omer Beshir,
to the

Sudan

in

Conflict

and

Conflict Resolution in Africa

with Special

AFRICA: 25 YEARS ON 141(KWESI KRAFONA, Ed., 1988).

Id. at 143.

265

Donald Rothchild & Caroline Hartzell, The Peace Process
Stop the Killing 63-93 (Roy Licklider ed., 1993).
266

Peter

267

-

Woodward, Sudan War Without End in Furley supra

in the

Sudan 1971

J 972 IN

note, at 102.

See generally Angella M. Lloyd, The Southern Sudan: a Case for Secession, 32 COLUM.

J.TRANSN'LL.419(1994).

1
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of Africa,

268

has attempted to mediate an end to the conflict but has avoided direct

involvement for fear of precipitating a fallout (between the Islamic states

in the

sub-Saharan states) that could destroy the unity within the continental body.

modest success

in

some

endeavours

peace

two

efforts of the

It is

important to identify

in Africa. Internal conflicts

OAU

OAU. The

daunting challenge to the

reasons. First,

been characterized by

in conflict resolution has

OAU has made and the challenges

at establishing lasting

conflicts for

OAU

the

cases and dismal failure in others.

general fashion) inroads the

269

OAU in Conflict Resolution and Dispute Settlement

D. Assessment of the Role of the

The performance of

it

has faced in

in

the

Congo

that the

Secondly, the
internal conflicts.
internal conflicts

has been helpless in the face of intra-state

where foreign forces have been involved the capacity of the

IG AD

is

270

271

OAU. For

superpower intervention was so pervasive and

OAU

lacks the power, 'locus standi', so to speak, to intervene in
to understanding the impotence of the

IQ

member

(3)

which prohibits member
271

states.

composed of Kenya,

states

OAU
from

Jonah supra note 253,

at

OAU Charter Art. m (2).

at

1

15.

with

interfering with

Ethiopia, Sudan, Uganda, Eritrea and Somalia. See

1 1.

Gordenker supra note 249,

in dealing

This provision has been conservatively interpreted

Daily Nation, hrnp://www.africaonlme.co.ke/...onlme/nauon/970707/rn/2.html.
269

is

OAU efforts to nullify them proved fruitless.

Article

internal affairs of other

the

crisis

The key
is

a

general

OAU to impact positively on a conflict were substantially eroded. 270 This

overwhelming

268

its

(in

have presented the most

explained by the fact that extraterritorial forces have been too strong for the
instance

north and

The

54
and applied to place

OAU. The
state

and

former.

resulted

conflicts within a state

is

an

and conceptually

artificial

OAU

intra-state conflicts, with the

As

self-evident to

is

beyond the purview and
unrealistic

jurisdiction of the

dichotomy between

inter-

having jurisdiction to deal only with the

any casual observer of the African scene,

this distinction is

not

realistic.

All intra-state conflicts have a trans-border spillover effect that cannot be ignored

by other

states. It is

be faithful to
that

therefore (as the above case studies show) impossible for the

this distinction.

could be viewed as

The

internal.

impair the capacity of the

OAU intervened in one way or another in all the cases

The only

thing that this distinction does

the Nigerian federal

affair, to

This

be faithful to

way

OAU

the

this

government

OAU

although

this

beginning.

was

273

unsatisfactory.

norm, the

was a Nigerian

it

had insulated

itself

the area that confronted the

been

internal

272

admitted

border conflicts;

OAU with the biggest challenge from the
boundaries

were

and

It

has

2 4

Writers and observers of the African scene have nonetheless conceded

'

more

conflicts.

map

that

colonial

arbitrary

of Africa will invite unprecedented problems and even

The maintenance of the

status

quo has proven more prudent than opening

supra note 239.

l/3

For instance it contributed to the end of Ethiopia/Somali/Kenya border
Morocco/ Alegeria border conflict. See Gordenkor supra note 249, at 1 14.
274

but

from being accused of

has however registered success in the sphere of

attempts to redraw the

see

and

OAU intervened in support of the federal government.

ironically thought

that

272

to enfeeble

OAU was unable to stay aloof,

insisted that the conflict

undermining the sovereign integrity of Nigeria.

The

is

OAU to resolve intra-state conflicts without preventing the OAU

from intervening. In the case of Nigeria for example the
since

OAU to

W.at3.

conflict

and

s

55

box by attempting

a pandora's
this rule in

to revise borders.

275

The

OAU over the years,

every conflict and the rule has become the norm.

expression

in the legal doctrine

of

uti possidetis.

borders have been maintained in Africa

America fought over

The

The

stability

rule has

with which the colonial

wars between India and Pakistan, the 1962 Sino-

India war, and the extra-ordinary carnage of the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war,

over disputed territory,"

The

movements with

275

William

Deng

J.

OAU in decolonization cannot

which originated

279

be overemphasized.

were generated by the clash between the African independent

itself to the eradication

Conflicts in

although some scholars feel otherwise.

role played by the

conflicts in Africa

liberation

278

found juridical

astounding considering "the three wars in Latin

is

frontier issues, the

211

276

has stuck to

Foltz,

et aal

of

the colonial regimes.

all

From

vestiges of colonialism

its

inception, the

Many

states

and

OAU dedicated

from the continent.

280

Through

its

The Organization of African Unity and the resolution of Africa

supra note 95,

at 353.

276

Alan K. Henrikson, The United Nations and Regional Organizations: "King-links" of a
"Global Chain," 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 35, 48 (1996).
277

This

is

a prescriptive doctrine that asserts the continuity of African state entities the

transfer of sovereignty

from the colonial regimes notwithstanding. See Crawford Young, Selfet aal supra note 95,

determination, territorial Integrity, and the African State Systems in Deng

at

328.
278

Id. at

279

1

332.

See Dr. Makau

16 MlCH.J. INT'L L.

1 1

Wa Mutua, Why Redraw the Map of Africa: A Moral and Legal Inquiry,

13,

1 1

14 (1996)-

He wites: "The juridical

statehood attained with the

decolonization of the colonial state has in the last four decades proven inadequate.
increasingly apparent that these concepts and principles

capsule; they

now seem

to

may have

It is

becoming

trapped in a detrimental time

be straight-jackets with time-bombs ready to explode. The imposition of

the nation-state through colonization balkanized Africa into ahistorical units and forcibly yanked into
the age of Europe, permanently disfiguring

it."

Mutua

beautifully describes the

problem of colonial

borders but does not address the fundamental issue of how Africa can go about redrawing

He does

not offer a formula. Should Africa call another Berlin Conference, for example?

280

See

OAU Charter Art. 11(d) & m(6).

its

map.

.
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liberation committee, the

movements, and
to Act.

281

at the

For instance

OAU

gave material and military support to the liberation

United Nations level put diplomatic pressure on the United Nations

Many

on South

anti-apartheid resolutions, sanctions

Africa,

282

and

the resolutions establishing steps towards independence for Namibia were crafted at the

prodding of the

OAU members at the United Nations.

283

independence of Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe.

South Africa

it

can be said Africa

Another

significant step

in

is

now

the

OAU's

stability in the

world through disarmament.

sophisticated

weaponry

Africa.

two
a

By

things.

new

free

It

The
284

OAU has contributed to the

With the end of Apartheid

from any form of colonial

One,

it

peace and

cannot be gainsaid that the presence of highly
insecurity,

adopting a convention making Africa a denuclearized zone the
286

285

effort to contribute generally to

world has contributed to general

in the

rule.

has saved Africa from the costs of an arms race.

more so

human

rights dimension; either they are

violations, are triggered by attempts to stop

281

Jacobson supra note 281

282

,

at

287-306

human

in

OAU has done

Two,

it

has charted

path in ongoing search for peace and stability based not on militarism but on trust.
All conflicts have a

in

287

caused by human rights

rights violations,

and certainly they

.

See United Nations General Assembly Resolution 48/258 on the Elemination of

Apartheid and the Establishment of a United, Democratic and Non-racial South Africa, 33 I.L.M.

1055 (1994).
283

See The United Nations General Assembly Resolution on the Question of Namibia, 20

I.L.M. 516(1981).
284

Gordenker supra note 249,

285

286

Goodrich supra note 184,

at

at

1 1 1

316-32.

See Organization of African Unity: African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba

Texy), 35 I.L.M. 698 (1996).
287

Lyon supra note 202, at 17; for a discussion of post-colonial militarization in
Africa see Robin Luckham, The Military, Militarization and Democratization in Africa: A Survey
of Literature and Issues, 37 THE AFR. STUD. REV. 27 (1994).
Peter
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human

entail

Peoples

'

conflicts_

rights violations.

Rights
is

289

_seen

288

in the

The adoption of

backdrop of the human

the adoption of the Charter

it

marks a

could close
in

its

rights

The

regionalization of

a significant step in the

radical departure

human

pertaining to

is

stability.

from the

were seen

human

as internal affairs of

288

and

caused by

human

human

rights in

rights through

movement

in Africa, in

1970s within which issues

member

state,

hence the

OAU

eyes to for example the massacres of tens of thousands of Hutu in Burundi

Jean Bedel Bokassa
290

rights

OAU policy of the

1972 and 1973 and the massive violations of human

Guinea

on Human and

rights crisis in Africa

a milestone in the long road towards establishing a culture of

Africa_ a prerequisite for peace and

that

the African Charter

Idi

rights

in the Central African Republic,

Amin

in

Uganda.

by the notorious regimes of

Marcias

Nguema

of Equitorial

291

Louise Pirouet supra note 102,

at

275-94; Oloka-Onyango. Beyond Rhetoric:

Reinvigorating the Struggle for Economic and Social Rights

in Africa,

26 CAL.W. INT'L L.J.

1

(1995).
289

Reprinted in 21 1.L.M 69 (1980).

290

AM. J.

U.O. Umozurike, The African Charter on
INT'LL. 902, 903 (1983).

Human and Peoples'

Rights, 77

^See David Gyyn, Idi Amin: Death-light of Africa (1977); Martin Jameson, Idi
Amin and Uganda (1992).

CHAPTER n

THE OAU/UN INTERACTION IN AFRICAN CONFLICT RESOLUTION

A.

The

OAU as a

Regional Organization Within the Meaning of Chapter

VD3

of the

United Nations Charter.

The

role played

by regional organizations

in the

maintenance of international peace

and security cannot be overemphasized. This point was not
conference that drafted the Charter of the United Nations.

between those who favored a universal system and those
within a universal framework,

was incorporated
Nothing

293

who

the later visionary position

into the United Nations Charter. Article

in

the

present

Charter

precludes

292

lost in the

San Franscisco

While there was polarization

desired regional arrangements

won

the day

when Chapter

Vm

52 declares:

the

existence

arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters

of regional

as relating to the

maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional
action, provided that such arrangements or agencies

and

their activities are

consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

The independent

294

existence of regional organizations and their competence to deal

with matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security, cannot be

292

For a discussion of the importance the San Francisco conference attached to regional
RUTH B. RUSSEL, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS 688-703 (1958); Anthony

organizations see

Clark Arend, The United Nations, Regional Organizations, and Military operations: the Past and
the Present 1
293

DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L.

3,

5-17 (1996).

Jane A. Meyer, collective Self-defense and Regional Security: Necessary Exceptions to

a Globalist Doctrine, 11 B.U.lN'LL.J. 391,408 (1993).
294

U.N. Charter Art. 52.

58

59
questioned. The Charter, in no uncertain terms recognizes the legal capacity of regional
organizations to deal with matters relating to regional peace and security, as long as their

do not run afoul

activities

however,

that

is

An

agencies."

situations that

to the purposes of the United Nations.

no attempt

is

made

attempt by Egypt to

may

in the

sell

295

What

is

unsatisfactory

Charter to define "regional arrangements or

a definition

was dismissed

be covered by regional arrangements.

296

too restrictive of

as

Organizations were therefore

left

to themselves to decide whether they qualified to be regional organizations or not.

The question

Where an
(OAS),

that

itself

here

organization explicitly states in

that

especially

it is

if it

organization

problematic.

The

its

is

whether the

O AU is

a regional organization.

charter, like the Organization

of American States

a regional organization, one would have no problem in agreeing that

performs regional security functions.

is silent

their organization

is

on

this

matter like the

not a Chapter

VIQ

297

A situation where

OAU Charter,

or where the

organization like the

OAU

beyond doubt. The

was formed long
its

the charter of an

Members claim

NATO members

do,

after the

legal status

UN was

created. That the founders

and competencies

vis

a

vis the

more

purposes and principles of the

is

OAU are not disimilar to those

U. N. Charter Art. 52.

^Okoye supra note 87. at

155 (1972).

^Charter of the Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394, as
amended by the 1967 Protocol of Amendment, 21 U.S.T. 607 (effective Feb. 27, 1970) Art.2

OAS

had the

United Nations

295

298

is

that

OAU Charter is awash with evidence showing that the drafters grappled

this question. Firstly, the

[hereinafter

it is;

298

opportunity to consider

with

imposes

Charter].

See Christopher

J.

Borgen, The Theory and Practice of Regional Organization
POL. 797, 807 (1994).

Intervention in Civil Wars, 26 N. Y.U.J. INT'L L.

&

.

60
of the United Nations.
Nations.

The

299

Secondly, the

OAU Charter makes several refences to the United

OAU founders were convinced that "the Charter of the United Nations and the

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to the principles of which

we

reaffirm our adherance

provide a solid foundation for peaceful and positive cooperation

commitment of
Nations

is

the

members of

further underlined

the

by Article

OAU

to the purposes

II (l)(e)

which

among

states.

300

The

and principles of the United

states the

OAU's

goal of promoting

"international cooperation, having due regard to the United Nations Charter and the

Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

of the

OAU

301

Article

XXVI

further provides for the registration

Charter (after ratification) with the United Nations Secretariat "in conformity

with Article 102 of the Charter of United Nations."

There

is

no question

302

that the founders recognized the primary role of the

United

Nations in the maintenance of international peace and security. Nonetheless, the assertion that
the founders considered the
rather curious.

It is

OAU a regional organization yet failed to explicitly state so is

unbelievable that such an important issue could have escaped the mind

of the Addis Ababa summit.
founders envisioned the

Some

writers have interpreted Article

OAU as a regional organization.

303

Article

26

to

26 reads

mean

that the

as follows:

"This Charter shall, after due ratification, be registered with the secretariat of the United

Nations through the Government of Ethiopia

in

Nations Charter." Clearly, such an interpretation
the United Nations Secretariat

^See OAU

is

Charter Art.H; U. N. Charter Art.l

^The OAU Charter Art. E (1 ) e.
The

303

is

OAU charter Art. XXVI.

Amankwah supra

far-fetched. Registration of treaties with

a requirement of the international law of treaties and has

^^e OAU Charter Preamble.

302

conformity with Article 102 of the United

note 135, at 200.

61
nothing to do with nature of the treaty being registered. All treaties, bilateral or multilateral,

such

irrespective of the nature of legal relations

treaties create are required to

be registered

with the United Nations Secretariat.

A

more

credible explanation of the silence of the

relationship with the United Nations

is

OAU

a desire on the part of the

Charter as to

its

legal

OAU to avoid direction and

control by the "extra-African" United Nations Security Council, and therefore preserve

independence and non-aligned stance.
.

.the point

.

must be made

304

Okoye eloquently argued

that the Charter of the

this

it

point thus:

OAU envisaged the concept

of a regional organization operating independently of the United Nations and
of the Security Council in particular. The general impression
carefully avoided
its

any

specific formulations

activities are subject to

is

that the

OAU

which might remotely suggest

United Nations

control.

Member

that

states are

impatient in their desire for national progress and African advancement and

they are afraid that the United Nations crippled by cold war politics will

on such matters

frustrate their efforts

the struggle against neo-colonialism".

The OAU's quest

autonomy and

for

Nations does not however preclude

Chapter

VHI despite

Neither does

its

NATO's

it

as the right to self-determination,

originality

of initiative independent of the United

from being a regional organization for the purposes of

other stated aims and objectives outside the realm of chapter

protestations that

it is

supervisory role of the Security Council
character notwithstanding.

307

_ make

OAU and the UN: can

206. at 112.

^Okoye supra
306

it

Indeed, the utilization

Leon Gordenker, The

note 87,

Meyer supra note 293,

at 158.

at

417.

^See Borgen supra note 298, at 807.

VEQ.

306

not a regional organization but a self-defense

arrangement within the meaning of Article 5 1 _ aimed

304

and

305

at

escape

avoiding being subjected to the

this classification; its self-defense

NATO troops

by the United Nations for

they Live Together, in Mazrui supra note

62
enforcement action in the former Yugoslavia clearly demonstrates the duality of

and regional arrangement), and the

a self-defense

Charter.

308

flexibility

NATO

(as

UN

of Chapter VIII of the

Indeed even the European Community (EC), a regional economic organization,

has been drawn into regional dispute settlement and security concerns in the Balkans.
clearly demonstrates the foresight of those

who

309

This

rejected attempts at defining "regional

arrangements," the result of which could only have been to deny the United Nations Charter
the flexibility necessary in dealing with regional crises like that in the Balkans.

it

employed

in Article

elastic

enough

52 of the United Nations Charter

to denote

all

B.

Involvement

inclusive and

to dealing regional

therefore a regional organization the silence of

OAU-UN

is

multilateral agencies of a regional character

encompass but are not necessarily restricted
is

the

sensible and logical to conclude that the term "regional arrangement"

foregoing

is

From

in

its

was intended

to be

whose competencies

peace and security. The

OAU

Charter notwithstanding.

African Conflict Resolution and Peace Making: Tackling

Jurisdictional Bottlenecks

The United Nations and
important to examine

how

the

these

given the fact that although the

OAU

have co-existed for over three decades.

two organizations have

OAU

It is

related over the years, especially

Charter recognizes the importance of the United

Nations and pledges to promote the purposes of the United Nations, no formal legal
relationship between the

OAU

(as already

308

two bodies

envisioned by their respective charters. Indeed the

mentioned) has over the years seen

Meyer supra note 293,

309

is

at

Borgen supra note 298,

431.

at 809.

itself as

an autonomous regional

63
organization always taking with a pitch of salt any interaction with the Security Council that

may

lead credence to the view that

This does not

in

way mean

any

uneasy relationship. Far from

it is

that.

The

a subordinate actor in the regional scene.
that the

relationship

has always been cordial and warm; manifesting

the

member

1963 the

states

United Nations".
is

OAU,

of the

311

adopted

at the

two organizations

that

have evolved over

through a resolution termed "Africa and the United Nations,"

OAU expressed their commitment "to strengthen and surpport the

The African

states underlined their conviction that the

economic and

social

"United Nations

among

nations and for

advancement of all peoples." 312 Another resolution

Nineth Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers and approved by the

Assembly of Heads of States
with the United Nations and

1967

in

its

have charted out

specialized agencies.

in the social

Economic Commission

of the

spelt out the principles

Of practical importance however is

commenced

OAU

resolutions by both organizations and

an important instrument for the maintenance of peace and security

the promotion of

OAU have had an

between the United Nations and the

itself in

various forms of mutual cooperation between the
the years. In

United Nations and the

310

OAU policy in dealing

313

the cooperation the United Nations

and economic

fields.

The work of

for Africa that has been critical in the

with a special agreement between the

OAU

and the

OAU

the United Nations

development of Africa, was

and the United Nations.

314

The

OAU adopted in 1980 Lagos plan of Action (LP A) for the economic development of Africa,
a comprehensive

310

311

in

document

detailing the strategies for Africa's

See Gordenker supra note 304,

1

13;

Okoye supra note

Discussed in Okoye supra note 87, at 157.
ld.

313

ld.
314

at

See Sohn supra note 16,

at 129.

economic development to the

87, at 158.

64
year 2000.

Lagos

315

In 1985 the

OAU adopted a revised and a more down-to-earth version of the
Program

Plan, the "African Priority

Nations General Assembly,

Program of Action
support of the

support of

in

for African

for

Economic Recovery (APPER).
this initiative,

316

The United

approved the "United Nations

Economic Recovery and Development (UNPAAERD)"

in

OAU initiative. 317

Examples are a legion of

UN-OAU

particular concern for this thesis, however,

is

cooperation

the

in the

socio-economic

field.

Of

UN-OAU cooperation in conflict resolution

and peace making. The charters of both organizations invest them with the authority to deal

with conflicts and

settle disputes.

318

While the

geographical land mass occupied by the
universal.

Hence not only do

the

OAU

OAU

mandate

is

restricted within the

members, the United Nation's mandate

membership of both organizations overlap, but

is

also their

respective jurisdictions in dealing with conflicts.

The United Nations Charter of course attempts
organizations to the utilization of peaceful
the

monopoly of use of force,

The United Nations Charter

means

to restrict the jurisdiction of regional

for regional dispute settlement,

the so-called enforcement measures for the Security Council.

also attempts to create an hierarchy of sorts

instruments of pacific settlement of disputes and the security Council.
called

upon

to

and retains

"make every effort

319

between regional

The member

to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes

states are

through such

regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security

315

See Berhanukun Andemicael, OAU-UN Relations in a Changing World in THE
Organization of African Unity After Thirty Years, 1 30 (Yassin El-Ayouty, ed. 1994).
31

V

317

A*.

318

319

See the U.N. Charter Chapter VI

The U. N.

Charter Art. 24.

&VR;

the

OAU Charter Art. XIX.

65
Council."

320

The

security Council

is

therefore a tribunal of last resort after "exhausting local

remedies," so to speak.

These provisions however do not

Security Council expected to intervene
disputants have

made every

regional arrangements.

in

another

How is the Security Council to

way what

disputes are not local?

when

Do

And what

"good

the

of local disputes through

is

these provisions

utilize

is

after the

determine every effort has been

failed to resolve a dispute?

Council or the Secretary General has no power to
local disputes

One might answer:

in a local dispute?

effort to achieve pacific settlement

and regional arrangements have
it

of computation of

between the United Nations and regional mechanisms. 321 At what point

jurisdiction

to put

clarify conclusively the issue

made

a local dispute?

mean

Or

the Security

offices" for resolution of

regional agencies are undertaking similar initiatives, or even

when

regional agencies have not gotten involved? There are no easy answers to these questions.

What

is

clear

however,

is

that nothing in the

United Nations Charter prevents the

Security Council or the Secretary-General from being involved
Indeed, Chapter
in the

VI of the United Nations Charter empowers

resolution of conflicts through peaceful means.

in a dispute at

any stage.

the Security Council to assist

The Security Council "may

the parties to settle their disputes by such means, and

may

call

upon

investigate any dispute or any

other situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute."

322

That

regional organizations do not have exclusive jurisdiction over disputes "appropriate for

320

The U.N. Charter

321

Art.

52

(2).

Indeed, scholars have raised the question of jurisdiction in a

number of conflicts. Some

observers believed the Arab League was the competent forum to deal with the Gulf conflict at the
initial stages.

At

the early stages of the conflict in the Balkans the United Nations and the regional

organizations including

away from

note 292, at
322

NATO,

Western European Union and the European Union seemed to back

the conflict each expecting the other to
3.

U. N. Charter Art. 34.

assume jurisdiction. For

details see

Arend supra

66
regional action," (assuming

is

it

underlined by none other than

possible to determine

is

fully

was

are),

Dag Hammarskjold:

The importance of regional arrangements
security

what such disputes

in the

maintenance of peace and

recognized in the Charter and the appropriate use of such

arrangements

is

encouraged. But in those cases where resort to such

arrangements

is

chosen

in the first instance, that

choice should not be

permitted to cast any doubt on the ultimate responsibility of the United
Nations.

The

323

short and long of this

is

that in

many

instances the United Nations and regional

organizations have ovelapping jurisdictions over regional disputes and one can imagine
scenarios of tension between the

over a dispute.
the

OAU

324

It is

two organizations

interesting to see

and the United Nations

disputes in Africa. Depending

i.

this

both assert

their respective jurisdiction

anomalous situation has been avoided by

in their various efforts to resolve conflicts

and

settle

on the nature of the dispute a mondus vivendi has been evolved

between the United Nation and the
competition for jurisdiction

how

if

OAU

to avoid tension

and

friction that

any form of

may generate.

The United Nations Deferrence
The wisdom of deferring

to the

OAU.

to regional organizations

by the security Council

lies in

the

recognition that regional agencies have intimate knowledge and understanding of the
intricacies

of local conflicts and are hence better suited to fashion out appropriate remedies.

The Security Council

323

has, in appropriate cases,

Aida L. Levin, The

more

often than not deferred to the

325

OAU

OAS and the UN: Relations in the Peace and Security Fields

45(1974).
324

A case in point was the tension created between the United Nations and the Organization

of American States (OAS) in 1965 when both organizations competed for jurisdiction over the
in the

Dominican Republic. Henrikson supra note 276,
325

Meyer supra note 293,

at

410.

at 47-48.

crisis

67

when

a dispute has been refered to

OAU

first. "African

solutions.

a practice that has politically been dubbed "try the

it,

countries have also tried their best to give African problems African

326

Examples of

this practice

abound.

When Morocco

border conflict with Algeria to the Security Council,

it

Security Council to seek a settlement within the
prevailed

upon

conflicts with

to

withdraw

Kenya and

its

Ethiopia, until the

OAU

to cooperate to the fullest with the
its

ii.

was persuaded by her

OAU

327
first.

to submit

within the

allies

Similarly,

in its effort to settle the conflict.

civil

OAU has delt with them,

lot

or

its

Somalia was
its

border

In the Western

OAU by calling upon the protagonists

war mainly due

the side of the federal government.

Council has over the years shown a
before the

1962

OAU had adjudicated the dispute.

hands off the 1967-70 Nigeria

was already involved on

in

petition before the Security Council dealing with

Sahara conflict the Security Council deferred to the

Nations Kept

decided

329

328

The United

to the fact that the

OAU

In a nutshell the Security

of reluctance to deal with African border conflicts

when

the

OAU is seized of the matter. 330

Concurrent Exercise of Jurisdiction
Other than deferring to the

Nations and the
instances

326

327

328

329

when

OAU there are many other occasions

when

the United

OAU have jointly attempted to deal with a conflict on an equal footing and
the United Nations has taken an upper hand and relegated the

OAU to the

See Henrikson supra note 276.
Layachi supra note 1 5 1

,

at 151.

S.CRes. 658, U.N. SCOR, 2929th MTG., U.N. Doc. S/RES/658 (1990).
See Stremlau supra note 231,

at 129.

330

See Berhanykun Andemicael, The Organization of African Unity and the United
Nations: Relations in the Peace and Security Field, in REGIONALISM AND THE UNITED NATIONS
238, 254-56 (Berhanykun Andemicael

ed., 1979).

68
backstage. The United Nations and the
operations in both the

Congo and Chad, and

condemning super power

the United Nations and the

footing

is

war

OAU

have

peace envoy

in the

delt

the modalities of a cease-fire.

332

331

The

the

to mediate over the conflict

and work out

the three point peace plan

in Pretoria

conflict

a classic example of a dispute

is

its

(South Africa) were

when

the

one of the protagonists

conflict pointing out that the
334

It is

OAU is at

OAU started to decline at the

OAU officially admitted the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (S ADR) into

OAU. Morocco,

umpire.

where the

role diminishes as that of the Security Council

and the General Assembly increases. The involvement of the

the

example of a situation

OAU appointed a

Both organizations adopted

predominantly involved, but gradually

point

in

333

The Western Sahara
first

latest

OAU

of Laurent Kabila and the government

proposed by the mediator upon which the peace negotiations
based.

peacekeeping

with a conflict in a more or less equal

in Zaire pitting the rebels

name of Mohamed Sahoun

jointly involved in

the United Nations joined the

Mobutu Seseseko. The Unite Nations and

of dictator
joint

were

intervention in the former.

where

the recent civil

OAU

OAU,

however worth noting

in the conflict rejected

after admitting

SADR

OAU mediation in the

was no longer an

that the three point formula formulated

331

impartial

by the

R A. Akindele, The Organization of African Unity and the Promotion of
World Peace: a Study of Universal-Regional Systems 98-102 (1976).
.

332

The Daily Nation, Monday April

33

28, 1997.

V

334

See Naldi supra note 148,

at 152.

OAU

,

69
special

committee reverberates

implicitly supported

Security Council and General Assembly level, and

at the

by the decision of the International Court of Justice.

The United Nations has

is

335

also played a pivotal role in the resolution of conflicts related

with decolonization such as the Namibian and South African (apartheid) conflict.

336

However,

although the steps leading to the resolution of these peculiar conflicts (especially the

Namibian one

)

were crafted

United Nations

at the

OAU played a backstage role.

would be wrong

to assert that the

United Nations arena,

at the

OAU level they adopted

OAU Charter_ giving material, military and logistical support to

a strategy envisioned in the

movements involved

African territories which are

From

it

OAU member states concentrated their diplomatic

While the

efforts to resolve these conflicts at the

national liberation

level,

the foregoing,

in these conflicts

dependent."

it is

difficult to identify

hard and fast rules on which the

their relationship in exercising their

jurisdictions to resolve African conflicts.

It is safe,

OAU

overlapping

however, to conclude that a pragmatic

approach_ based on the nature of the dispute and the
dictated the nature of the partnership

for the "total emancipation of

338

still

and the United Nations have based

337

practical realities of the

between the United Nations and the

day _ has

OAU in resolving

African conflicts.

335

See Chapter

I

(B)(1)(b).

336

For a detailed discussion of the involvement of the United Nations

African conflict see Ibrahim

The United Nations
337

338

J.

Gassama, Reaffirming Faith

NGOs and Apartheid

Gordenker supra note 249,

OAU Charter Art.m (6).

at

1

in the

19 FORDHAM INTR'L L.
12.

in resolving the

Dignity of Each
J.

1464 (1996).

Human

South

Being:

70
C. Utilization of United Nations Mechanisms for Resolution of African Conflicts:

Problems and Prospects

1.

The Security Council
Resort to the Security Council

African conflicts. In

this regard,

is

whenever the

action against a regional threat to peace,
for a

stamp of approval.

339

one avenue the

it

OAU

will submit

OAU may consider in resolving

wishes to undertake an enforcement
its

resolution to the Security Council

Alternatively, a member-state or the

a conflict to the jurisdiction of the Security Council for

it

OAU collectively may submit

to take a decision as to

whether

or not enforcement action under Chapter VII or other measures under Chapter
appropriate for such a conflict.

caution the

340

VI

is

Various shortcomings of the Security Council will however

OAU against relying on the Security Council to guarantee peace and security in

Africa.

Firstly,

a danger of a deadlock within the Security Council

of the permanent members using
in the geopolitical interest

its

of such a

is real,

with one or more

veto power to block a Security Council decision,

member

or

members so

to do.

341

Especially

now

if it is

after the

end of the cold war when the hegemonic dominance of the United States prevails

in the

Security Council, one expects any decision that does not advance Washington's perceived

339

Article 53 of the United Nations Charter prohibits regional organizations from taking

"enforcement measures" without Security Council authorization.
340

Member

states of the United Nations are obligated,

means

they are unable to settle by peaceful

under Article 37, to refer disputes that

to the Security Council.

^Borgen writes: The dilemma of deadlock arises when a regional
undertake an enforcement action but

is

Security Council stays silent as to whether or not a given situation

and

security, or b. Security Council

as such

would

result in a veto.

organization wishes to

unable to get security Council approval because:

members

is

a.

The

a threat to international peace

believe that any attempt officially to label the situation

Borgen supra note 298,

at 802.

71
foreign policy, to be blocked.

competence to resolve the

342

Once

the

OAU submits a conflict to the Security Council the

conflict henceforth devolves in the Security Council.

Security Council retains the keys to the resolution of the conflict and
resolve the conflict or

may keep

it

in its locker, letting the conflict

may

Hence

use the keys to

continue unresolved.

That the Security Council as presently constituted suffers from a democratic

and a

crisis

Council that
states that

of legitimacy
is

is

able to carry out

form the majority

raw power by
Gassama puts

beyond doubt.

of

affairs in

what they see

at

as

an exercise of

framework of the Security Council. Professor

an historical perspective thus:

During the Cold War, the potential
essentially

deficit

While welcoming a more revitalized Security

United Nations object

the United States within the
this state

343

mandate under the United Nations Charter, the small

its

in the

344

the

undemocratic nature was not

for abuse of these
at issue.

powers and

their

Indeed, the key concern then

was the Council's inability to act on controversial matters since the hostility
between East and west virtually assured institutional paralysis. Permanent
members on the Council routinely frustrated the resolution of most major
global issues. This institutional paralysis, however also meant that the Security

Council did not interfere

in the affairs

of smaller

members of the

organization.

Today, with the Security Council increasingly disposed to following U.S.
leadership, smaller nations are becoming more concerned about the Council's
powers, independence, and accountablity.

342

Ruth Gordon, United Nations Intervention

Many

of these nations

now

in Internal Conflicts: Iraq,

Somalia, and

Beyond, 15 MICH. J. INT'LL. 519, 581 (1994).

^See U.N.
344

Charter Art. 25

0ne of the

& Chapter VH.

ironies of the United Nations

recent past sought to promote democracy

system

by interveninng

democratic regime to power, lacks democratic credetials of
are

now

Human

is

in

that the Security Council that has in the

some

its

states like Haiti to restore a

own.

Many writers and commentators

questioning the credibility and legitimacy of the Council. See David Bills, International

Rights and Humanitarian Intervention: the ramifications of reform on the United Nations'
J. 107, 117 (1996); Sean D. Murphy, The Security Council,

Security Council, 31 TEX. INT'L

Legitimacy and the concept of Collective Security After the Cold War, 32 COLUM.
L. 201, 247 (1994)

J.

TRANSNAT'L

72
advocate changes to the council that would make
of the membership of the United Nations.

It is

it

more

representative

345

not just the small states that acknowlegde the need for reforming the Security

Council. Big states including the United States have
the Security Council to reflect the present

day

reality.

owned up
346

An Agenda

United Nations Secretary-General Report's,

community on

for

Peace by the immidiate former
,

347

and the appointment of a

the reform of the Security Council, a consensus in the international

the inevitability of reform seems to have been reached.

The crux of

need for overhauling

Indeed, with the publication of the

Secretary-General, underlining the need for such reforms,

Working Group on

to the

the matter, however,

is

reforms desired by the community of nations.

determing

in specific

348

terms the nature of the

A plethora of proposals have been put forward

depending on what the proponents of these proposals feel are the fundamental flaws within
the Security Council and the nature of the changes they discern will address these

shortcomings.

Some

Scholars have argued that during the Cold

War

East- West division

dominated the United Nations, but with the collapse of communism, and the end of the Cold

War, we now have a North-South
United Nations.

South

349

division.

conflict (other than East- West divide)

Hence, they Argue, a reformed Security Council must

The

status

dominating the

reflect this

North-

quo characterized by Northern dominance, they argue,

^^rahim J. Gassama, World Order

in the

Post-cold

War Era: The Relevance and

the

Role of the United Nations After Fifty Years, 20 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 255, 318 (1994).
346

See David

Bills.

International

Human

Rights and Humanitarian Intervention: the

Ramifications of Reform on the United Nation's Security Council 31 TEX. NTER. L.

J.

107, 117

(1996).
34

'United Nations Report of the Secretary-General on

An Agenda for Peace _ Preventive

Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping, June 17 1992, 31

^G.A. Res.
349

Bills

26, U.N.

GAOR, 48th Sess.,

supra note 346,

at

1

19.

I.

L.

M. 953

(1992).

Supp. No.49, 29 U.N. Doc. A/48/49 (1993).

is

1

73
unpalatable.

their

350

Some

scholars have advocated for the scrapping of the veto power, since in

view veto power only serves to undermine the principle of sovereign equality of states

upon which

the international law edifice

law, goes to emphasize that might

Others would

is

is

predicated, and instead of buttressing the rule of

right.

351

like to see the one-state-one- vote

system

in

both the General Assembly

and Security Council replaced by a weighted System whereby state representation

in

both of

these organs would be directly proportional to the population in a given state and the
financial contribution

such a state makes to the United Nations.

Council representation

is

permanent members
victory in the
States

is

another proposal espoused by

in the

some

352

scholars

A regionalized Security
who

argue that the five

Security Council were given permanent status following their

World War n. 353 The continued possession of veto power by some of these

anachronistic in the sense that

it

does not

distribution of military and economic power.

reflect the

354

Further

present day reality on the global

more, they argue, the defining

characteristics of what constitutes threats to peace have shifted

from global

military capability

to local situations directly linked to poverty and deprivation. Therefore, in their opinion,

incorporating regional economic superpowers in a reformed Security Council
sense.

355

makes

a lot of

For instance India and Japan would represent the Asian Continent while Latin

America would be represented by

Brazil,

Western Europe by Germany and Africa by Egypt,

South Africa or Nigeria. Veto power would be extended to these regional powers

3S0
/rf-

351

/<f.atl20.

,52

Gassama supra note 344,

,53

Gordon supra note 342,

3S4

Id.

355
'Id.

at 307.

at

585.

in addition

74
to the five permanent

members who

already posses

it;

since

it

would be

difficulty to

convince

Great Britain and France whose possession of veto power no longer seems justified, to give
it

up.

356

Some

scholars have even

gone

further to

representatives in the United Nations organs.

Nations General Assembly

who

is

propose

357

'direct universal suffrage' for state

The incumbent President of

also the chairman of the

Council reform has proposed a three-tier system with the
five

industrialized countries.

power.

358

The

first tier

tier

consisting of the present

of five

states, three

from

America and the Caribbean, and two from the

second-tier states

would have permanent

status but

no veto

A third tier would consist of four rotational members elected every five years akin to

the present ten non-permanent

members

Eastern Europe, and the Caribbean.

While

it is

to be derived each

from Africa, Asia, Latin America,

359

not within the scope of

this thesis to discuss the

these proposals, a few important points need to be noted.
that

Working Group on Security

permanent members retaining the veto power, and a second

the developing regions of Africa, Asia, Latin

the United

Any reform

merits and demerits of

of the Security Council

does not address the genuine concerns of the developing countries that form the majority

of the members of the United Nations will not resolve the credibility and legitimacy
currently engulfing the United Nations Security Council.
the Security Council that preserves the veto

members

like the

proposed

three-tier

More

power exclusively

system

is

an exercise

not deal with the bottomline of the desired reforms; that

356

357

,58

See Gassama supra note 344,

specifically a restructuring of

for the current five

in

crisis

permanent

window-dressing which does

is,

the removal of superpower

at 321.

/rf.at316.

Panafrican

News Agency, http://www.africanews.org/PANA/news/970321/feat6.html.

75

syndrome by making the Security Council a more representative body.
be taken not to over-expand the Security Council.

bound

However

A security Council that

to be unwieldily and inefficient in carrying out

its

mandate.

361

And

San Francisco conference, the General Assembly

possible to call another
to

360

is

is

care must

too large

since

not

it is

the right

is

forum

discuss and adopt the requisite reforms, in accordance with Article 108 of the United

Nations Charter.

A genuine spirit of striving for fundamental reforms that will serve the ends of peace,
and justice, captured

stability

in the

preamble to the Charter of the United Nations _ other

than political expediency and self-interest
reforms.

_ should permeate

the discussions leading to the

The immediate former Secretary General of the United Nations underlined

spirit that

must inform

relations

this

and intercourse within the United Nations system

new

in the

following words:

a genuine sense of consensus deriving from shared interests must govern the

work of
nations.

Council, not the threat of a veto or

members of

other

power of any one group of

Moreover, the permanent members must have the deeper support of
the Council, and the

membership more widely,

council's decisions are to be effective and endure.

2.

The International Court
The

members
is

have recourse to

is

another universal institution that the

in the resolution

of conflicts and disputes inter

an avenue whose potentialities have hardly been explored since the existing

360

the

of Justice (I.C.J).

international Court of Justice

state could

if

362

OAU conflict

few by taking away from the great many,

in blatant disregard for the principles

sovereign equality enshrined in the Charter." Id.

362

se. It

Indeed Italy criticized the proposal, saying "we cannot accept a system that attempts to

benefit the very

361

OAU

Murphy supra

note 344, at 264.

Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy,
Peacemaking and Peacekeeking 15 Par. 78 (1992).

of

.

76
resolution and dispute settlement structures and the practice of

seem

to be bent in favor of informal

modes of resolution of disputes and
this

its

member

means and diplomatic resolution
conflicts.

363

Some

states generally

opposed

as

to juridical

scholars have found explanations for

supposedly African (and Asian too) scepticism displayed towards the international Court

of Justice rooted

in the

African (and Oriental) cultures which prefer

negotiation and

consensus as the ideal modes of dispute resolution, and look with disfavor juridical resolution
364

of disputes.

Such

assertions (with

empirical evidence exist to

due respect

show

to their proponents)

that informal

have no

scientific basis since

mechanisms of dispute resolution based on

negotiation and consensus co-existed with indigenous courts administering indigenous justice
in pre-colonial

African and Asian societies.

365

African and Asian states have avoided the

International Court of Justice for historical reasons that have nothing to
cultures, but every thing to

do with

The African (and Asian)

the culture of the international Court of Justice

states

emerged from colonial subjugation to

overburdened with onerous duties and obligations

which the Western powers agreed

"principles by

do with Afro- Asian

in the international

to live

and conduct

366
itself.

find themselves

regime deriving from
their business."

367

In

other words the newly independent states, propelled into the international law edifice

suddenly found themselves having to abide by norms of classical international law

363

made by

Asante supra note 35 1
K..P.

Anand. Attitudes of the "New' Asian African Countries Towards the International
in Snyder et aal supra note 135, at 163.

Court of Justice
36

Tt

is

these court the colonial authorities, unable to administer western justice to the natives

incorporated into the colonial judicial machinery, albeit in a distorted form. For example see E. A.

Keay

& S .S.

Richardson, The Native and Customary Courts of Nigeria (1966).

Anand supra note 364,
367

S.

at 164-65.

Prakash Sinha, New Nations and the Law of Nations 23

(1967).

77

and skewed

in favor

Justice with judges

of Western

states.

from the Western

368

The composition of

the International Court of

countries, and the practice of these judge that

was

directed at perpetrating vested interests of the western states, served to alienate the Afro-

Asian states from the International Court of
institution designed to serve

Western

interests

problems affecting the newly independent

Justice,

which they viewed

and

removed from

November

Western

the realities of the

369

states.

The Court was presented with an opportunity
African states on

far

as a

to correct this

image of itself from the

1960 when the governments of Liberia and Ethiopia

4,

filed, in

the Court registry, applications instituting proceedings against South Africa in the famous

South West African Cases
jurisdiction of the

finding that

it

370
.

Preliminary objections raised by South Africa touching on the

Court and the legal standing of the petitioners were dismissed by the Court;

had jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the merits of the dispute and the applicants

had locus standi before the court.
in the

a

merit stage of the case

summary of the main

(

371

The court then went

to deal with the substantive issues

South West African case. Second Phase)

issues that

were

in contention

Whether South West Africa was still a
whether the mandatory obligation to
1.

administration to the Council of the

between the

territory

furnish

372
.

The following

parties:

under mandate and
annual

is

reports

if

on

so
its

League had been replaced by an obligation

so to report to the General Assembly of the United nations.

368

P.

Kenneth Kiplagat, Legal Status of Integration Treaties and the Enforcement of Treaty
COMESA Process 23 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 259, 262 (1995).

Obligations: a look at the
369

Anand supra note 420.

at 166.

370

See Kr ystyn a Marek, a Digest of the Decisions of the International Court vol.
11,718 (1978) for analysis of the Court's judgement and the historical background of the territory of
South-West Africa see L.C. Green, South West-Africa and the World Court, 22 INT'L J CANADIAN
LNSTTTUTE OF INT'L AFFAIRS, 39-67 (1966-67).
37

V

372

at 728.

(Rep.

Of S.

Afr. v. Ethiopia

& Liberia)

1966

1.

C.

J.

6.

78

Whether in keeping with the mandate, the Republic of South Africa had
promoted to the utmost the material and moral well being and the social
2.

progress of the inhabitants of the territory.

Whether the mandatory had, by

3.

of provisions
segregation,

in the

mandate,

acts and/or declarations, violated a

number

following a policy of racial

in particular,

by establishing military and naval bases and by creating

administrative structures which

amount

to a unilateral modification

of the terms

of the mandate.

Whether by attempting

4.

to

modify the Mandate without the consent of the

United Nations General Assembly, the legal successor of the Council of the

League for this and other purposes, South Africa had violated the provisions
in the Mandate that the mandate can only be modified with the consent of the
Council of the League of Nations.

373

Sadly, this opportunity slipped through the hands of the Court

judgement,

in a streak

as a "legalistic, restrictive

majority "resort to a restrictive or

and narrow ruling."

literal treaty interpretation

resulted in technical dismissal of the applicant states' case."

and Liberia had locus standi

[

subject-matter of the present claims"].

377

[

375

The court

conclusively dealt with at the preliminary stage,

Ethiopia

374

Elias supra note

1

375

Id. at 94.

376

377

1966LC.J.6,

18.

1966I.C.J.6,50.

The

court's

and to legal quibbles had

The Court

ruled that Ethiopia

was

18, at 75.

& Liberia)

1966

them

376

in the

thus by creating a nuance between legal
the parties thought the court had

all

able to avoid dealing with the substance

of the application.

Afir. v.

374

"legal right or interest appertaining to

standing and subject matter interest, an issue

Of S.

1966

"the legal standing before the court itself '] before the court,

but no legal right to receive judgement

(Rep.

in its

of ultra-conservatism the International Court of Justice delivered

what has been righdy described

373

when

1.

C.

J.

6, 10-16.

79

The
ruling

is

alienation of the African states

obvious. This

was not

from the International Court of justice by

the only time the Court

had

failed to rise to the

contribute to the positive development of international law.
rightly) indicts the

378

this

occasion and

A commentator harshly (but

Court thus:

The international Court is said to have successfully alienated the Eastern bloc
on (Corfu Channel case), the Latin American on (The Asylum and Haya de la
Torre cases) and the Asians on (the Temple of Preah Viheah and Rights of
Passages cases). There can be little doubt that the South West African cases
have turned the African states from mere alienation to total disenchantment
with the International Court. The Court could probably be called by the
radical sceptics no less than the moderates, the "Western European Court of
Justice," determined to give legal protection to the colonial

interest of Southern Africa.

Whether

frustration remains to be seen.

The

this attitude is

real tragedy

has probably abdicated any capacity

it

criticism

warrant some caution
in

that the International

means other than

in overly criticizing

it

its

rulings have

'

Court

or at least to

379

in the 1960s. Its

undergone some change to

make such

criticism mild.

The

1968 changed the composition of the Court to reflect "the main forms

of civilization and of the principal legal systems of the world,"

3 8

violence.

was deserving of the International Court before and

composition and perhaps the substance of

General Assembly

induced by temporary

ever had to contribute towards the

resolution of Conflict between nations by

Such

is

and imperial

In the Northern

Cameroons case
fait

by electing two Africans

the Court refused to "adjudicate

upon

the merits of the

" since the

amalgamation of Northern Cameroons and The
accompli, and therefore the "any judgement which the court might

claim of the Republic of Cameroon,
Federation of Nigeria was a

380

pronounce would be without object." Great Britain under the Mandate system of the league of
Nations and the Trusteeship system of the United nations, had administered the territories of
Southern and Northern Cameroons as part of the colony and protectorate of Nigeria.

By way of two

referendums administered by the United Nations General Assembly, Southern and Northern

Cameroon decided

to join the

Republic of Cameroon (formerly under French rule) and the Federation

new Republic of Cameroon was unhappy with the results of the
Cameroon and sought a "declaratory" opinion from the Court. Case
Northern Cameroons (Cameroon v. United Kingdom) 1963 I. C. J. 15, 37.

of Nigeria, respectively. The
plebiscite in Northern

Concerning the
379

380

Okoye supra note
Art.

87, at 203.

9 of the Statute of the

International Court of Justice.

80
judges to the Court.

381

Africa

Justice has therefore gained

of Justice of

late

was

some

conflict

384

its

The Court's

cited as a

383

The

International Court of

In fact the international Court

among

popularity

inter- state conflicts, especially

by the Court on Western Sahara can be
colonial past.

and popularity.

stature

seems to have enhanced

forum for resolving

382

hitherto unrepresented.

African states as the right

boundary disputes. The Opinion

delivered

landmark ruling on issues touching on Africa's

ruling ordering provisional measures in the case concerning the border

between Mali and Burkina Faso seems to have resolved the devastating conflict between these

two neighboring
Court of Justice.

states.

385

The Libya/Chad Border

conflict too has

been settled by the International

386

Nonetheless certain quarters

still

feel there

is

need for reforms to make the

International Court of Justice a truly "principal judicial organ of the United Nations,"

can contribute to the "clarification and development"

388

retrogressive practice of having "to apply the law as

finds

381

LC.J..

See the International

1969)
382

it

387

that

of international law, and avoid the
it,

Court of Justice Yearbook

not to

make

it,"

happened

as

1968-69, no. 23 (The Hague:

P.3.

For information pertaining

to the composition of the Court

between 1946 and 1996 see

arthur witteveen, the international court 1946-19%, 370-3.(kluwer law
International, 1996)
383

Edward Macwhinney, Judicial Settlement of International Disputes

122

(1991).
384

385

Faso/Mali,
386

Advisory Opinion, Western Sahara, 1975

I.C.J.

See Order on Provisional Measures

Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burkina

I.C.J.,

in the

68 (Oct.

16).

(1986), 25 I.L.M. 146 (1986).

See the Case Concerning the

territorial

Dispute (Libya Arab Jamahiriya/Chad),

I.C.J.,

(1994), 33 I.L.M. 571 (1994).
387

388

U. N. Charter Art. 92.

See Barcelona Traction Case (Belg.

judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice).

v. Spain),

1970

1.

C.

J.

3,

63 (separate opinion of

81
389

in the

South West Africa

for the

empowerment of the International Court of Justice by scrapping

cases.

In Particular

some

scholars and commentators have been calling
the optional clause [Article

36

(2)

of the Statute of the International Court of Justice] and expanding the compulsory jurisdiction of

the

Court

390

While these proposals are very sensible and necessary

judicial body,

it is

doubtful whether the United Nations

member

if

to

be a

truly global

ready at

this

point in the

the court

states are

is

history of the development of the international legal system to confer to the 'world court' inherent
jurisdiction akin to the jurisdiction enjoyed

389
is

A portion of the Courts judgement reads:

to apply the
390

by municipal

law as

it

finds

0koye supra note

it,

not to

"... the Court

make it." 1966

87, at 203;

courts.

I.

C.

J.

is

6, 47.

Gassama supra note at 323.

not a legislative body.

Its

duty

CHAPTER

m

LIMITATIONS AND IMPEDIMENTS TO EFFECTIVE CONFLICT RESOLUTION

AND DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN AFRICA

The

limitations that

regional

resolve

have impeded or checked the capacity of the

conflicts

compartmentalization of

located

are

this

within

and without

OAU to effectively
OAU. Hence

the

discussion into Charter-based limitations and obstacles,

denoting the conceptual, normative and structural improprieties within the
the one hand, and non-charter based problems

problems and political

the

inertia, that are

_ meaning

external factors such as budgetary

not attributable to the

of the economic and political milieu within which the

OAU Charter on

OAU per se but are products

OAU operates,

on the other hand.

A. Charter-based Limitations and Obstacles

Perhaps the best approach
obstacles

is

to

go back

in the

exploration of the Charter-based limitations and

to the conception of the

permeated the Addis Ababa conference

most prominently advocated by the

OAU. Two

that drafted the

visions informed the process

Charter of the

OAU. The

first

Nkrumah of Ghana, conceived of a

late President

and

vision

unitary

government, a united state of Africa, that would be able to overcome the historical internal
contradictions in Africa and check external forces.
to guarantee the security, independence

391

For Dr. Nkrumah

and prosperity for Africa.

He

this

was

the only

way

eloquently painted his

vision thus:

Our

essential

bulwark against such

of the neocolonialist

391

is

in

sinister threats

our political union.

If

and the other multifarious designs

we

are to remain free,

Opoku Agyema, Nkrumah's Ghana and East Africa 31
82

(1992).

83

if

we

we must

are to enjoy the full benefits of Africa's rich resources,

and the

to plan for our total defense

human means,

in the full interests

unite

exploitation of our material and

full

of our peoples.

To go

alone will limit our

it

horizons, curtail our expectations, and threaten our liberty

.

.

.

Unless

we

meet the obvious and very powerful neocolonialist' threats with a unified
African front, based upon a common economic and defense policy, the
strategy will be to pick us off and destroy us one by one.

The second

vision conceived

'

392

by the Monrovia group of states and best advocated by

Nigeria, thought of an amalgamation of African states into a continental

sovereignty of

all states,

Nigeria's stand

dealing with issues of
that

is

if

certain essential things.

we want

The

common

concern:

we must

unity in Africa,

first is that

first

agree to

African states must respect one

another. There must be acceptance of equality by

whether they are big or

body based on equal

small, they are sovereign

all states.

and

No

matter

their sovereignty

is

sovereignty.

The Charter

emerged from

that

the conference

was therefore necessarily a

compromise document representing both world views of Africa, but with the second vision
forming the core of the Charter. Like
expediency,

394

continent, the

is

OAU Charter, most scholars agree,
attribute the

weaknesses of the

meet

political

in

395

OAU only to its origin and process of

The

OAU

is

a creature of international

OAU are by and large those of the international legal system

Kwame Nkmmah, Africa Must

Legacy ofKwame Nkrumah
ed.,

tailored to

lost its cutting edge.

to paint a partial picture of the problem.

law and the weaknesses of the

l92

compromise documents

rather than designed to confront the problems and challenges facing the

However, to
creation

all

Unite

p. xvii

(1985) quoted in Shridath Rahphal, The

ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY: 25 YEARS ON,

1

(Kwesi Krafona

1988).
393

Agbi supra note
John Marcum,

1

18, at

1

16.

How wide is the Gap Between

Casablanca and Monrovia, 7 AFR. REP. 3

(1962).
l95

See Thomas Nsenga Kanza, Africa Must Change in ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY:
25 YEARS ON, 146 (Kwesi Krafona ed. 1988); W. Scott Thompson & Richard Bissel, Legitimacy

and Authority

in the

OAU, 15 AFR.STUD. REV. 27

(1972).

84
itself.

International law has over the centuries exalted the concept of sovereignty as the

bedrock of relations between nations.
attempt by a state

to, in

396

State borders were considered sacrosanct and any

any way, exert influence over what happens within another states

borders was considered contrary to international law and frowned upon.
organizations that

397

The

emerged were therefore loose associations of sovereign

and geared towards promoting the

essential

international

states designed

and minimum international relations without

offending the tenet of sovereign equality between

member

states.

The Member

states

still

functioned as self-contained units with the real power of decision-making. Frey-wouters

eloquently captures the weakness inherent

in regional organizations

due

to this flawed

conceptualization of international relations, in the following words:

The

limited character of existing regional institutions shapes their response to

internal

conflict.

American
States

is

The decision-making process of

States, the Organization of African Unity,

of an intergovernmental character. There

center of power above the

member

direct interaction between the

is

the

no supranational regional

states; the regional

power

Organization of

and the League of Arab

centers of the

system

member

regional secretariats are merely administrative organs, exercising

power and entrusted with

,%

little

scope for independent

Classical definition of sovereignty

is

is

limited to
units.

The

no executive

initiative."

398

provided by Jean Bodin as "the absolute and

SK BOOKS OF THE
COMMONWEALTH 25 (C.H. WILSON & R.B. McCALLUM EDS., M.J. TOOLEY TRANS., BASIL
BLACKWELL 1955) (1576)]. Although the concept of state sovereignty has evolved over the years,

perpetual power" within a single states boundaries. [JEAN BODIN,

starting from the Treaty of Westphalia in 1 648, the modern concept of sovereignty still poses
monumental problems, see CAROLINE THOMAS, NEW STATES, SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERVENTION

(1985).

The crisis of the
it

O AU is therefore to a large extent the crisis of international law itself, as

grapples with the challenge of confronting the realities of the ever changing nature of the subjects

and objects of international

"The

relations.

Grossman and Bradlaw capture this crisis when they write
on the de jure sovereignty of the

deficiencies of the present international legal order based

nation-state and a relatively clear distinction between the international and domestic legal issues are

The nation-state is no longer functionally "the master of its own territory.""_ Claudio
Grossman & Daniel Bradlow, Are We Being Propelled Towards a People-Centered Transnational
Legal Order?, 9 AM.U.J.lNT'L L. & POL'Y 1 22 (1993).
obvious.

,

398

Frey-wouters supra note 107, at 460.
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The founders of

the

OAU

were therefore simply paying homage

incorporating classical international law norms into the

normative and institutional structure of the

1.

to international law

by

OAU Charter. An examination of the

OAU will throw more light into this discussion.

Conceptual and Normative Weaknesses

The
in Article

classical international

HI

of the

(1)

OAU. 399 All other norms
of non-interference

OAU

law principle of sovereign equality of all states enshrined

Charter forms the core of the normative structure of the

only serve to reinforce

in the internal affairs

this

'grundnorm', so to speak. The principle

of member states, and the prohibition of subversive

geared towards the protection of state sovereignty.

activities are

400

Additionally, the

OAU

Assembly of Heads of State and governments and the Council of Ministers have over the
years passed

many resolutions aimed

at

safeguarding state sovereignty.

as Prof. Borella observes, that the infant

that

It is

understandable,

OAU sought to strengthen the weak African states

were emerging from colonial subjugation. He wrote: 'Created only a few years

independence

it

was normal

that the continental organization should

devote

after

itself to the

objective of the Charter (Art. 2. I.e. of the Charter) of defending their sovereignty, their
territorial integrity

That

may

and

their

be so but

independence.

isn't there a

,401

need for the

OAU to keep pace with the evolution

of international law and the the changing times? There
non-intervention and non-interference

concepts

in the

"The

is

no denying

in the internal affairs

that the concepts of

of states are fundamental

United Nations Charter and customary international law.

402

However, while

member states solemnly affirm and declare their
The sovereign equality of all member states."

said Article reads: "... the

adherence to the following principles:

1

.

400

Michel-Cyrdjiena Wembu, The OAU and International Law in THE ORGANIZATION OF
African Unity After Thirty Years, 17 (Yassin El-Ayouty ed., 1994).
*° x
1d. at

16

^See U.N.

Charter Art.2 (4)

& 2 (7).
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the United Nations Security Council, especially after the

these concepts restrictively, and utilized

within

member

states, the

its

end of the cold war, has interpreted

Chapter VII powers to deal internal situations

OAU has dogmatically and conservatively continued to observe

these norms, allowing conflicts to rage on in Africa unabated.
illustrate this contrast

In

403

between the Universal body and the regional

December 1992

Some examples

will

OAU.
794

the United Nations Security Council adopted resolution

authorizing the Secretary General

tandem with cooperating member

in

states "to use all

necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief
404

operations in Somalia."

Clearly the Security Council

Chapter VII powers to deal with an internal
"restore peace,

stability,

political settlement

in

Somalia."

405

was expansively

conflict within a

and law and order with a view to

member

it

to

failed

achieve

unequivocally marked the beginning of an

its

activist

objective,

Haiti

process of a

at national reconciliation

the

Somalia operation

post-cold war Security Council

intervention in matters hitherto regarded as internal affairs of member states.

The Security Council Resolution 940 on

was even a

further step

406

away from

concepts of absolute sovereignty of states and non-interference with internal

member

407

states.

Through

of a multinational force

this resolution, the

in Haiti to restore

^S.ICB. Asante, The Role of the

its

state in order to

facilitating the

under the auspices of the United Nations, aimed

Although

interpreting

the

affairs

of

Security Council authorized the intervention

ousted President Aristide and remove from

power

OAU in Promoting Peace, Development and Regional

Security in Hansen supra note 124, at 127.

^S.C.

Res. 794,

UN. SCOR, 47th

Sess.,

314th mtg.

at 63,

U.N. Doc. S/RES/794 (1992).

«*Id.
4

K.uth Gordon, The United Nations
Beyond 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 519, 545 (1994).

^S.C.

Res. 940, U.N.

SCOR, 49th

Intervention in Internal Conflicts: Iraq, Somalia

Sess.

3413th mtg. At

1-4,

U.N. S/RES/940 (1994).

and

87
the military junta that ousted him.

coup

408

Such

the elastic interpretation of Chapter VII that a

is

d'etat can be termed as "a threat to international

enforcement action.

While

this

peace" necessitating Security Council

409

evolution (or

is

revolution?)

is

going on within the United Nations, The

OAU has continued to stringently observe the norms of sovereign equality of member states
and non-interference with internal
with the present
integrity

reality.

410

Since

must be observed by

all

affairs

all

411

member

member

affairs

states in a fashion clearly out of tune

states are equal sovereigns their territorial

and sundry and

of non-interference with internal
boundaries.

of

this

involves religiously observing the

member

of

states

and

inviolability

norm

of state

Devastating conflicts and concomitant humanitarian crises have been raging

from the horn of Africa (Sudan and Somalia) to the heart of Africa (Rwanda, Burundi and
Zaire).

Yet the

law concepts.

OAU has

continued to bury

its

head

in the

sand of outmoded international

412

This state of affairs does not augur well for the future of the
for the

OAU to reevaluate

its

role. If the

OAU. There

is

a need

OAU does not come up with a formula for dealing

with internal conflicts, unilateral intervention by

member

states will be

new norm and

slowly

«*ld.

^^Richard B.
the

Lillich,

Humanitarian Intervention Through the United Nations: Towards

Development of Criteria, 53
410
It

may be recalled

Nations during the

first

ZAORV (HEIDELBERG J. INTL.L.)

557, 564 (1993).

the reassertion of the principle of sovereignty even within the United

World War II was spearheaded by the members of the
tandem with other developing countries, through a series of

few decades

OAU within the United Nations in

after

resolutions in the General Assembly. For a discussion of these resolutions see

CHANGING PRIORITIES

of the International Agenda: The New International Economic Order

(Karl P. Sauvan, ed.,

1971).
41

J. Foltz, The Organization of African Unity and the Resolution of African's
CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN Africa 352 (Francis Deng & William Zartman eds., 1991).

'William

Conflicts in
412

See Chapter

I

(B).

88
but surely the

1979

is

OAU will be pushed to political limbo.

a case in point.

413

The

intervention of

Tanzania's intervention in

ECOMOG

successful in restoring civil order and stability in Liberia,

Uganda

in

war,

if

in the Liberian Civil

may mark

the beginning of a shift

of the center of power from the continental body to sub-regional groups that have the will

and the means to

2. Institutional

act.

414

and Structural Limitations

Apart from the normative weaknesses inherent
institutional

in resolving regional conflicts.

of competencies between
Institutions"; the

Secretariat,

OAU

Charter, various

and structural anomalies have continued to constrain the capacity of the

an effective role

to play

in the

its

principal organs.

Chief

among them

The Charter

is

creates

OAU

the delimitation

four "principal

Assembly of Heads of State and Government, the Council of Ministers, The

and the commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration.

further clothes these institutions with varying degrees of competencies.

415

The Charter

416

A closer scrutiny however reveals that the Assembly is the organ with real power;
the other organs are just ancillaries to the

for the

Assembly with no

Commission whose anomalies have been

Assembly

is

powers of their own (save

dealt with in detail elsewhere).

the "supreme organ" combining both executive and judicial

to general supervisory

power over

the other organs.

413

TONY AVTRGAN, WAR IN UGANDA 53-95

414

See Chapter IV (D)(1)

415

OAU Charter Art. VTL

416

OAU Charter Arts.

417

See Chapter

418

real

I

(A)

(1982).

VTH-XVUI.

(1).

OAU Charter Arts. VUL, EX, X & XXVH.

418

powers

417

The

in addition

The Assembly may "review

the

89
structure, functions and acts of

contrast the Council of Ministers

implementing
420

Assembly."

retaining

all

whom the

Secretariat

examination of the history of

General was not intended to play any

initiative

is

OAU

supposed to function.

423

by the

it

421

reveals that the founders

much

were keen on

so that the Secretary-

politically significant role.

422

Hence

the

tittle

power and monopolization of

This asymmetry of

by the Assembly, has not worked very well for the

prediction shortly after the

In

does not confer any significant role for the

important competencies for the Assembly. So

"Administrative Secretary-General."

419

confined to preparing conferences for the Assembly,

for the Secretariat, the Charter

Secretary-General under

An

is

decisions and taking "cognizance of any matter referred to

its

As

the other organs and any specialized agencies."

all

OAU.

Indeed, Boutros-Ghali's

OAU inaugural conference that drafted the Charter, remains true

today:
It

would be presumptuous

to pass

judgement on the organization

at this stage,

but one cannot help noticing that extremely broad powers have been bestowed

Assembly of Heads of State and Government, when these powers
are considered in relation to those already enjoyed by each head of state in his
own country, it becomes obvious that the Assembly is the only real organ of
the Council of Ministers has virtually no authority of its own. If
the OAU.
this is true of the second ranking organ of the OAU, it applies even more to
the other organs. .there does seem to be a trend towards an "Africa of Heads

upon

the

.

.

.

of State.

424

419

OAU Charter Art. VTA.

420

OAU Charter Art. XHI.

421

OAU Charter Art.XVI.

422

423

James O. Jonah supra note 253,

at 5.

A resolution on the functions and regulations of the General Secretariat was adopted by

the Council of Ministers at

Dakar on August

functions of the Secretary-General

is

just a

1 1

,

1963. Rule 11 of the regulations which

summary of the strictly technical aspects of the
Sohn supra note 16, at 93.

the executive head of any organization without more. See
424

BOUTROS-GHALI supra note

list

86, at 45.

the

duties of

90

A

comparison of the

Nations counterpart

role of the

OAU

Secretary General and that of his United

will reveal the minimalist notion of the role the drafters of the

OAU

Charter intended the Secretary-General to play. Apart from the Administrative duties

endowed on

the United Nations Secretary General by Article 97 of the United Nations

Charter, Article 98 confers

on the Secretary-General the authority

reports to the General- Assembly
Article

on

the

work of the United

to

make and submit annual

Nations, and

more importantly

99 empowers the Secretary General "to bring to the attention of the Security Council

any matter which
security."

425

It is

in his opinion

from

this

may

threaten the maintenance of international peace and

provision that the

powers of the United Nations Secretary-General

to investigate situations that are likely to endanger peace
conflicts,

emanate.

and use

his

"good

offices" to resolve

426

Provisions similar to Article 98 and 99 of the United Nations Charter are missing in
the

OAU Charter.

So

proactively using his

on

his

that over the years the

good

own motion lest it

offices to resolve conflicts or take

minimum expense of

time and resources have been

General of exceptional personal
hurdles and play

some

any similar diplomatic

initiative

be interpreted as arrogating to himself a visible political role.

been that small conflicts that could be resolved

result has

abilities (like the

role in dispute resolution.

425

U.N. Charter Art.98.

426

OAU Secretary-General has shied away from

Jonah supra note 253,

at 5.

left

at the earliest

to escalate.

427

The

convenience and

It

at

takes a Secretary

incumbent one) to overcome these legal

91

One might argue
and therefore
that sitting

it is

that sitting

OAU Chairmen have been able to play this crucial role

not necessary to confer such powers on the Secretary-General.

OAU

Chairmen have,

Secretary-General

in practice,

played

this role traditionally

428

It is

meant

true

for the

Secretary General) although the Charter does not

(in effect eclipsing the

429

acceptable to the Assembly of

envision such a role for the occupants of

this office.

Heads of State and Government

Chairman plays such a role since himself being a

head of

not

state at par with his peers in the

power. In any case,

that

that the

arise.

However

that

way

the problem

Assembly

is

in retrospect the

is

that the

Chairman

is

too busy with his state responsibilities

and meaningful role

in conflict resolution.

the ideal role for the Secretary General.

Closely allied with the problem of 'Africa of Heads of State'
the

Assembly exercising

the danger of a powerful Secretary General emerging does

to find sufficient time to personally play an effective

This

is

It is

OAU "constitutional order,"-

Security Council.

430

responsibility for the

There

is

is

another lacuna within

lack of an enforcement organ akin to the United Nations

need for creating such an organ bestowed with the primary

maintenance of regional peace and security. The Assembly of Heads of

State and government, like the United Nations General Assembly,
diverse opinions to be able to

make

is

too large and with

timely decisions of such magnitude and implement

them

with the necessary speed. In any case even the Assembly of Heads of state and Government
is

not bestowed with disciplinary or enforcement powers.

431

429

Rule 10 of the rules of procedure of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government
describes the role of the chairman as that of chairing and directing meetings, and ensuring order and

decorum of the proceedings of the Assembly. The diplomatic
resolving conflict

supra note 16,
430

is

role played

a creature of practice that has no basis in the

by the Chairman

in

OAU juridical order. See Sohn

at 79.

U. N. Charter Chapter

V & VH.

S.K.B. Asante, The Role of the Organization of African Unity in Promoting Peace,
Development and Regional Security in AFRICA IN AFRICA PERSPECTIVES ON PEACE AND
DEVELOPMENT 128 (Emanuel Hansen, 1987).

92

Another anomaly

in the

OAU

OAU. For

decision-making process within the
State and

Government or

must be present
is

requisite

determined by two-third of the

significant threshold

is

linked with the procedural aspect of the

a meeting of either the

Assembly of Heads of

the Council of Ministers to take place, two-thirds of the

form the

to

Charter

members

quorum and further more, any decision of the Assembly
membership of the organization.

total

432

This

is

a very

and many a time the running and proffer functioning of the organization

may be jeopardized by lack

of quorum. This leads credence to the accusation that the Charter

has an inbuilt tendency to encourage indecisiveness and ineffectiveness.

Closely connected to

general over-reliance on consensus and informal

this is the

structures in decision-making and dispute resolution, respectively.

resolution of disputes

is

433

important, but there are limits.

Some

Consensus and diplomatic
conflicts are susceptible to

diplomatic solutions while others are only amenable to juridical resolution.
over-reliance on diplomacy and

ad hoc procedures has

left

many

434

The OAU's

disputes temporarily

resolved only to resurface later in greater magnitude because diplomatic solutions rarely
to the

bottom and substance of a dispute.

of a dispute

is

435

Dealing with the substance by going to the core

the raison d'etre of juridical processes. There

the creation of a judicial organ within the

go

is

therefore a glaring need for

OAU legal regimes alternative or supplemental to

diplomatic means.

432

See rules 14 & 25 of The Rules of Procedure of the Assembly of Heads of State and
Government, and Rule 18 of The Rules of Procedure of the Council of Foreign Ministers, reproduced
in Sohn supra note 16, at 77-97 (1971).
433

Folts supra note 275, at 350.

434

Id at 356.

435

For example the Ethiopia/Somalia border

conflict

only to resurface later in a greater magnitude. See Chapter

I

was

superficially solved

(B) (1)

a.

by

the

OAF
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B. Non-Charter Based Obstacles

Many

other factors external to the mechanics of the

curtailing the effectiveness of the

examine them

to

dominant one

is

organization, the

in detail,

OAU. Whereas

OAU,
436

worth the while to mention some of them

it is

ever since

its

Nevertheless

More

in passing.

The

than any other regional

not possible to divorce an organization from the

it is

it

functions.

The

financial

ill- health

of the

OAU

neatly intertwined with the economic condition of the African states which form

membership. The financial position of the

improvement

in the

economic

some

new

life

into the

lease of

life.

its

will

and

therefore expected to improve with the

437
bog down the organization.
Hence the need

Closely related with the problem of political inertia

its

to

OAU by redrafting its Charter so that the organization can be given

referred to as a legitimacy
enforcing

OAU is

its

situation in Africa.

Political inertia also continue to
inject

in

formation, has continued to experience debilitating

socio-economic environment within which

a

have contributed

not within the province of this thesis

the general lack of financial resources.

budgetary problems.

is

it is

OAU

crisis

within the

OAU. Due

is

what has been

to general lack of effectiveness in

general aloofness in the face of internal conflicts

many member

states

have dared to take independent positions on conflicts without attracting any sanctions from
the

OAU. 438
sum the

In
the

OAU Charter

is

and normative anomalies rendering

OAU a very weak tool for regional conflict resolution.
436

437

438

Asante supra note 349,

See Foltz supra note 275,

were

militarily

show

is

therefore an urgent need

at 350.

For example some member

states recognized Biafra without

any protest from the

OAU.

OAU cannot do anything. Some states like Malawi and Zambia

and economically vulnerable

while others for

There

at 128.

Others do not pay their dues and the

that

replete with structural

OAU's resolutions on Southern Rhodesia
OAU. For a discussion of these and other factors

to support

unknown reasons simply defied

the

the erosion of legitimacy and authority of the

OAU see Scott et aal supra note 243.
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to overhaul the Charter to strengthen

its

institutional

archaic international law concepts that have

no place

and normative structure, and
in

rid

it

of

today's increasingly interdependent

world. In particular an effective executive organ that can respond to the conflict resolution

and management needs of a highly

volatile region

Secretary-General to be empowered.

A judicial organ buttressed with compulsory jurisdiction

over inter-state disputes
with internal

affairs

is

need to be created and the office of the

also a prerequisite. Anachronistic

norms such

as non-interference

of member states and inviolability of state frontiers must be discarded or

reinterpreted to cope with the conflict resolution needs of our time.

CHAPTER IV

OTHER MECHANISMS FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN AFRICA

The problem of

conflict resolution in Africa cannot be divorced

question of regional security.

Is there a

from the

regional security problem in Africa?

Of course

current instability and protracted conflicts in Africa pose a regional security problem.
there a regional security

problem

(real or potential)

larger

the

But

is

posed by an external force? This chapter

answers these questions and also examines sub-regional mechanisms for resolution of
localized conflicts in Africa. In particular part
to create a regional defense

such

and

initiatives

of

this

chapter examine the proposals

mechanism and regional intervention force and the

might encounter. Part

their place in the

A and B

C examines

sub-regional conflict resolution

the formation of an African defense force, an "African

gorvernment.

439

it,

was thought of as

The plan was

to create a

439

1 1

8, at

1

15.

WW.
95

Kwame

for collective action against the

The Assembly of Heads of State and

the idea and eventually incorporated

Agbi supra note

late

OAU

arm of the proposed African union

mechanism
440

At the creation of the

High Command", as the

a neccessary

remaining colonial regimes and any external aggressor.

Government debated

mechanisms

Mechanism

A common defense system for Africa is not a new idea.

liked to call

problems

OAU conflict resolution structure.

A. Regional Self-defense

Nkrumah

legal

it

into the Charter, albeit in a

96
whittled-down form of a Defense Commission.
capability to

back

If the

borrow a

resolutions,

its

OAU

it

was a

wishes to resurrect

leaf from the

441

Since the commission did not have military

non-starter

this

ab

idea of a

2

initio.**

common

Western European and Northern Atlantic

defense mechanism
states

5 of the

NATO

OAU

on

443

This could

Charter to incorporate provisions similar to Article

treaty to the effect that

attack will be viewed as an attack

all

if

one of the

OAU

member

states

is

attacked the

of them and therefore the members of the alliance

"individually and in concert with other parties" will forthwith take "such action as

neccessary"in self-defense

beyond doubt.

in the face

Now

deems

lot

of sense

in the

framework of a continental

of threats of invasion by the then existing colonial regimes

that there are

independent existence of African states,

The North

it

444

That a pan- African defense force made a

government and

may

by starting a military

self-defense arrangement permitted by Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

be done by amending the present

it

no colonial regimes
is

Atlantic treaty Organization

left

is

in Africa to threaten the

a colllective self-defense arrangement neccessary?

(NATO) was

created to quarantee the security of

post-war Europe against possible attacks from expansionist post-war Russia and any possible
threat

from Germany.

"•The
** 2

445

Scholars are

questioning the need for

NATO

after the threat

of

OAU Charter Article XX (4).

For instance

in 1969, Portugal carried out military attacks

retaliation for the support the

Portuguese African
443

now

two countries were offering

territories.

The Defense Commission

on Guinea and Senegal

in

to African nationalist groups within

did nothing.

Agbi supra note

1

18, at 122.

Unite Nations Charter Article 51 provides: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair

an armed attack occurs against a member
the Security Council has taken measures necessary to main tain

the inherent right of individuals or collective self-defense

of the United nations, until
international peace

^North

if

and security"

Atlantic Treaty, April 4, 1949,

U.N.T.S. 243.
*"ld. at 480.

4 Bevans 829, 63

Stat.

2241, T.I.A.S. No. 1964, 34
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an attack from the Warsaw Pact evaporated with the collapse of communism
446

Europe.

One
threat

cannot, even more, see the need for such an alliance in Africa where a serious

from an external enemy has never

more African

The

existed.

financial implications contrasted with the

Further

in eastern

viability

of such an alliance given

economic conditions

usually supported by external forces, there

is

no

in Africa, is questionable.

Although

security problems are basically internal.

its

conflicts in Africa are

identifiable direct military threat against

African States' teritorrial independence that calls for a collective self-defense military pact.

Howerver

if

created within the existing

OAU framework without

an elaborate institutional

and avoiding unnecessary financial expense a pan- African military alliance

structure

as a deterrence to external forces, real or imaginary, that

formenting trouble

may

be

(in future)

may

act

bent on

in Africa.

B. Regional Intervention Force

A security architecture for Africa must of neccessity include a regional intervention
force as one of
military force

what he

is

its

key

not a

pillars.

new

one. Dr.

called an 'African

continental government.

As

447

already observed, the idea of a continental pan- African

Kwame Nkrumah,

High Command'

at the

inception of the

as the military

wing of

his

OAU proposed

envisioned African

Although Nkrumah 's envisioned force was intended to ward off

external aggression, nothing today stands in the

way

of creating a force with the twin

objectives of fighting external enemies and intervening to resolve internal conflicts.
In spite of the fact that, at

its

inception, the

OAU shelved the idea of

force in favor of a commission, the need for such a force has refused to

an intervention

go way. Never has

Jane E. Stromseth, The North Atlantic Treaty and the European Security After the Cold
War, 24 CORNELL INT'L L.J.479, 479 (1991).
44

Nkrumah

Obed Asamoah, Nkrumah' s Foreign Policy
195-6 (Kwameh Arhin ed., 1993).

in
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this

need been demonstrated

in the

most

brutal

way

than in the

last eight years.

The Horn of

Africa and the Great Lakes region has been embroiled in devastating conflicts that have
claimed millions of lives, displaced millions, torn communities and states apart, with a rapidity

and vengeance unwitnessed before. Such a force, had

stemmed

it

existed, could

have mitigated

if

not

the tide of these inexplicable conflicts.

The

OAU and the international community have been forced to own up to the need

of such a force. In October 1996 former United States Secretary of State, Warren Christopher

made

a

week-long tour of Africa

to solicit support for

what he termed an "African

response force," that would be trained and equipped by the United States.
to be seriously considering the creation of such a force, but there are

between the United States proposal and the
force

would be under

feels

it

The

its

body should seek

OAU plan. 449 While the Washington-proposed

own comand and

control.

to create a regional force

would be necessary

to depart

OAU seems

fundamental differences

the auspices of the United Nations Security Council, the

to create a force under
continental

448

crisis

It is

under

from the normal

logical that the

its

armpit.

OAU intends
OAU

being a

But why Washington

legal practice of deploying a

multinational force of a universal character in any conflict that threatened international peace,

under the direction of the Security Council, and instead create an African force under the

command
bizarre.

of the Universal Security Council _ to be deployed in African conflicts _

is

at best

450

Besides the practical problem of designing an acceptable structure for such a force
there are other

problem

that stand in the

way

of the creation of the envisaged force.

Panafrican news Agency,
htttp://www.africanews.org/usal/usafrica.iisafrica.8003985999.html.

W

449

450

See Online Focus, News Maker: Warren

Christopher, Http://web-

erOl .pbs.org/newshour/bb...st/october 96/christopher_10-15html.

Firstly,

99
there

is

the problem of the

a force.

451

The

sovereignty of

OAU

OAU Charter whose letter and spirit does not have room for such

was created

member

as

bulwork against colonialism and a safeguard

was never intended

states. It

to play a supranational role.

creation of a regional intervention force entails a supranational role for the
anti-thetical to the protection of sovereignty of the

of

affairs is

proposed

an overhaul of the entire

force.

Whether

the

OAU

member

states.

for the

Yet the

OAU necessarilly

An antidote

to this state

Charter as a prerequisite to the creation of the

OAU member state have the political will so to do is a different

matter.

A

second obstacle

relate to the validity

to the creation of such a force,

of such a force

more problematic and

in international law. If the force is to

one, acting within the tenets of traditional peacekeeping

intricate,

be a peace keeping

to be deployed with the consent

_

of the belligerent parties either to observe a pre-agreed ceasefire or monitor the
implementation of a peace settlement, without interfering with the so-called "internal affairs"

of a state _ there are no legal problems to bloc the formation of such a force by the
or any other regional or sub-regional body.
to

engage

in

for the force

what

It

The problem

arises

when

the force

is

intended

termed as humanitarian intervention (precisely the purpose envisioned

by the present writer) _ a grey area of international law whose frontiers are not

clearly delimited.

451

is

452

OAU

453

has been argued before that the central norm in the

the internal affairs of member states.

Hence an

OAU Charter is non-interference in
is not envisaged in the OAU

intervention force

constitutional order.
452

This

is

the role that a traditional peacekeeping force does. Chapter

Nations Charter permits regional organizations to engage in peacekeeping

VHI of the United
among their

activities,

other mandates in the maintenance of regional peace and security.

See Generally Rosalin Higgins, Intervention and International

WORLD POLITICS 29-44 (

Hedley Bull

ed.,

1984)

Law in INTERVENTION IN
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Opinion of scholars

is

divided over whether humanitarian intervention

or permitted in international law.

454

The

heart of the controversy

is

is

prohibited

Article 2 (4) of the United

Nations Charter which reads:
All

members

shall refrain in their international relations

of force against the

territorial integrity

from the

threat or use

or political independence of any state,

or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United
Nations.

455

Basically,

two schools have evolved over the interpretation of the above provision.

For the

positivists, Article

except

in self-defense as

2 (4) prohibits

all

forms of use of force

in relations

between

456

states

per Article 51 or for peace enforcement purpose by the Security

Council under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. Use of force in any other manner
runs afoul of Article 2(4).

457

This interpretation

is

predicated upon classical positivist theory

of international law according to which states are the primary subjects of international law.

Human beings

have no place

in this

amalgamation of the individual
is

perception of international law since their interests are an

states to

which they belong. The principle of non-intervention

ancillary to the right of sovereignty in that

conduct

liberty to

their

own

affairs

it is

intended to guarantee independent states'

unimpaired by external interference.

459

454

See generally Humanitarian Intervention and the United Nations (1973);
De Lima, Intervention in International law, (University of Virginia Press, 1 97 1 ).
455

458

F.

X.

U. N. Charter Art. 2(4).

456

This

is

an oversimplification. Scholars have

identified a

myriad of schools ranging from

See Ravi Mahalingam, The Compatibility of the Principle
FOREIGN
of Non-intervention with the Right of Humanitarian Intervention, 1 UCLA J. INT'L L.
realists

and

liberals to the cosmopolitans.

&

AFF. 221, 222-237 (1996).
457

See Articles by Ian Brownlie and Richard B.

World (John Norton Moore ed.,

Lillich in

as to the legality of use of force with Brownlie arguing

it is

supported by state practice and customary law generally.
45

*Id. at 222.

459

/<l

Law AND CrviL WAR IN MODERN

1974). Both scholars profound diametrically opposed view points
illegal

while Lillich argues use of force

is

101

On the other hand the cosmopolitans adopt a permissive interpretation of Article
They Argue

that humanitarian intervention

is

2

(4).

a customary law right that survived the United

Nations Charter although in a modified form.

460

The

positivists

counter

this

by arguing that

even though customary law allowed humanitarian intervention prior to the enactment of the
United Nation's Charter, use of force for humanitarian purposes was outlawed
incorporation of Article 2 (4) in the United Nations Charter.

in

1945 by the

461

A number of reasons explain why scholars cannot agree on the scope of prohibition
on the use of force

in the

United Nations Charter.

ambiguous; hence capable of varied interpretation.

and

What does

wording of Article 2(4)

outlaw annexation of a

state's territory

is

the terms "territorial integrity"

independence" mean? Does the prohibition of use of force against

"political

integrity only

First, the

by another or does

it

territorial

also extend to

any

violation of the frontiers of a state for any other purpose such as rescuing aliens trapped in

a civil

war or rescuing hostages taken by some

of force against the
state so that

it

political

ceases to exist as an independent state?

be a military action?

it

adopts certain

human

Does

prohibition

on

the use

independence of a state mean an action intended to annex another

against such a state intended to

Must

religious fanatics?

make

it

Does

it

also include

follow a particular policy?

Is a threat to cut military aid to

any coercive action

And what

is

use of force?

a developing country unless

rights standards or hold democratic elections

amount

it

to use of force

against political

independence of such a state? Clearly some of the scenarios outlined above

do not amout

to use of force envisioned by Article 2(4).

demarcating the

line

of force

in

lies in

between what actions amount to and what actions do not amount to use

contravention of Article 2(4).

460

Richard B.

Lillich,

Constructive Alternatives in
ed.,

However, the problem

Humanitarian Intervention: A Reply

to

Ian Brownlie and A Plea for

LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN MODERN WORLD 231-244 (Jom

1974).

^'ian Brownlie, Humanitarian Intervention

in Id. at

218- 228.

Norton Moore

102
Secondly, state practice has not been consistent and that has not helped in clarifying

what

the drafters of Article 2(4) meant. While states have over the years used force for

humanitarian purposes against other states, and have justified their actions on humanitarian
grounds, more often than not, they have adduced other grounds like self-defense and consent
462

of the legitimate authorities of the states in which they are intervening.
the grounds like consent and self-defense are valid in international law,
situations

where

it is

And

some of

since

difficulty to isolate

states intervened for purely humanitarian considerations so as to be able to

decide whether such intervention was legitimate or not.

463

Thirdly, scholars have been 'pro-intervention' or 'anti- intervention' depending
their theortical

on

and philosophical perception of international law. Professors Henkin and

Teson, perhaps the sharpest contemporary proponents of non-intervention and the right of
humanitarian intervention, respectively, best illustrate this point. Prof. Henkin
believer in the prohibition of use of force.

464

He

is

based on

all

his

of the United Nations and the normative structure of
built into the

other forms of use of force are

perception of the historical mission

its

Charter.

465

For Henkin the values

United Nations Charter form a normative hierarchy. Peace

hierarchy, other

norms

like respect for

right of self-determination

^See studies

an absolute

contends that save for the two exceptions to

the non-use of force in the United Nations Charter,

outlawed by Article 2(4). His conclusion

is

human rights, economic and

is

at the

apex of this

social development, the

and justice are of lesser importance:

of state practice in

ANTONIO Tonga. FOREIGN ARMED INTERVENTION IN

Internal Conflicts 148-195 (1995).

^Tanzania justified

its

invasion of

Uganda on both

the grounds of self-defense and

Sathyamarthy, THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS OF UGANDA: 19001986 608-57 (1986); The United states too put forward many grounds for its invasion of Grenada.
See generally John Norton Moore. Law and the Grenada Mission (1984); Scott Davidson
Grenada, A Study in Politics and the Limits of International Law (1987).
humanitarian purposes. T.V.

464

Louis Henkin, the Use of Force:

Temple Swing

ed.. 1991).

"*Id. at 38.

Law and US.

Policy in RIGHT V.

MIGHT 37-69

(John

103

The Charter reflected universal agreement that the status quo prevailing at the
end of the World War II was not to be changed by force. Even justified
grievances and sincere concern for "national security" or other "vital interest"

would not warrant any nation's initiating war. Peace was the paramount value.
The Charter and the organization were dedicated to realizing other values as
well _ self-determination, respect for human rights, economic and social
development, justice, and a just international order. But those purposes could
not justify the use of force to achieve them; they would have to be pursued by
other means. Peace was more important than progress and more important
than justice.

Prof.

466

Teson on

the other hand, argues that individuals and not states should be the

primary subjects of international law.

467

For Teson, promotion of human

value in the United Nation's normative structure.
defense of human rights.

468

In the view of Teson there

He
is

sees the

World War

and the precepts

rights.

underlies the concepts of state and

that are to protect

rights of states recognized

is

the highest

II as

a

war

in

no other way the legitimacy of states

can be justified other than the protection and enforcement of human

The human rights imperative

rights

He

writes:

government

them, most prominently Article 2(4). The

by international law are meaningful only on the

assumption that those states minimally observe individual rights. The United

Nations purpose of promoting and protecting human rights found
1(3),

and by reference

in Article

in Article 2(4) as a qualifying clause to the prohibition

of war, has a necessary primacy over the respect for state sovereignty. Force

used

in defense

of fundamental

human

rights

is

therefore not a use of force

inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

Further digression into
to be

this

controversy

is

469

unwarranted. However several points need

made. Whatever some opponents of humanitarian intervention might

say, there

«*Id.

"^Fernando R. Teson, Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry Into Law and
Morality 81 (1988).
"*Id. at 135.
469

Id. at 153.

is

.

104
general consensus

among

scholars that certain forms of humanitarian intervention are

permitted by international customary law and the United Nations Charter.
intervention have been characterized as "just,"

on goals

that

Some forms

and hence acceptable because they are "based

have received general international approval, such as anti-colonialism

determination, and the implementation of

470

human

rights."

humanitarian intervention "strictly limited to what

wide acquiescence."

471

of

is

Even

Prof.

Henkin admits

self-

that

necessary to save lives," "has brought

Mention has already been made of intervention by a

state into another

state either by consent or invitation by the 'legitimate authorities' of that state; a practice

accepted by customary international law.
After the end of the Cold

War

the bubble of non-intervention seems to have bursted.

Certain forms of intervention hitherto prohibited seems to have gained currency and
acceptability as legitimate forms of intervention. Intervention in support of
restricted to restoring a validly elected

government

to

power,

supported by both state practice and opinion of publicist.
extent that

it is

after a military

However

it is

democracy

coup

is

now

accepted only to the

carried out in a collective fashion within the auspices of the United Nations

commentator observes:

Security Council or a regional organization, as one
collective intervention

may well have crystallized

in recent state practice, as

".

.

.

the right of

recent scholarship

focusing on the crucial distinction between collective and unilateral intervention seems to
472

suggest."

470

United Nations intervention in the

civil

Gabriel Wilner, Introduction to panel 1, 13

war

in

Somalia to protect

GEORGIA J. OF INT'L & COMP.

relief agencies

L. 189,

190

(1982).

its

He even concedes that this intervention is
own nationals. Henkin supra note 463, at 41
472

not restricted to actions by a state on behalf of

Antonio F. Perez, On the Way to the Forum: the Reconstruction of Article 2(7) and the
Rise of Federalism under the United Nations Charter, 31 TEX. INT'LL.J. 353,365 (1996).

105

from the warring

factions

is

the earliest example of this post-cold

war

intervention.

43

The

Security-Council-authorized intervention to restore the democratically elected government

of president Aristide to power after a military junta took power in Haiti has been seen as
classic

is

the

example of intervention to protect democracy.

OAU-authorized intervention

Community of West

Africa States

in Sierra

(ECOMOG)

4 4
'

The

Leone by

is

no evidence

the forces of the

to reverse a

overthrow the elected government of president Kabbah.
In conclusion there

latest intervention for

military junta that

of international law barring the

Such a force once created

will serve as

a very useful instrument for resolution of conflicts that threaten regional peace.

however must exercise caution
at the slightest

intervention,
states.

476

in

Economic

475

in the present status

OAU from creating the proposed intervention force.

coup by a

democracy

The

OAU

deploying such a force; the force should not be deployed

excuse. Deployment must be done strictly within the limits of humanitarian
lest the

force

becomes a hegemonic tool

in the

hands of powerful regional

477

473

See U.N. Security Council Res. 792 supra note 404.

474

See U. N. Security Council Res. 940 supra note 407.

475

476

See subsection

C

(3) below.

A number of conditions against which to judge an intervention to determine whether

it

be a humanitarian intervention have been suggested by scholars. They include (1) human
rights violations must be egregious; (2) all peaceful means for resolving the conflict must be

qualifies to

exhausted; (3) there must be no immediate hope of relief in the absence of intervention; (4) the

must be aimed at stopping the violation of human rights; (5) the principle of
must be respected; the victims of human rights violations must welcome the
intervention; and (6) collective intervention is to be preferred to unilateral actions. These criteria
have generally gained acceptance, but the specific meaning of each criterion and factual situations
intervention

proportionality

them

a subject of debate. See Teson supra, note 466, at 1 1 1-123; Athony
The
Ofodile,
Legality ofEcowas Intervention in Liberia, 32 COLUM. J. TRANS AT'L L.
381,396(1994).
that satisfy

is still

Chukwukaa

'Nigerian dominance of the ECOWAS peace initiative in Liberia was reported to have
been the main obstacle to negotiation and cease-fire between the warring parties. Id. at 385.
'
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C. Utilization of Sub- regional Mechanisms

A

number of

factors

make

utilization of sub-regional

mechanisms

regional conflicts very convenient and politically attractive to the

budgetary constrains, sub-regional organizations
African States

like the

in the

(ECCAS) 480 being economic

it

its

OAU

decision. This

The
makes

and

Economic Community of West

Utilization of sub-regional

to avoid the possibility of alienating

way

the

OAU

is

some

states that

let conflicts

mechanisms

may

able to sustain the cohesiveness within

its

ranks that

continue devastating the continent.

seems to cause

at the

sub-regional

their

its

resolution.

48

knowledge of the

and

'The proximity of the sub-regional states to the conflict
intricacies

of the conflict makes them more effective in

initiative.

Perhaps

this explains the relative

with which sub-regional organizations have undertake conflict resolution
Examination of ECOWAS intervention

479

not agree

the neighboring states that have a stake in the resolution of the conflict ready

planning and implementing an intervention

478

OAU

and Economic Community of Central

destabilizing effect that an internal conflict

willing to invest in

locale

the

groupings, have the financial wherewithal lacking

seems to covet so much, without having to

level

479

OAU to finance a conflict resolution initiative.

also enables the

with

OAU. Given

(ECOWAS), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMES A), 478

Southern Africa Development Community (SADC),
African State

to resolve sub-

in Liberia, sanctions

success

initiatives.

on Burundi by neighboring

states

33I.L.M. 1067(1994).

32 I.L.M. 267 (1993).

"^ I.L.M. 945 (1984).
48
'it is

on record

that support for the

ECOWAS

initiative

warring parties started destabilizing neighboring countries,

For instance, Taylor's

was

NPFL "precipitated a revolt in Sierra Leone,

Joseph Momoh." Immediately several countries joined the
revolts within their borders. Ofodile infra note at 384.

at first

lukewarm but when the

ECOWAS received unqualified support.
which lead to the

ECOWAS

fall

of president

initiative to forestall similar

107
to protest the overthrowal of a democratically elected government, and the recent

authorization of

ECOWAS

in Sierra

to intervene

Leone

will

throw more

OAU

on

this

Devastated by a

civil

light

discussion.

1.

ECOWAS
Liberia

Intervention in Liberia
is

war since 1989

one of the countries

that

one

may term a

failed state.

482

pitting Charles Taylor's National patriotic Front of Liberia

(NPFL), Prince

Johnson's Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL), a break-away faction

from NPFL, and United Liberation Movement of
Doe's army, and other factions,

483

Liberia

(ULIMO),

The germs of

now Monrovia and

the Liberian conflict originated

treated

day.

486

them

set

in

1847 by former American slaves.

up a system of government

The Americo-Liberians

482

and

from the history of

that

as second-class citizens. This precipitated a

Liberian of the minority

life

institutions

Krahn

For a discussion of the

overthrow and

They

country.

settled in

chasm

COLUM.

J.

1

killed the

a native

American-descended president.

Henry

J.

Richardson,

m,

(1996).

Anthony Chukwukaa Ofodile, The Ligality

ofEOWAS Intervention

TRANSN AT'L L. 38 1 383-89 ( 1 994).
,

Netscape:

CNN Interactive,

http://www.am.c»nVWORlJ)/9604/30/hberia/background.html.

™ld.
^Ofodile supra note 476,

at 288.

what

that has never healed to this

when Samuel K. Doe

salient features of a failed state see

Democratic Expectations, 10 TEMP. INT'LL.J.

The

excluded the indigenous tribes and

ruled the Country until 1980

tribe

485

this

"Failed State," Self-determination, and Preventive Diplomacy: Colonialist Nostalgia and

483

have

484

Republic of Liberia was founded
is

Samuel

an estimated 200,000 people have been killed and half of

the countries 2.8 million people have been rendered homeless. Civic

completely broken down.

a remnant of

in Liberia,

32

_

108
William Tolbert.

487

Doe imposed martial law and ruled

constitution restored civilian rule. In January

retained

power by

Civil

way

bribing his
his rebels

war

rigging the elections.
started in 1989

with an iron

fist

until

1985 when a new

1986 the new constitution took

effect but

Doe

488

when

Charles Taylor,

who had

returned to Liberia after

out of a Massachusetts prison in the United States, invaded the country with

from the neighboring Ivory Coast. In the ensuing war, Taylor's forces managed to

occupy most of the country except Monrovia.

489

Taylor's take-over of the whole country

checked when Prince Johnston (one of his commanders) broke away to form
Johnston entered into a pact with

Doe and

started (in

Taylor's rebels from the outskirts of Monrovia.

murdered by forces

loyal to Prince Johnson.

490

his

own

In

September 1990 Doe was

and the Civil war intensified with the three factions fighting against each other.

(ECOWAS) decided to
of the Economic

deployed

intervene in order to

on August 27, 1990.

492

ULIMO

491

States

impose a cease-fire and end the war. The forces
States Monitoring

Group (ECOMOG), were

Doe, who was then trapped

in the presidential

bunker and Johnson supported the Intervention while Taylor declared war on
severally clashed with them.

brutally

Economic Community of West African

Community of West African

in Liberia

faction.

tandem with Doe's forces) to drive back

Doe's forces regrouped under the name

Shortly before the killing of Doe, the

was

ECOMOG,

and

Several stages can be identified in the ongoing peace process

in Liberia.

487

Jennifer L.Tumer. Liberian Refugees:

A

Test of the 1969

Specific Aspects of the Refugee Problems in Africa. 8

GEO. IMMIGR.

OAU Convention Governing
L.J.

281, 287 (1994).

488

/J.

m

Id. at 315.

490
Id. at

289.

A9l

Id.

Binaifer Nowrojee, Joining Forces: United Nations and Regional Peacekeeping
Lessons From Liberia, 8 HARV. Rts. J. 129, 135 (1995).

109
a.

The

Initial

Stages of

This stage

is

ECOWAS

marked by

Intervention

three initiatives by

ECOWAS:

(1)

deployment of forces to

enforce and monitor a cease-fire between the warring factions; (2) attempts to bring the
factions together to

government.

hammer out

a peace formula; and (3) setting

ECOWAS relied on Article

to intervene in the war. Article 7 of

7 of

ECOWAS

and Government (AHSG), the "supreme

its

treaty

and

its

up of an interim

Protocol on Non-aggression

treaty invests the Authority of

institution

Heads of State

of the community," with broad

supervisory powers and mandate to oversee the implementation of the objectives of the

Community.
the

493

AHSG

Although the Protocol

interpreted

it

On

Non-aggression applies only to inter-state conflicts

broadly to encompass the Liberian conflict

destabilizing effect the conflict had regionally.

Standing Mediation Committee

and the Chairman of

ECOWAS
of

all

maintained.

AHSG

established a

(SMC) comprising of two members appointed by

AHSG

the

ordered the ceasing of all military and para-military activities and surrender

ECOMOG. 496 The

SMC and ECOMOG so that law

warring factions were further ordered to

and order could be restored and cease-fire

EMOMOG was mandated with the role of assisting the SMC in supervising the

implementation of the Cease-fire.

493

Consequently, the

view of the

AHSG. 495

arms and ammunition to

cooperate with

494

in

497

Economic Community of West African

States

(ECOWAS):

Revised Treaty, Done

at

Cotonou. Benin, July 24. 1993, 35 I.L.M. 660 (1996).
494

See Protocol on Non- Aggression. Apr. 22, 1978, reprinted

West African

States: policies

and Programme Series

Economic Community of
21-22 (1981) referred in Kufuor infra note 494,
in

at 375.
495

Kofi Oteng Kufuor. Developments

U.J. INT'L L.

& POL'Y 373, 375 (1994).

496
Id. at
49

V

376.

in the

Resolution of the Liberian Conflict, 10

AM.

110

The next

step

was

for

ECOWAS

to establish an interim

oversee the countries transition to democracy.
parties, patriotic fronts, interest groups

(Nigeria).

498

The conference

A

conference of

and concerned

citizens

government

was organized

member broad-based

more than

Government. Despite
to

efforts

dominance of Nigerian forces

made

by

ECOWAS

all

(that

that Taylor

the interim president

to fail

ab

initio.

Charles Taylor's

NPFL, whose

to assuage Taylor's fears, his forces continued

had

initially

and allowed to run for the presidency during the elections;

501

win the confidence of NPFL. The

observers from International Negotiations

™Id.
499

supported Taylor) to offset the

accused of partiality. Taylor however insisted on

Several fruitless meetings were organized by the

Turner supra note 487,

at 289.

*»ld.
501

ECOWAS

the parties had agreed that the interim president should not be eligible for the

presidential elections.

try to

OAU

half of the country refused to participate in the Interim

and other French-speaking countries

although

Assembly. The

ECOMOG in battle. 500 For instance, ECOMOG incorporated troops from Senegal

engage

being

legislative

The

499

The peace plan however was doomed
forces controlled

Abuja

as the President.

support for the Interim Government, the Peace Plan and the efforts of

to bring peace in Liberia.

in

drafted a peace plan and established a broad-based Interim

conference also established a 51
its

would

the Liberian political

all

Government of National Unity (IGNU) Headed by Dr. Amos Sawyer

endorsed

that

Ofodile supra note 476, at 385.

first

SMC between NPFL and IGNU to

meeting (held

Network (INN) and

in

1991) involved neutral

states considered sympathetic

.

Ill
to

NPFL. 502 The second meeting was organized

NPFL

and

IGNU

agreed to establish a five

supervise elections, and an
elections.

503

The

third

in

member

ad hoc Supreme Court

Yamoussoukro (Cote
Elections

Commission

to settle disputes that

d'lvoire).

to organize

may

arise

meeting of the committee produced the so-called Yamoussoukro IV

IGNU. 504 The NPFL however continued

to renege

on

the peace process.

503

refused to implement the

Yamoussoukro Accord IV and launched an attack on

positions in Monrovia.

Although

process was derailed.

b.

and

from the

Accord, incorporating the decisions of the second meeting and the agreement between

and

Here

ECOMOG repelled the attack

it

was

NPFL

The NPFL

ECOMOG"s

clear that the peace

506

United Nation's Involvement

The United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 788
belief that the

Yamoussoukro IV Accord

resolution of the Liberian conflict."

a general arms

embargo

50.

The

"offers the best possible

upon

Nations Secretary-General to

503

Tumer supra

all

it

affirmed

its

for a peaceful

states to

implement

against Liberia (except for arms and equipment destined for

the parties to abide by the

^Kufuor supra

which

framework

resolution further directed

ECOMOG) and supported ECOWAS efforts to
called

in

make

bring peace in Liberia.

The Security Council

Yamoussoukro IV Accord and

directed the United

a report on the implementation of Resolution 788.

508

note 495, at 379.
note 487. at 289.

505

Kufuor supra note 495,

^U.N. SCOR. 313th

at

381

mtg,

at 1,

^U.N. SCOR. 3138th mtg, at 2-3,

U.N. Doc. S/RES/788

(1992).

U.N. Doc. S/RES/788 (1992).

LAW LIBRARY
'ERSITY

OF GFOPOIA
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The report submitted

later to the Security Council, identified the

peace process and the views of the parties involved
report, the Security

Council passed Resolution 813

the Liberian peace process and

welcomed

in

in the conflict.

which

the continued

it

main obstacles

509

On

reiterated

to the

the basis of this

its

commitment

commitment of ECOMOG

to

to the

peaceful resolution of the Liberian conflict. The resolution also hailed the support and

endorsement the

OAU

had given to the

ECOWAS

peace

initiative.

510

The

resolution also

acknowledged and acceded to the desire of the warring parties for a greater United Nations
involvement in the peace process.

c The Cotonou

511

Peace Accord and the Akosombo Agreement

The United Nations

Secretary General as mandated by the Security Council in

Resolution 813 (in conjunction with the
in

512

Geneva.

OAU)

assembled the parties to a peace conference

The Cotonou Peace Accord signed by IGNU,

ULIMO

and

NPFL

1993 was an embodiment of the proceedings of the Geneva peace conference.

Peace Accord invested the United Nations observer Mission and

member Council of State

^Cited
510

511

512

in

U.N.

Sec. U.N.

SCOR.

to exercise executive

8 1 3, 3 1 87th mtg, at

SCOR. 26th mtg.

at 1,

UN Doc.

1

.

power

at

386.

See United Nations Observer Mission Liberia:

ralph.gmu.edu/cfpa/peace/unomilJitnil.

with a joint

in the transitional period.

S/RES/8 13 (1993).

sa
Id
514

ECOWAS

U.N Doc. S/RES/8 1 3

/J.at3.

See Ofodile supra note 476,

The Cotonou

peace process. The Accord further set-up

responsibility to oversee the implementation of the

a five

513

on July 25,

http://

(1

993).

514

-
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The

Security Council subsequently adopted Resolution 856 which underlined the

importance of the Cotonou Accord in ending the Liberian war and approved an advance team
of United Nations military observers.

515

By

Resolution 866 the Security Council established

the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia

(UNOIL)

monitoring the implementation of the peace Accord.

Owing
main

to

renewed

factions, another

much

join

of

ECOWAS

its

and

ECOWAS

splinter

12, 1994.

517

Under

responsibilities to the transitional

UNOMIL

in the

in

groups from the three

agreement amending the Cotonou Peace Accord was signed

Akosombo (Ghana) on September
transfer

work with

516

and emergence of more

fighting

to

this

ECOWAS

agreement

in

agreed to

government which would henceforth

supervision and monitoring of the peace process.

Although sporadic fighting was reported between Taylor and Johnson

518

in April last year the

peace monitoring groups seems to have contained the situation and Liberia seems to be on

an irreversible road to peace, as the peaceful outcome of the recently concluded elections

show.

519

A

number of observations need

Nations Observer Mission
driven

initiative.

Initiative

is

to be

first

in

515

516

517

518

519

is

Although the United
clearly an

ECOWAS

Resolution 866 observed that the Liberian

peace-keeping mission undertaken by the United Nations

cooperation with a peace-keeping mission already
stressed that

in conclusion.

involved, the Liberian peace process

Indeed the Security Council,

was "the

made

set

in

up by another organization," but

ECOMOG had "the primary responsibility of supervising the implementation"

U.N. SCOR., 3262rd mtg, U.N. Doc. S/RES/856 (1993)
See U.N.

SCOR. 3281st mtg, U.N.

Kufuor supra note 495,

Doc. S/RES/866 (1993).

at 390.

See U.N. SCOR.3624th mtg,

at

2 U.N.Doc. S/RES/1041 (1996).

CNN Interactive: htto://www.cnn.comAVORLD/9604/30/liberia/background.html.
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of the Agreements.

was necessary
had been

520

The involvement of the United Nations and

to give the intervention credibility

criticized as infringing

on

and legitimacy.

the support of the

521

Indeed, the intervention

Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter.

Council Resolution 788 was therefore a kind of post

OAU

The Security

ipso facto authorization of the

intervention.

Further more, the
initiative

with the

ill-fated

Liberia

a big success.

is

restored

United Nations intervention

civil order,

the country

is

intervention

by a sub-regional organization

bold

first

ECOWAS

It

is

significant in a

number of ways.

It is

the

to intervene in a local conflict. Contrasted

in

Somalia, the

ECOWAS

intervention in

has been able to stem the humanitarian crisis triggered by the war,

and a peace process that

on course. This Leads credence

may lay the

foundation for sustainable peace

in

to an observation quickly gaining currency that

with the end of the cold war the primary responsibility of resolving conflicts

is

shifting to

regional and sub-regional bodies.

2.

Sub-regional Sanctions on Burundi
Following a military coup

in

Burundi by Major Pierre Buyoya

On

July 25, 1996

overthrew the legal government of Sylivestre Ntibantunganya, countries

in the

522

that

Great lakes

region decided to impose sanctions on the minority Tutsi regime that took over the reigns of

power.

523

Ntibantunganya had taken over the presidency

Ndandaye's successor, Cyprien Ntaryamira

520

521

Council

Sec. U.N.

See

SCOR.3281st mtg,

at

UN. SCOR.3187th mtg, at

commends

1

1

in

after the

death of Melchior

a suspicious plane crash over Kigali with the

U.N. Doc. S/RES/ 866 (1993).
U.N. Doc. S/RES/813 (1993)

in

which the security

ECOWAS for its efforts to bring peace in Liberia and the OAU for endorsing

ECOW AS 's Initiatives.
Pan- African news Agency, Netscape: http://egi.bin.nando.net/plweb.egi/fastwe.
523

Africa

News

Online, http ://www.africanews.org/east/burundi/l 9970506_feat2.html.
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then Rwandese president Juvenal Habyarimana on April

6,

1994.

524

The coup was

culmination of a bloody conflict that was sparked off by the assassination of the

Hutu

democratically elected

on October 21, 1993.

An

president, Melchior

Ndandaye,

in a

a

first

putsch by the Tutsi military

525

estimated 150,000 people were killed between October 1993 and the date of

Buyoya coup. 526 The ensuing

conflict pitted the extremist

Hutu _ who saw the assassination

of Ndandaye as an attempt to sabotage the democratic revolution and revert to Tutsi

domination _ against the Tutsi army and

militia

groups.

527

Other than the sub-regional sanctions both the United Nations and the
responded to the

by the

crisis.

The

OAU

have

OAU condemned the coup and supported the sanctions imposed

states in the great lakes region.

528

It

called

upon

the military junta to start dialogue with

other parties with a view to ending the conflict and reverting to democratic rule. In addition,

the

OAU

sent an observer mission to observe the peace process.

529

The United Nations

Security Council in Resolution 1012 set up an international commission of inquiry to
investigate the facts leading to the assassination of President Ndandaye, the subsequent

massacres, and to

524

Africa

recommend "measures with regard

News

to the bringing to justice of persons

Online, http://www.amcanews.org/east/burundi/19970523_featl.html.

525

For a superb account of the history of Hutu-Tulsi conflict see Gerard Prunier-Writenet,
Burundi: Descent to Chaos or a Management Crisis?, (1995):
http://www.unhCT.ch/refworld/country/writenet/wribdi01.htm; and for

some background information

about the Hutu and Tulsi see Neil Weiner, Hutu an Tulsi of Rwanda and Burundu:
http://www.backgroundbriefmg.com/hutututs.html.
52

Netscape: http://egi.bin.nando.net/plweb.egi/fastwe.

527

528

Burundu Breaking

the Cycle of Violence infra note.

See Sec. Council Res. 1040, 3623rd mtg, on 29th January 1996, U.N.Doc. S/RES/1040

(1996).

Netscape: Pan- African News Agency,

http:egi.bi.nando.net/plweb.egifastwe.
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responsible for these acts."

Burundi Although reports

530

The United Nation

indicate that the

also set

up a military observer mission

commission of inquiry submitted

its

in

report to the

Security Council available information indicate that no action has been taken in relation to the
531

report so

far.

The

sanctions by the Great lakes states are significant in a

they are unprecedented.

nor

political history;

unique

in that

sanctions

it is

on the

the

The Buyoya

military

military

coup was not the

coup

in the region.

number of respects.

first in
532

First,

the countries bloody

However, the coup was

is it

the

first

coup against a democratically elected government. By slapping

first

military regime the regional states indicated that attempts to reverse trends

towards democracy

in the

region will no longer be tolerated.

And by

the

OAU and the United

Nations Security Council acquiescing to the sanctions, they lent a cloak of legitimacy to

and any future sub-regional

intervention.

533

this

The sanctions may not have succeeded

in

reversing the coup but they have achieved the objective of forcing the Buyoya junta into

peace

talks with the ousted

political situation that

530

is

government and other stackholders

Burundi.

532

and complex

534

Sec. Council Res. 101 2 3571st mtg, on 28 August, 1993,

53l

in the fluid

UN Doc.

S/RES/1012 (1995).

See Africa News online, http://www.africanews.org/east/burundi/19970523_featl.html.

in Uganda and Rwanda. The history of Burundi has been
by hatred and bloody conflicts between these two ethnic groups. Records indicate that
since gaining independence from Belgium in 1962, Burundi has witnessed a number of massacres of
the Hutu by the Tulsi dominated military. For instance in April 1972 Micombero, a Tutsi military

There have been several coups

characterized

ruler

massacred an estimated 200,000 Hutus and eliminated

suppress Hutu unrest. Col. Bagaza

1984-87 military

rule.

dominated military,

August 1988

is

Buyoya

is

all

Hutus from the armed forces, to

also reported to have killed thousands of Hutus during his

the incumbent Burundi

strongman recycled back to power by the Tutsi

reported to have butchered 20,000 people in operations to restore order in

after eruptions of violence.

See Burundi: Breaking the Cycle of Violence,

http://www.nsws.com/mrg/burundi.html.
,33

OAU"
Sess.

In this resolution the Security Council "expresses strong support for the efforts of the

and other organizations and individuals

facilitating the

peace process. U.N.

SCOR. 3639th

U.N.Doc. S/RES/1049 (19%).
534

See Netscape, Pan- African News agency, http:egi.bin.nando.net/plweb.egi/fastwe.
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3.

Suppressing a

On May

Coup

in Sierra

Leone

25, 1997 Maj. Paul

elected president of Sierra Leone,

Ahmed

third military take-over in five years.

would mark
Leone

536
It

Tejan Kabbah

Sankoh.

538

53,

an estimated 10,000

lives.

coup coincided with the 33rd

ill-timed

in

in

Harare (Zimbabwe).

(ECOWAS)

540

tougher every time.

I

rebels of

Foday

OAU summit of the Heads of State and

In an unprecedented

mum

and

to use force and any other

President

535

election 14-months earlier

1991, leading to a conflict that claimed

at best

move, the

means

Mugabe of Zimbabwe was

OAU departed from

condemning coups and endorsed
541

State and Government unanimously mandated the Economic

OAU

This was the

and signing a peace treaty to end

military as well as diplomatic measures to reverse the coup.

the

535

539

past practice of at worst keeping

States

coup.

war with the rural-based Revolutionary United Front (RUF)

Government

democratically

first

After winning the elections president

international respect for quickly negotiating

RUF took arms against the government

The

in a military

was hoped Kabbah's

since the beginning of British colonial rule.

a five year

the

the end of a century of brutal authoritarianism that had characterized Sierra

Kabbah earned

its

Koroma Ousted from power

The Assembly of Heads of

Community of West African

to reverse the coup.

categorical:

can assure you for the future coups

it

will

"We
be

The Chairman of

are getting tougher and

much

tougher..

.We want

CNN Interactive World News: http://cnn.conVWORLD/9706/03/sierra.leone/index.html.

536
'Id.

537

The Washington Post: http://search.washingtonpost.com/w...ch/1979-05/26/084F-

052697-idx.html.
538

53

Africa news Online: http://www.africanews.org/west/sien-aleone/19970606_feat2.html.

V

540

Pan- African

News Agency,

http://egi.bin.nando.net/plweb.egi/fastwe.

Reuters, http://www.yahoo.conVheadlmes/speciaVsierraleone/sierraleone. 1 .html.
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to (ensure) that conflict

we

attend to the situation

decision: "If

it

avoided, democracy

is

542
.

.

becomes the

Z'

last resort,

the ruling military junta will succeed

By endorsing
watershed
affairs

spell

ECOWAS

the

not reversed and, where

we

initiative,

is

to

end the

peacefully between

crisis

a matter of conjecture at this stage.

however, the

intervention to resolve the Sierra

in its regional conflict resolution role.

Leone

conflict, the

OAU

ECOWAS

544

OAU

543

and

Whatever the

has reached a

The ghost of non-interference

in internal

OAU normative structure and has cast its
OAU,

is

slowly but surely getting

A respected African weekly news magazine commenting on the
this

the

OAU decision is clearly unprecedented.

over intra-state conflicts since the creation of the

summed up

reversed, that

are prepared to support a military solution."

of member states that forms the core of the

buried.

it is

The United Nations Secretary-General supported

Whether the ongoing negotiations

outcome of

is

Sierra

Leone coup,

evolution thus:

At Harare, the

OAU heads of state joined the rest of the international community in

unanimously condemning Sierra Leone's military take-over. But unlike in the past,
where the OAU stopped at mere condemnation, it called for the reinstatement of the
civilian government of president Kabbah by all means possible, including force if need
be.
its

The question is whether we are seeing a determination by the OAU to adjust
Charter to the new challenges of peace keeping and security which many domestic
.

.

civil clashes

states, are

This

is

previously considered by the

now

an important paradigmatic

framework. Intervention

M2

OAU

to be the internal affairs of

member

posing.

shift in the

in internal conflicts hitherto

OAU conflict resolution and security
considered anathema due to the

norm

CNN Interactive,

htrp://www.am.cx>DVWORIJ)/9706/()4/zimbabwe.new.amca/index.html.

^Pan- African News Agency,
http://www.africanews.org/westsieiTaleone/19970613_feat4.html.
544

AfricaNews Online, http://www.amcanews.org/west/sierraleone/19970613_feat3.html.

^^e Weekly Review June 13, 1997,
http://www.amraonlme.OT.ke/amc.. .stand/weekly
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of non-interference in internal

way of settling

legitimate

affairs

of

member

regional conflicts. This

seems to be gaining currency as

states,

is

as

it

should be since, as argued before,

humanitarian intervention at least at the collective level as opposed to unilateral intervention

has crystalized into an accepted

democracy and

intervention to defend

simply abandoning an archaic

However
internal conflicts

the

norm of

norm

international law.

The

OAU

by engaging

cancer of military dictatorships in Africa

nullify the

in

is

already discredited at the United Nations level.

new-found willingness on the part of the

OAU to deal with the so-called

through intervention must be exercised with pragmatic caution. Intervention

should not be used to subvert social change.

546

Armed

struggle or revolution

legitimate

way of removing an unwanted regime from power. An

a process

would be

self-defeating and therefore unacceptable.

still

remain a

intervention that stifles such

A critical line must therefore

be drawn between totalitarian and dictatorial regimes on the one hand and popularly elected

governments

in

later that the

a free and

OAU

fair

election

on the other hand.

It is

only on the overthrowal of the

has business in intervening to prevent the gun-totting warlords in

revolutionary straight-jackets like those currently in Sierra Leone from suppressing the

peoples

will.

On

the

whole

it is

evident from the foregoing that, in a comparative sense, sub-

regional initiatives have been successful in resolving localized conflicts.

a healthy partnership

is

evolving between the

OAU

It

also appears that

and sub-regional bodies.

In this

partnership the broad decisions of what nature of action or measures to be taken in resolving

a localized conflicts

is

taken

implementing the decision are

at the

left

OAU

The modalities and

technical details of

to the sub-regional bodies. In the case of Sierra

decision to intervene and reverse the coup

mandated to implement the

level.

decision. This

was made by

the

OAU

while

Leone

ECOWAS

way, when major policy decisions are made

^^W. Friedmann, The Changing Structure of Internal Law 267

(1964).

the

was

at the

120
continental level, the danger of dominant

powers

in a sub-regional level

scene by influencing the decisions of a sub-regional body
that

hegemonic dominance of Nigeria permeates the

is

dominating the local

greatly reduced.

ECOWAS

peace

doggedly cast a shadow over the peace process could have been avoided
in Liberia

had followed

this pattern.

The accusation

initiative that

if

has

the intervention

CONCLUSION

This thesis has explored the role of the

OAU in regional conflict resolution and dispute

settlement. In the introduction a glimpse into the historical origins as well as the normative

and

institutional structure

Created

at a

period

of the

when

OAU was undertaken. The OAU was seen as a slave of time.

nationalism and sovereign integrity of states were the foremost

concepts in international relations _ especially so to African states which were emerging from

The

colonial subjugation.

OAU

thus assimilated and entrenched these concepts into

architectural foundation. Until recently the

unresponsive to the changing times.
Sierra

Leone has been viewed

Its

OAU remained a highly conservative institution

unprecedented attempt to

as an attempt

human rights

affected state. This apparent behavioral change

The

thesis

went

OAU now

seems to be prepared to no

The

as internal matters to be addressed only

may however

not last long;

performance

of

the

intra-state

OAU.

it

it is

by the

faces the danger

not accompanied

a

in resolving intra- state conflicts

was found

compartmentalization of conflicts

is

interdependent
simplistic

and

121

and

closely

unrealistic.

was

OAU Charter creates

conflicts; placing intra-state conflicts

so

OAU

to be wanting. This

and theoretically untenable dichotomy the

world

examine the

OAU has been effective in resolving inter-state

Although the

and inter-state

In

OAU if

further to characterize conflicts in Africa and to

attributed to the practically

between

in

OAU Charter to incorporate the new paradigms.

conflict resolution initiatives.
conflict its

coup

OAU to come to terms with

of being undermined by the ultra-conservative forces within the

by an overhaul of the

nullify the military

on the part of the

the changing realities of inter-state relations.
longer treat internal conflicts and

its

beyond the purview

linked

together,

such

Purely internal or international

122
conflicts
conflicts

do not

exist. Inter-state conflicts

have international repercussions

have internal causes while the so-called internal
outflow of refugees and armed insurgencies

(like

into neighboring states) that cannot be ignored

The

between the

relationship

by the affected

states.

OAU as a regional organization and the Premier global
was

organization, the United Nations, in the arena of regional conflict resolution

also

examined. The Charters of both organizations invest them with the competence to deal with
regional conflicts. At the theoretical level, the involvement of both institutions in resolving
African regional conflicts therefore poses the problem of delimiting the jurisdictional frontier

of each

institution. In practice

reinforcing. Nonetheless,

it

however

the involvement of both institutions has

was demonstrated

that, for historical

been mutually

and constitutional reasons

the executive and judicial organs of the United Nations (the Security Council and the
International Court of Justice, respectively) have not been popular with the African states as

forums for resolution of African disputes, alternative to the
affairs

however seems

Justice

and

is

bound

to

to have gradually

change

changed

OAU mechanisms.

This state of

in relation to the International

in relation to the Security

Council

if

Court of

the ongoing reforms are

not scuttled.

Impediments

to effective conflict resolution

on the part of the

OAU

were

also

explored. These impediments were found to be both Charter based and non-charter based.
the institutional level an

asymmetry of power between the Assembly of Heads of States and

Government and other organs of the
juridical

power of

the

OAU is inbuilt into the Charter.

Assembly was found

overwhelmed and emasculated

the

other

The juridical and

to be so complete

organs.

Specific

extra-

and pervasive that

suggestion

unsatisfactory state of affairs could be rectified were offered, chief

empowerment of

At

on how

among them

it

this

being the

the office of the Secretary-General and the creation of a Judicial and

enforcement organ within the

OAU institutional framework.

In the end a security framework for Africa within the existing international legal order

123

was proposed. In

framework sub-regional organizations were seen

this

fundamental component.

was

bodies

identified.

An

There

partnership in order to give

were

it

evolving partnership between the
is

however a need

juridical anchorage.

and

OAU and these sub-regional

to develop a legal

Reformed

as a necessary

framework

institutions

to

govern

this

of the United Nations

also allocated a critical role in this security arrangement.

The underlying

was

hypothesis throughout

that a holistic appreciation of the role the

OAU has played in addressing the chronic problem of conflict in Africa _ perhaps the most
critical challenge

of our time _

is

a prerequisite to offering solutions. In this quest, several

OAU has

fundamental questions and answers were apparent. The question whether the
effective in resolving regional conflicts

was answered

conflicts in Africa testify to this fact.
ineffective

was located

in

of the

it

member

must be concluded

states.

new

restructuring and revitalizing

its

rights

ones.

The

OAU

in

wiping out the scourge

This calls for political will on

institutions to

dressing exercise will not suffice.

cope with the

vital role

Most Importantly,
rights a

a

of resolving conflicts.

new and

revitalized

is

no other

initiative.

After

ethical justification for the existence of

the state itself _ other than the welfare of humankind;

which

OAU

fundamental norm incorporated
all

protection of

a matter of course in international relations today. In any case, after

done, there

has been

must be empowered and rejuvenated by

Charter and central to any conflict resolution
is

OAU

that nothing short of an overhaul of the Charter

must make the promotion and protection of human
its

the

Archaic norms that have done a lot of disservice to the African

region must be replaced by

Any window

why

debilitating

which was a major source of conflicts.

OAU will cure the anomalies afflicting the organization.

the part of the

into

to the question

with playing a leading role

(at least in its classical form),

On the whole

The ongoing

both the historical underpinnings and the normative structure of the

OAU. The OAU was however credited
of colonialism

The Answer

in the negative.

been

any

boils

protection of human rights in the broadest meaning of the term.

institution

down

to the

all is

human

said

and

_ indeed even

promotion and
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